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I African health challenges and the Ugandan 
Success 
1.1  Introduction and focus of the thesis 
The challenge of AIDS is a metaphor for the challenges of the 21st century in a world 
of high interdependence - a challenge, which threatens our humanity and security 
(Clinton: 5/ 11/031). 
Terrorism is currently considered to be the greatest threat to development and 
international security. At the same time, millions have died worldwide by HIV/AIDS 
in the past decade. While initially being regarded first and foremost as a health issue, 
the pandemic is increasingly threatening living standards for the individual, growth 
and development for the countries concerned and stability and security for the world at 
large. According to statistics from UNAIDS (2003) an estimated number of 40 million 
people are infected with the HIV virus worldwide. 95 percent of those infected live in 
developing countries with insufficient health systems and few resources for prevention 
and care (Harboe 2000). The African continent is most heavily affected by the 
pandemic, reinforcing problems of poverty and low growth in many countries. In sub- 
Saharan Africa around 25-28.2 million people are infected with the HIV virus, and the 
disease is considered to be the most frequent cause of death (UNAIDS 2002; 2003). 
With medical solutions and answers still awaiting, improved knowledge about health 
and government programmes to ease the burdens is critical.  
Uganda is the country most often regarded to be “a success story” in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS, having managed to turn the trend and reduce a high number of infected. 
The first estimates in 1990 suggested that Uganda was one of the countries most 
heavily affected by the disease with 14 percent of the adult population (19 to 49 years 
old) infected with the HIV-virus (UNAIDS 2000). By 2002 the prevalence rate had 
fallen to around 5 percent (UNDP 2003: 260).2 While there are several reasons to 
                                                 
1 th From the seminar: “Meetings the Challenges of HIV/AIDS in an interdependent World”, 5  November, 2003, University of Oslo. 
2 “By 1992, HIV prevalence rates in women receiving antenatal services had climbed to 30 percent in urban areas and 3 percent 
in rural” (Okware et al. 2001). However, in 1993, the first positive signs emerged with declining HIV prevalence rates at six large 
surveillance sites in Kampala and other urban areas (Kaleeba et al. 2000).  
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regard AIDS statistics with caution (see 1.4), the decrease in prevalence trend is clear3 
and an apparent fall in incidence rate (reflected by the prevalence rate among 15-24 
year olds) increases the probability of real changes4. Uganda has managed, where 
other neighbouring countries struggle an uphill battle. Uganda's success in reducing 
the number of newly infected comes in spite of major poverty problems, socio-
economic challenges and limited resources compared to many other countries on the 
African continent. So what may explain Uganda’s success? The focus of this master 
thesis is on health and public policies in developing countries with specific attention to 
the politics of combating HIV/AIDS. 
Classic theories of public policy implementation have focussed on the importance of 
the public sector, centralisation and the role of the state. Others have argued for more 
decentralised programmes, and the involvement of civil society actors. Yet, these 
theoretical perspectives have in common that they have been born and bred in Western 
settings. How adaptable or relevant are they to non-Western settings? To what extent 
can they explain the apparent success of public policies in Uganda?  We will look at 
the following questions in order to understand the progress in the fight against 
HIV/AIDS in Uganda:  
• What characterises the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes? 
• How can we explain the relative success of Uganda in fighting HIV/AIDS? 
• To what extent do existing Western implementation theories need to be 
supplemented in order to grasp the challenges of health and service delivery in 
developing countries? 
The reason for the reduction in number of infected with HIV in Uganda is most 
probably a change in people’s sexual behaviour, as this is the most common way to 
attract the disease.  The efforts made by the government to reduce the impact of the 
epidemic is assumed to have influenced people’s sexual behaviour and on reducing the 
number of people infected with the HIV/AIDS virus. Hence, we will first and foremost 
                                                 
3 The number of newly infected (15-19 years old) has decreased most drastically from 21 percent in 1993 to 7.1 percent in year 
2000 (STD/AIDS Control programme 2001: 05). In the capital of Kampala the share of HIV-contaminated has fallen from around 
29.4 percent in 1992 to around 8.3 percent in 2002 (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2003: 12). 
4 See section 1.4-p.19 for more information on “incidence vs. prevalence rates”. 
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look at the preventive policies and measures put in place by the Ugandan government 
and their partners in order to reduce the spread of the epidemic rather than the policies 
and programmes put in place to help those already affected. The overall aim of the 
thesis is to contribute to political knowledge and theory building on public policy 
implementation in developing countries, and more specifically to a better 
understanding of health programmes and HIV/AIDS programmes. 
1.2  Uganda and HIV/AIDS in a regional perspective 
The World Bank emphasises structural conditions such as education and income 
growth to be important factors in deciding the country’s health: “Since overall 
economic growth- particularly poverty-reducing growth- and education are central to 
good health, governments need to pursue sound macroeconomic policies that 
emphasize reduction of poverty” (WB 1993: 06). These structural conditions will be 
important for influencing people’s behaviour and for improvements of their health.  
Compared to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Uganda scores relatively low on 
central social and economic indicators5. Uganda is among the poorest countries in the 
world, ranging as number 147 of the 175 countries on the Human Development Index 
(HDI) with a GDP per capita (PPP $) of 1490. Nevertheless, other countries have a 
much higher percentage of their population infected with the HIV virus compared to 
Uganda. Uganda has an HIV prevalence rate of 5 percent, and as such is the country 
with the lowest percentage of their adult population infected followed by Tanzania 
(7.8 percent). Countries like South Africa and Namibia, ranked as number 111 and 124 
on the human development indicator list (HDI), have a considerably higher HIV-
prevalence rate than Uganda. South Africa has the fastest growing epidemic with 
about 20 percent, i.e. 4, 7 million, of the adult population infected. In Zimbabwe an 
estimated percentage of approximately 34 percent of the adult population is infected, 
in Swaziland about 33 percent, Lesotho 31 percent, Namibia 23 percent, Zambia 22 
percent, Kenya 15 percent, Malawi 15 percent and Mozambique 13 percent. 
Surprisingly, a country like Botswana, which has a GDP almost seven times higher 
than Uganda, has a prevalence rate as high as 38.8 percent. 
                                                 
5 See table 1, page 4. 
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All of the countries represented in the table have a higher level of literacy than Uganda 
except for Mozambique. Thus, one could expect the people’s ability to acquire 
information about the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda to be lower. According to the 
WB; “People who have had more schooling seek and utilize health information more 
effectively than those with little or no schooling” (WB 1993: 08). Simultaneously a 
life expectancy in Uganda of 44, 7 years is somewhat higher than most other Southern 
African countries represented in the table (besides South Africa, Namibia and 
Botswana and Kenya). Hence, although social and economic indicators have improved 
in Uganda since the mid 80s6, factors such as economic growth and literacy cannot in 
themselves explain the relatively low percentage of the Ugandan population infected 
with HIV. 
Table 1 Social and Economic indicators in Uganda and selected Southern African 
countries (UNDP 2003) 
 
 
 
Country 
 
 
 
HDI 
 
 
HDI 
Rank 
Real GDP  
Per capita 
(PPP US$) 
2001 
Real GDP per 
capita (PPP USD) 
minus  
HDI rank7
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
Adult 
Literacy 
Rate 
2000 
Percent 
People 
Living 
w/HIV/AIDS 
(15-49 yrs.) 
Percent 
 
South Africa 
 
0,684 
 
111 
 
11,290 
 
- 64 
 
50,9 
 
85,6 
 
20,1 
Namibia 0,627 124   6,431 - 59 47,4 82,7 22,5 
Botswana 0,614 125   7,820 - 65 44,7 78,2 38,8 
Swaziland 0,547 133   4,330 - 34 38,2 80,3 33,4 
Lesotho 0,551 137   2,420 - 13 38,6 83,9 31,0 
Zimbabwe 0,496 145   2,280 - 18 35,4 89,4 33,7 
Kenya 0,489 146      980    14 46,4 83,3 15,0 
Uganda 
 
0,489 
 
147 
 
1,490 
    
    1 
 
44,7 
 
68 
  
5,0 
Tanzania 0,400 151    520    14 44,0 76,0  7,8 
Malawi 0,387 162    570    11 38,5 78,4 15,0 
Zambia 0,386 163    780      7 33,4 79,0 21,5 
Mozambique 0,356 170 1,140  - 15 39,2 45,0 13,0 
Uganda’s political history 
As several theories address the need for political commitment and decentralisation in 
order to succeed in implementation of public programmes, it is essential to look into 
                                                 
6 In 1990, Uganda had a HDI of 0.194, a GDP of 524 (dollars), an adult literacy rate of 48.3 percent of the population and a life 
expectancy of 52 years (UNDP 1993) 
7 A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP USD) rank, a negative the opposite 
(UNDP 2003). 
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the political history of Uganda. The country’s political background is not a favourable 
one in comparison to other countries in the region. At the time of independence 
Uganda was a prosperous country rich on natural resources, a well developed 
infrastructure and a favourable climate (Mugaju 1996: 06). However, for twenty years 
Uganda has suffered devastating consequences of seven different regimes, with no 
limit to their exercise of power, ignored the rule of law and left people powerless 
without a sense of personal security (Hyden 1998).  Several dictators have fought wars 
and led genocides, leaving the country in economic ruins. The terror regimes of Obote 
and Amin ruined the country’s resources, infrastructure and people’s lives. Thus, at the 
time when Museveni became the president of Uganda in January 1986 “Uganda itself 
was a country with one of the greatest single resources of political instability, social 
dislocation and economic disruption in the Great Lakes region of sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Twaddle/Hansen 1998). 
Today the political system in Uganda is not a multi-party democracy as some of the 
other Southern African countries, but rather a zero-party system. The constitution of 
1995 requires suspension of all political parties under the regime of the National 
Resistance Movement (NRM). NRM is according to Museveni an organisation and not 
a party representing all Ugandans, under the President’s authority (Human Rights 
Watch 1999). Museveni announced the importance of political stability when he seized 
power in 1986 as a former guerrilla leader fighting the previous regime. He promised 
that a no-party system would only be a “system of transition” until economic stability 
and establishment of a middle class would lead to a multiparty democratic system 
(Human Rights Watch 1999). Today, President Museveni is honoured for having 
brought great changes to the country: economic growth, peace and democratic 
transitions. Uganda has followed a liberalisation of the economy according to the 
World Bank’s policy, and is often referred to as a success story also in the economic 
area as well as in the fighting of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In practice however, the 
system is often criticised for lack of democracy and for resembling a one-party system. 
According to Mamdani (Human Rights Watch 1999) the only difference between a 
one party state and the Ugandan Movement System is that they call themselves a 
political system and not a party, even though they are organized as one. 
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Another important characteristic of the political system in Uganda is the election of 
representatives to five different levels of government (Councils), a system intended to 
introduce democracy to people. The decentralization policy in Uganda is based on a 
hierarchy of councils and committees including the village (LCI), parish (LC II), 
subcounty (LC II), county (LC IV) and district level (LC V). These political structures 
were legalised by the 1993 Resistance Council Statute, which was in turn enshrined in 
the Uganda Constitution of 1995, with amendments made the Local Government Act, 
1997 (Makerere Institute for Social Research, 2000: 02 in Golola: 2001). Despite 
intentions of introducing democracy, the NRM is criticised for controlling the Local 
Councils and the NGOs and to ensure own power.  According to Mamdani the Local 
Councils are partisan and the higher up in the bodies, the less democratic they appear 
(Human Rights Watch 1999). Today Uganda is also known for its corrupted regime 
and for having a large record of human rights abuses (Ofcansky 1996: 59).  
History, impact and progress of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda  
The first cases of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda were reported in the Rakai 
district in 1982 (Okware et al. 2001). Currently about 5 percent of the adult population 
is infected with the virus (UNAIDS 2003). In urban areas there is a higher HIV 
prevalence than in rural (6.1 vs. 4.2 percent) and more women than men are infected 
with the HIV virus (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2001).  In Uganda the HIV virus 
is in 75 to 80 percent of new cases transmitted through hetero-sexual intercourse while 
spread of the virus from mother to child is the second most important source of 
contamination (around 25 percent) (STD/AIDS Control Programme 1997). “The 
HIV/AIDS epidemic has had far reaching consequences for individuals, families, 
communities and the country as a whole” (UAC 2000: 13). The epidemic was in 2001 
assumed to have taken the lives of 838,000 Ugandans (STD/AIDS Control Programme 
2001: 14). The epidemic has affected an already overstretched health sector- as the 
demand for palliative care is large and the access is limited (Ibid, p.15). The extended 
family structure of Uganda has been challenged by HIV/AIDS as the most productive 
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age groups pass away, and the old are left to take care of the many orphans (Lyons 
1998)8.  
In addition to the decline in prevalence rates, various studies report of high levels of 
awareness about HIV/AIDS among Ugandans. In the 1995 Uganda Demographic and 
Health Survey (p.147), 92 percent of women and 96 percent of men reported knowing 
about AIDS. In the following survey (2000-2001) this percentage had increased to 
99.7 of women and 100 percent of men9. However, knowledge of ways to avoid 
contracting the virus is lower: 78 percent of women and 90 percent of men (Uganda 
Demographic and Health Survey 1995: 158). Level of education is positively 
associated with the level of knowledge of ways of avoiding HIV/AIDS and the level of 
awareness is higher among people in their twenties and thirties (Ibid). Several 
researchers assert a change in sexual behaviour in addition to increase in awareness 
and decline in prevalence rates. A study conducted by the Ugandan AIDS Control 
Program (ACP) was published in the international journal AIDS in 1997. This report 
compared sexual behaviour between 1989 and 1995 in two major urban districts 
(Kaleeba et al. 2000: 5). The study revealed behavioural changes among the young 
Ugandan population consistent of factors like: a two year delay in first sexual 
intercourse among youths aged 15-24, real increases in condom use and 9 percent 
decrease in casual sex among male youths 15-24 (Asuumwe-Okiror et al. 1997). 
Simultaneously, in the same area under the same period, there was an overall decline 
in the rates of HIV seroprevalence among pregnant women attending antenatal clinics 
(Ibid). “It can be hypothesized that the observed declining trends in HIV correspond to 
a change in sexual behaviour and condom use, especially among youths” (Ibid).10
Later studies confirm the progress in fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda also in rural areas. 
The first general population study was published in year 2000 covering a seven year 
period in a rural area of Masaka. This was “the first study of this kind showing overall 
long term significant reduction in HIV prevalence and parallel evidence of sexual 
                                                 
8 In the year 2001 alone, 880 000 children became orphaned by AIDS (UNAIDS 2002).  
9 However, knowledge of AIDS does not necessarily mean that people act according to their knowledge, thus we have to also 
look at if they have actually changed their sexual behaviours. One should be careful to analyse these results due to the 
insecurity on surveys on knowledge and attitudes in developing countries. 
 For further discussion on the progress of Uganda, see section 1.5. 10
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behavioural change” (Kamali et al. 2000). According to Rwomushana (1999) evidence 
of decrease in new infections is clearest among the youth and is associated with delay 
of sex till marriage. A population based KABP survey from four rural districts also 
shows an almost universal level of awareness as well as an increase in age at sexual 
debut of 16 years and an increase in condom-use especially with non-regular partners 
(STD/AIDS Control Programme 2001). However, the observed changes in sexual 
behaviours in this survey do not match the high level of awareness among Ugandans 
(Ibid). A study conducted in 2000 by Ntozi et al. from three different districts in 
Uganda also confirms an almost universal knowledge and a positive relationship 
between awareness and changes in sexual behaviour (Ntozi et al. 2000). In this study 
(…) “more than one third of the respondents used condoms, six times more than 
observed in the 1996 Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (Ibid)11. The last 
surveillance report reveals that 38 percent of women and 59 percent of men reported 
using a condom last time they had sex with a non-cohabiting partner, figures 
increasing with their level of education (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2003: 34). 
1.3 Focus, theoretical approach and questions to be addressed 
Researchers point to the fact that the government of Uganda has shown an early 
political will and initiative to combat the disease of HIV/AIDS in the country. 
“Uganda’s was the first government on the continent to recognize the danger of HIV to 
national development” (UNAIDS 2000). Museveni has been acknowledged by the UN 
for his personal fight against the disease. There might however be other explanations 
on the reduction of the disease acting in relation to or outside of the government’s 
HIV/AIDS politics. With reference mostly to theory on public administration and 
implementation of development and health programmes this thesis will look closely on 
the necessary factors for succeeding in implementing HIV/AIDS prevention 
campaigns. 
This study will look closer at the initiation and implementation of various HIV/AIDS 
programmes in Uganda. The intention is not to measure the effect of the different 
                                                 
11 Also according to a UNAIDS study (1998) there was an increase in condom use between 1987 and 1996 from 3 percent to 25 
percent. 
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programmes, but to examine the general response to the epidemic, and to look at the 
cooperation between the various actors initiating and implementing the programmes. 
By exploring the interplay between different actors in the process of combating the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, the thesis will seek to explain the positive changes observed in 
Uganda when it comes to high level of awareness of the disease, changes in sexual 
behaviour and reduction of the HIV-prevalence rate. The study will look into a 
selection of factors to examine how they have contributed to the relative success in 
Uganda. Hence, the dissertation will not attempt to find the whole solution to the 
successful HIV/AIDS programs, but will seek to understand some of the dynamics 
having contributed to the positive developments in Uganda. In order to examine the 
factors, which can contribute to explain the relative success of the HIV/AIDS 
programmes in Uganda, we have to look thoroughly into theoretical approaches from 
different areas in political science. Thereby we will select some of these factors that 
we wish to examine.  
Theoretical perspectives  
The classic implementation theories in public policy and administration have not been 
extensively employed in developing countries, and especially in seeking to understand 
programmes directed towards reducing HIV-prevalence. Yet, the “bottom-up” and the 
“top-down” approaches distinguish themselves in their emphasis on different actors, as 
well as in their different points of departure. The “top-down” or “decision-oriented” 
approach represented by Pressman/ Wildavsky, Mazmanian/ Sabatier and Van Meter/ 
Van Horn starts off from a policy made decision and examines if the implementers 
have followed their goals and decisions. If this is the case, the programmes have a 
higher possibility of being successful (Kaufman: Chpt.10, in Sabatier 1986a). 
Adherents of this approach emphasise the formal decision-makers (politicians at 
central level), the central bureaucrats as the most important actors and point to their 
degree of control over the “lower-level”-as essential for successful programs. This 
“top-down” approach finds control and a centralised, bureaucratic and formal 
implementation process as an advantage. Adherents prefer centralisation over 
decentralisation in order to assure enough control over the implementation process. 
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They claim decentralised programmes will have a small impact on their target groups 
(Van Meter/ Van Horn 1975).  
On the other hand, the “bottom-up” or “process-oriented” approach looks into the 
informal networks and control mechanisms and supports a more decentralised 
implementation of programmes. The “bottom-up” approach focuses on the networks 
being created and the actors’ goals, strategies, activities and contacts (Banik/ 
Kjellberg: 2000: 153).  Adherents of this approach like Elmore, McLaughlin and 
Porter/ Hjern look into the policy problem, rather than the policy decision and focus on 
the importance of “street-level bureaucrats” (Banik/Kjellberg 2000: 153). These 
informal actors like private organisations are emotionally and geographically closer to 
people, thus having a better opportunity than the bureaucratic, formal actors to 
influence their behaviours. The “bottom-up approach” supports a decentralised system 
of governance as decisions are brought closer to people, leading to a higher possibility 
of a successful outcome (Ibid). 
Other theoretical contributions have looked more at the implementation of specific 
development programmes in developing countries. Researchers are stressing the 
necessity of political will, support and commitment in order for programmes to have 
successful outcomes. In addition these researchers put greater emphasis on the need 
for mobilisation of resources compared to classic implementation theories. They see 
political commitment and resources as two highly interrelated factors. For instance 
Rondinelli/Montgommery (1991) emphasise political support to be essential in order 
to mobilise resources for programmes in developing countries. Another important 
factor stressed by development theories is the involvement of the private sector. Thus, 
Turner and Hulme perceive inclusion of private organisations as a way to reduce the 
pressure on the public sector in delivery of services, attracting more resources to the 
programmes (Turner/Hulme 1997: 88). They claim decentralisation is positive if it 
leads to more involvement of civil society and brings decisions closer to people 
(Materu et al. 2000; Turner/ Hulme: 1997: 114). Grindle and Cleaves (1980) (….) 
stress the importance of looking into the context- the type of political regimes in which 
programmes are being implemented. Thus, whether or not e.g. political and 
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bureaucratic support is efficient depends on the kind of political system in the country. 
They claim real political support to a programme is more often the case in open 
democratic societies. Involvement of civil society is a positive factor if the interest 
groups are representing people and not protecting the existing regime. They also find 
regimes like open democracies to be more pluralistic, i.e. involving autonomous 
private organisations in their programmes (Cleaves 1980). Development theorists 
claim that even though the private sector could play an important role, the bureaucrats 
should be supportive of the programmes and responsive to people’s needs (Grindle 
1980; Rondinelli/ Montgommery 1991).  
Several reports published by the World Bank focus on the implementation of health 
programmes and how to improve people’s health both in Africa and in general (WB 
1993; 1994). The WB considers political leadership: political will and political 
commitment as a precondition for successful health programmes to be initiated and 
carried out. The Bank claims real political commitment will lead to more financial 
resources from donors and thereby enhance the possibility of success (WB 1994: 155). 
Support by government officials will also be an important trait to secure resources 
(WB 1993: 128). However, the WB considers civil society to be more efficient actors 
than the government and its officials12 as their involvement will improve efficiency of 
health programmes (WB 1994: 09). The Bank supports decentralisation, and by 
involving civil society at local level and thus building capacities, health programmes 
are more responsive to local needs (WB 1993: 128). WB also finds a decentralised 
system to be more capable of channelling resources than a centralised system and 
coordination between various actors as more efficient. According to the WB both 
donors and government should increase their financial expenditures to health 
programmes, and economic growth should be one of the targets (WB 1993: 168). In 
addition, governments should play an important role in more efficient and transparent 
channelling of donor resources (WB 1994: 43, 155). 
                                                 
12 The WB as well as WHO emphasise the possibility that government officials are corrupt and incompetent and thus are not as 
efficient and responsive to people’s needs as the civil society organisations (WB 1993: 59; WHO 2000: 63, 120). 
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Also WHO (2000: 64) claims decentralisation leads to more flexibility and 
responsiveness among local implementers, but there is also a danger of fragmentation 
of health services (WHO 2000: 69). The organisation supports the involvement of civil 
society in health service delivery, but considers the ultimate responsibility of health 
services should lay within the government. WHO expresses a need for coordination 
and regulation of the activities of the NGOs as well as for sharing of information 
between government officials and civil society (WHO 2000: 128).   
These theoretical contributions will be combined and employed as a tool for the 
present analysis seeking to develop a better understanding of the Ugandan HIV/AIDS 
programmes. While analysing the question of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it is important 
to keep in mind that these programmes are seeking to change people’s sexual 
behaviours. Thus, the issue is more sensitive and personal than most issues (tax 
reforms, prevention of malaria etc), and the results of the interventions are more 
difficult to measure. Hence, the analytical approach may carry certain weaknesses. 
Moreover, the study provides an interesting opportunity to evaluate and supplement 
theories employed in other areas of public sector research and implementation theory. 
Research questions 
Based on the issues raised by the theoretical perspectives above, questions arise as to 
centralisation versus decentralisation; public versus private responsibilities, and civil 
society involvement in the health programmes in Uganda. With the overall aim to 
describe and explain HIV/AIDS programmes delivery in Uganda, we will look closer 
at the more operationalised issues: political will and commitment, support of 
government officials, resource allocation, involvement and support of civil society in 
programme or decision-making and local control over the programmes 
(decentralisation). As these factors will operate in tandem and interlink, it is an overall 
aim of this study to discuss whether some characteristics of the Ugandan programmes 
seem more important than others. The following figure outlines the focus of this study 
and the possible relationship between the factors examined and the relative success of 
fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda. 
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Figure 1 Contemporary mind map on the influence of the different factors explaining the 
relative success of fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda 
Political will 
and 
commitment 
 
 
To what extent, and how, may these factors have influenced the relative success of the 
HIV/AIDS programmes in Uganda? On the basis of interviews with a substantial 
number of respondents involved at various levels in the HIV programmes in Uganda 
(see section 1.4), we address the factors mentioned above through the following 
questions:  
Political will and commitment: Do politicians express support to the HIV/AIDS programmes? Is 
the issue of HIV/AIDS expressed in various documents by politicians: in speeches, policies, meetings, 
laws etc? To what degree and how have politicians been involved in channelling information about the 
epidemic to the people? Do they hinder HIV/AIDS interventions to be carried out? How large amount 
of the HIV/AIDS resources have been spent by the government? What loans have been granted from 
international donors to the Government of Uganda to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic? To what degree 
have politicians created an enabling environment for other actors involved in fighting the epidemic 
such as civil society and international organisations?  
Support of the government officials: Do they express support to the HIV/AIDS programmes? To 
what degree and how have bureaucrats initiated and implemented HIV/AIDS programmes? How 
extensively are they involved in channelling of resources? Do they channel resources efficiently to 
actors? Do they support and cooperate with civil society and donors? Do they hinder HIV/AIDS 
interventions from being carried out?  
Initiation and 
implementation of  
HIV/AIDS 
programmes 
Support of 
government 
officials 
Information  and 
awareness on 
HIV/AIDS. Will and 
trust to support the 
programmes. Financial/ 
Human 
resources 
Sexual behavioural 
Changes Involvement 
and support of 
civil society 
Decreasing  
HIV -prevalence/ 
incidence Degree of decentrali-
sation rates 
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Involvement and support of civil society13: How do the civil society organisations spread 
information to people about the disease? Do their programmes/ activities support and compliment 
government programmes? To what extent do they cooperate with the government? How are CSOs14 
included in public programmes, in decision-making and implementation? To what extent and how is 
civil society controlled by the government in their HIV/AIDS activities? 
Human and financial resources: How much money has been spent on HIV/AIDS activities? Where 
has the money come from? How much has been given to HIV/AIDS activities from international donors 
and through what channels? How much and to whom has government given financial resources? 
What activities and what actors have attracted most financial resources? How have human resources 
been mobilised and through what actors? Are financial/ human resources adequate or are there great 
gaps between needs and resources? 
Degree of decentralisation: How much has been and is decided by central government and how 
much by local governments? Who has implemented and implements HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda? At what levels of government do initiatives to various programmes come from? How much 
control, supervision does central government have over local governments? How do districts mobilise 
and channel resources? 
1.4  Methodological Approach and sources of Information 
This is a case study as I want to find out why Uganda has been relatively successful in 
fighting the epidemic, through which factors one can explain the phenomenon. In 
addition, the thesis focuses on how the selected factors are influencing the HIV/AIDS 
programmes. According to Yin (1993: 01) a case-study is “(…) the preferred strategy 
when “how” or “why” questions are being posed. The object of this study seems to fit 
in Yin’s preconditions of case-studies: A case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
“investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident!” In 
principle, a comparative case-study of two countries: one with success and another 
without could have been interesting and probably more informative than a singe case. 
However, as a topic for a master-thesis a comparative study would be too extensive 
and resource demanding. 
With the intention to acquiring more information on how HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda have been initiated and implemented the thesis will combine national and 
district level data and analyses. Through a combination of a district and a national 
study: one can look into the national overall response and further examine the local 
dynamics of the HIV/AIDS programmes. Data from these two levels will be collected, 
                                                 
13 In this thesis civil society is regarded as both NGOs (non-governmental organisations), CBOs (community based 
organisations), FBOs (faith-based organisations) and partly INGOs (international non-governmental organisations). 
 NGOs, CBOs, FBOs and ASOs 14
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compared and combined. Comparisons of two districts could be interesting. However, 
difficult in obtaining data about HIV prevalence rates, made this approach beyond the 
scope of this thesis15. The chosen research strategy will expectantly increase the 
availability of additional data, which may lead to more in depth conclusions about the 
necessary factors, and lessen the possibility of reliability/validity errors.  
The district of Masaka’s response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic will be examined in this 
thesis. There are numerous reasons for choosing Masaka district. It was the second 
district, after Rakai, which was struck by the HIV/AIDS disease and response 
programmes were put in place early. Various types of evidence suggest that Masaka 
has experienced progress in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A cohort study collected 
by the Medical Research Council suggests that in a sub-county of Masaka the HIV- 
prevalence in the adult population declined from a peak of 8.2 percent in 1989 to 6.9 
percent in 1998. The reduction was found in seroprevalence among young men and 
women, but not among older women (Kamali et al. 2000). The study suggests 
behavioural changes to be the reason to these changes. Among young men aged 13-19 
years there was a trend towards an increase in reported age of sexual debut and women 
report marrying later (Ibid). 
In addition to the observed changes, Masaka is a district with more accessible 
information than many other districts in Uganda. Several research projects have been 
initiated, and the district has numerous organisations involved in fighting the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. However, we should keep in mind that Masaka district might be 
an example of a “good-case scenario” where more interventions have taken place than 
in many other districts. However, in order to understand which factors have 
contributed to the progress in Uganda, Masaka could at least serve as an example.  
Several actors have been involved in initiating and implementing HIV/AIDS 
programmes in Uganda with politicians, government officials, civil society and 
donors/ international organisations as the most important. The focus of this dissertation 
                                                 
15 I considered comparing areas districts with “success” versus districts with more of a failure rate in fighting the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. However, lack of information that may be “broken down” into district level, made such a strategy more difficult. On the 
basis of existing statistics, it is difficult to find areas where there has been an increase instead of a decrease in prevalence 
levels. There is also limited information in those districts where fewer interventions have been initiated/ implemented.  
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will lay on the national actors involved in fighting the epidemic, as well as actors 
operating at district level in Masaka. Even though external donors and international 
organisations apparently have been important actors I will not regard this as a separate 
variable but primarily analyse its role through national programmes and actors. 
However, the international community will be included when analysing resource 
allocation. Cooperation between the various actors will be an essential part of my 
analysis, and the effect of different factors/ variables will be examined through the 
effect they have on the cooperation between various actors.  
Figure 2 Collaboration between the internal actors in HIV/AIDS programme  
   Politicians 
 
Information about the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
           Target Groups 
 
 
Bureaucracy   Civil society 
 
Data collection and sources of information  
On the basis of limited resources, the information required for my research questions, 
could be best achieved through the use of qualitative material, through interviews and 
documents. No surveys or quantitative measures are available about people’s approach 
to, or expectations and delivery from, government programmes. Furthermore, the 
information we need is in depth information about the phenomenon and not 
information about expansion or numbers, qualitative measures will be employed 
(Thagaard 1998:16). The research will collect evidence from numerous sources as the 
studies of implementation of programmes should do (Yin 1982). 
One of the most important sources of information in case-studies is the interview (Yin 
1994: 84). However, as interviews represent subjective material and could be biased, 
poor and inaccurate, they will be supplemented by other sources of information (Ibid: 
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85). Thus, the primary sources of information will be collected through interviews and 
secondary data from various documents. Figures on HIV/AIDS spending, although not 
extensively employed, will be used as information to see resource use as well as to get 
information about the various contributors. By an integration of different types of 
empirical material, the reliability of the research will hopefully increase.  
In order to get as much balanced information as possible; to assure reliability a certain 
number of informants have been interviewed and documents have been collected from 
different sources. As the three main actors within this area are bureaucrats, civil 
society and politicians, they are all aims of the interviews and the collection of the 
written material. However, politicians have been difficult to get hold of and therefore 
only interviews of two politicians in Masaka are included.  In addition some interviews 
of academics who have analysed the problem will be included although they have not 
been directly involved in program implementation. Moreover, documents and 
interviews from international organisations and donors were collected as another 
means of getting more information on HIV/AIDS programmes, the interplay between 
actors and resource allocation. Various informants: government officials, donors, 
academics, politicians and civil society probably have different ways of looking at the 
HIV/AIDS programmes and have different interests in the HIV/AIDS programmes. 
Thus, when analysing the material provided by the different actors we should take into 
consideration that they may overemphasise their own role and underestimate the roles 
of others. In addition, there is a possibility that there might be a certain lack of trust 
between civil society and the government.  
Various documents were examined to supplement the information from the interviews: 
Documentations on the action of the government and others in reducing the HIV-
prevalence: the different National Strategic Frameworks for combating HIV/AIDS; 
Government agencies plans for HIV/AIDS activities in their sector; Documentations 
on financial and human resources (education/qualified health personnel etc.); 
Information about the programmes of the civil society organisations (their own reports, 
leaflets, etc.); Reports on how information is passed from one actor to the other: the 
cooperative mechanisms between them (NSP, guidelines etc); Inventory of Agencies 
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(1997; 2001): studies of all agencies involved in HIV/AIDS activities and Documents 
from various donors: (UNICEF, UNDP, World Bank etc.) on available financial 
resources. 
Interviews16
An important source of information for this research will be semi-structured 
interviews. The interviews are structured as they pose certain questions, but there is 
also the possibility of posing more questions when this is needed or to skip some 
questions if they are already answered. The questions will be open and without 
standard answers to obtain as much information as possible from the respondents. Too 
structured interviews would not be appropriate as “the implementation proves 
represents a complex interaction, over time, among a distinctive set of key actors and 
events at any given site” (Yin 1982). 
The first questions posed are very general questions about the reasons for the observed 
progress in Uganda to get as much information as possible about the reasons for 
success. Information on their influence/ contribution is also important. Other questions 
are being posed to get more information on the different factors examined. Potential 
problems may rise from the fact that HIV/AIDS and sexual behaviour is a sensitive 
issue. Nevertheless, as the focus will be put on what the respondents observe and 
experience through their work and in general in Uganda and not their own sexual 
practices, problems of sensitivity are probably avoided.  
Critics of the Ugandan success-story 
We have witnessed in the previous sections various evidence of progress in Uganda’s 
fight against AIDS. Thus, I will argue that the country has been at least relatively 
successful in their efforts. Nevertheless, some researchers have posed the question of 
whether the reduction of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda is only a natural course of 
the epidemic and not a result of the prevention programmes. Thus, Epstein (2001) 
opens up the possibility of the HIV-virus spreading in two periods in Uganda as 
several other epidemics have shown ups and downs during their course. The rapid 
                                                 
16 Go to Appendix IV for further information on how the interviews have been carried out. 
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spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic during the civil war in the 80s mainly happened 
through rapes and as a result of large migration waves, which again resulted in a huge 
prevalence rate a few years later (beginning of the 90s). A decrease in HIV prevalence 
could therefore be a result of death for people being infected through the “first wave” 
(Ibid). 
On the contrary UNAIDS (1998) also sees the reduction of the HIV-prevalence and 
incidence to be (…) “more than expected from the natural history of the epidemic and 
probably result from a behavioural change”. Kamali et al. (2000: 434) emphasise that 
the migration effect can not explaining the observed decline in prevalence. In addition 
to focus on real changes in seropositives we must look at the incidence: how many 
new people are infected with the virus. Prevalence in the young age groups (age 15-19) 
is closest to the incidence rate since infections have occurred recently and mortality is 
high and relatively stable (Fylkesnes et al. 2001). A study by Killian et al. (1999) 
points at the decrease in HIV prevalence to be larger than what is possible for an 
uninfluenced epidemic indicating changes in behaviours to be responsible also among 
the youngest age groups.  
The perhaps most critical article to the “Ugandan success story” was written by Justin 
Parkhurst and printed in Lancet, 2002. According to Parkhurst (2002) the assertion that 
HIV prevalence rate has fallen from 30 to 5 percent is mistaken as this is the only case 
in a few of the antennal urban sites, and there has been an overrepresentation of urban 
sites, especially in the early years. Parkhurst claims fall in prevalence rate is 
commonly regarded as fall in incidence rate17. However, this is a misinterpretation of 
data as a fall in prevalence rate will only reflect reduced incidence rates around seven 
years earlier. According to Parkhurst (2002) fall in prevalence rate in Uganda has been 
reported since 1993, which would result from falling incidence rates for 1985 when the 
country was in civil war and no prevention programmes had been initiated.  
                                                 
17 Incidence rate: the number of new people infected with HIV-1 virus, 
Prevalence rate: the number of people infected with HIV-1 virus throughout the whole population  
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In contrast with Parkhurst’s assertions UNAIDS (2000) operates with a general peak 
on a 14 percent HIV prevalence rate from the early 1990s18. Rural areas were also 
looked at separately, and overall declines have also been observed here. In addition, 
most reports observed a certain decline from 1993. Interestingly in 1986 the NRM 
introduced the first prevention programmes. Thus, apparently there is a seven-year 
delay between the start of the response and the beginning of fall in prevalence rates. 
Parkhurst’s scepticism to the prevalence rates does not seem to undermine the validity 
of this thesis. In fact, even the author himself claims there is growing evidence today 
that also the incidence has declined based on the fall of prevalence-rate among the 
youngest age group. The author even claims “other African countries have not seen 
similar declines in prevalence, suggesting that Uganda alone must have acted in a way 
that changed the course of its HIV/AIDS epidemic” (Parkhurst 2002). He believes 
other countries have several policy lessons to learn from Uganda (Ibid).  
Nevertheless, I share Parkhurst’s reservations about the exaggeration of the “Ugandan 
success-story”. Uganda could be referred to as a country with observed progress rather 
than “a success story”. Eight percent of the population in Uganda or 720 000 people 
are still infected with the HIV-virus and many people have died (UNAIDS 2002). 
However, there seems to be common agreement on the progress in Uganda in fighting 
HIV/AIDS which we can not find elsewhere in Africa. There is also reason to believe 
that programmes have been somewhat successful as a reduction in HIV/AIDS-
incidence/ prevalence has coincided with high level of awareness among people with 
changes in sexual behaviour. However, to what extent the behavioural changes are a 
direct result of different programmes are open to question (UNAIDS 1998).  
In addition, a final note of warning concerns the reliability of the statistics. Statistics 
and health and welfare data in developing countries generally struggle with 
inaccuracies as they are only estimates and often depend on people’s own perceptions. 
People might for instance exaggerate or underestimate their sexual activities. AIDS 
statistics also suffer from serious underreporting (STD/AIDS Control Programme 
2003). On that basis, causal explanations of health patterns and public policy have 
                                                 
 Even though a 30 percent prevalence rate was observed in certain urban areas in Uganda. 18
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clear deficiencies, which will be taken into consideration when analysing data from 
Uganda’s HIV/AIDS programmes. In order to control the amount of progress in 
Uganda and in Masaka, the respondents will also answer to whether or not they have 
observed any real changes in prevalence rates, awareness and sexual behaviours and 
cause of such changes as well as present limitations.  
Despite these possible weaknesses, there are certain tendencies which can be observed 
through the examination of the figures on which I have based this thesis. As long as 
there is no cure or vaccine and the access to medication is limited for developing 
countries, prevention programmes is the only way to go to cope with the epidemic. A 
better understanding of the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes can therefore help us in 
moving closer to a solution to prevent more people from catching this deadly disease.  
Chapter two will introduce the reader further into the Ugandan social and political 
background. In chapter three the theoretical approaches will be introduced with a 
strong focus on the different approaches’ view on the five selected variables. Chapter 
four looks closer at the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes and how they are organised. 
Chapter five will attempt to understand how the different factors have influenced the 
Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes. I will examine how these findings correspond to 
theoretical approaches and whether new approaches must complement the classical 
implementation theories.  
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2 Ugandan background 
2.1  Introduction and political background 
“But the Kingdom of Uganda is a fairy-tale. You climb up a railway instead of a beanstalk, and at the end 
there is a wonderful new world.” (Winston S.Churchill, My African Journey, 1908, in Ofcansky 1996: vi) 
While Churchill characterised Uganda as the “Pearl of Africa”, the country has 
become more known in the past decades for ethnic rivalry and its brutal past. After 
independence from British rule in 1962, the early years were marked by political 
instability and social violence. Various ethnic and religious divisions in the Ugandan 
society have been made at least partly responsible for instability, resulting in eight 
different governments, four of them achieved by military force before 1986 (EIU 
1992-93). Much violence was expressed through the Nilotic people in the north against 
the Bantu in the south. Colonialism has also made a contribution to these differences 
as the North was militarily dominant until the National Resistance Movement’s 
(NRM) takeover in 1986 (EIU 2002). 
The first Ugandan constitution allowing a federal state was suspended already in 1966 
by the Prime Minister Obote. He declared himself President as he turned the Congress 
under his control and became a dictator dependent on the army with a wish to 
transform Uganda into a socialist state (Mugaju 1996: 11, 15; EIU 1992). Idi Amin 
replaced Obote in a Military Coup in 1971. The initially popular rule of Amin soon, 
however, turned into a reign of terror (Ofcansky 1996: 44). His army led several 
attacks on the people of Obote, the Langi people in the North and their Acholi 
neighbours, killing the army and thereafter the civilians in the most gruesome ways 
(EIU 2002; Mugaju 1996: 18). Civilians in the South were also killed, especially 
Christians19. An estimated number of 300.000 people were killed in Uganda during his 
seven-year regime (EIU 1992). Lawlessness, collapse of public institutions and 
infrastructure, as well as economic catastrophes marked the following years. 
Deportation of 70.000 business-men and handing over of businesses to Africans led to 
total collapse (Mugaju 1996: 19). The regime of Idi Amin came to an end in 1979 
                                                 
19 Idi Amin wanted to kill all Christians who made up around 80 percent of the population (Mugaju 1996: 18) 
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when he was overthrown by a Tanzanian army supported by oppositionists having 
escaped from Uganda (EIU 2002).  
The following two governments of Lula and Binaisa only stayed in office for a short 
time. An election in December 1980 brought Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s 
Congress back to office, although many people questioned its fairness of the election. 
As Obote returned to power the 27th May, 1980 he was given a warm welcome from 
many Ugandans as he was portrayed as the only man experienced enough to lead the 
country (Mugaju 1996: 22). Obote’s strategy was to revive the economy and to 
maintain good diplomatic relations with the western powers20 (Mugaju 1996: 23). In 
spite of some economic success, the government was unable to attract foreign 
investment (EIU 2002).  From 1981 to 1985 the state remained de facto a one-party 
state and by the end of 1983, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) had emerged 
as the only real threat to the present regime (Mugaju 1996: 56). Obote responded to the 
opposition by use of military power which by late 1984 had resulted in deaths of over 
300.000 people (Tumusiime in Ofcansky 1996: 52). By 1986, the NRM/A marched to 
Kampala, seized power and Yoweri Museveni became Uganda’s president (EIU 2002).  
2.2  Social and economic conditions 
At independence Uganda had the opportunity of great development. However, when 
Museveni took over the Ugandan future looked anything but bright. By 1985 Uganda 
was on the verge of fragmentation as different armed fractions controlled different 
parts of Kampala and areas of the country (Leggett 2001: 02). In addition, the heritage 
of murders and massive refugee problems had to be solved, and there was a desperate 
shortage of essential goods such as soap, sugar and salt (Ibid). The economy lay in 
ruins and the politically state machinery was in shambles (Mugaju 1996: 27). Human 
resources were tapped as many people in the educated elite had been killed or left the 
country, and many educated Asians had been expelled (EIU 92-93). Lack of 
investments and maintenance skills led to a fall in capital assets in agriculture, 
transportation and manufacturing (Ibid). Inflation rates were extremely high. 
                                                 
20 Obote embraced the policies of the International Monetary Funds (IMF) and the World Bank as he started to adopt their 
economic strategies (Mugaju 1996: 23). 
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Smuggling was part of people’s lives and trade was impossible within and outside 
Uganda (Leggett 2001: 02). Only subsistence farming and coffee production had 
survived the regime of Idi Amin (Ibid). While Uganda’s social indicators in the 1960s 
were mostly much better than other low-income countries, in 1986 they were similar to 
the ones of low-income countries South of the Sahara with high birth and death rates, 
high fertility rates and low life expectancy at birth (Hansen/Twaddle 1991: 25). In 
1990 Uganda had become the 28th poorest country in the world (UNDP).  
Table 2.1 Development situation in Uganda at the time of NRM’s takeover (UNDP 1990) 
Life expectancy at 
Birth (1987) 
Adult Literacy 
Rate (1985) 
HDI (Human 
Development 
Index) 
GDP per capita 
(PPP- US $) 
HDI minus GDP 
rank21
 
52 58 0.354 511 7 
 
As a British colony Uganda had developed one of the finest Western medical services 
in sub-Saharan Africa (Obscansky 1996: 82). However, “(...) the Amin era and its 
aftermath resulted in neglect of health infrastructure and loss of resources” (EIU: 02). 
Doctors, nurses and medical technicians of different origins moved out of Uganda. 
Thus, severe personnel shortages throughout the health care sector occurred 
(Obscansky 1996: 82).22 The collapse of health infrastructure contributed to higher 
mortality amongst children from treatable illnesses (due to lack of vaccination) and 
increased mortality rates amongst patients treated in hospital (Hermele 1989: 84-85). 
Epidemics spread fast due to a run-down health system as well as under-nourishment, 
lack of safe water bad hygiene etc (Hermele: 1989: 85).23 Simultaneously, UNDP 
reports of simultaneous improvements in people’s life expectancy (from 1960 to 
1986),24 rising adult literacy rates25 and reduced “under five-mortality rates”26 (Ibid).  
                                                 
21 A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP USD) rank, a negative the opposite 
(UNDP 2003). 
22 From 11.110 physicians  in 1965 the number in 1984 was 21.900  (Hansen /Twaddle 1991: 24). 
23 In the countryside the situation was worse and in the Luwero-triangle the infant-mortality rate reached 300 thousandth, three 
times as high as in the rest of the country (Hermele 1989: 85). 
24 In 1987 life expectancy in Uganda was 52 years, a rise from 48 years in 1975 and 43 years in 1960 (UNDP 1990). 
25 Rose from 41percent in 1970 to 58 percent in 1985  (UNDP 1990) 
 Dropped from 224 (in a thousand) in 1960, to 169 in 1988 (UNDP 1990) 26
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Table 2.2 Uganda’s Health situation in 1986 (UNDP 1990; 2003) 
Pop. w/access to 
Health services: 
1985-87 
(percentage) 
Maternal mortality 
rate 
1980-87 
Thousands of 
people per doctor 
(1984) 
Infant mortality 
rate 
(1970) 
Health 
Expenditure of 
GDP (1986) 
61 300 21.9 110 0.2 
 
The collapse of social infrastructure also had a severe effect on the best education 
systems in tropical Africa at independence. This can be observed through a relative 
decline in primary school enrolment between 1965 and 1980 (in contrast to sharply 
rising trends in the rest of South Saharan Africa) (Hansen/Twaddle 1991: 25). In 1965, 
67 percent of the primary school age group was enrolled in school, but in 1985 only 50 
percent was enrolled (Ibid).  
2.3  Uganda Today 
The NRM government brought a ten-point program forward at the time of their 
takeover. The main points were: restoration of democracy, security of person and 
property and unity of Uganda. With the restoration of democracy Museveni claimed 
that both village committees and parliamentary democracy were necessary. By 
security of person and property the following was stated: “The people of Uganda 
should die only from natural causes which are beyond our control, but not from their 
fellow human beings” (Legum 1987). By unity of Uganda he wanted a change from 
the past regimes of sectarianism, which had put people up against each other. His 
Uganda should be a united country where all religions, tribes and individualities were 
welcomed (Ibid)27. In establishing democracy, the government understood that in a 
poor society where people are hungry, one cannot enjoy or practice democracy 
(Mugaju 1996: 29). Museveni argued that multi-party democracy is not right for all 
countries and for Uganda this system had been a part of past problems as it 
emphasised the differences rather than the similarities (Leggett 2001: 05; Obscansky 
1996: 59). In order to secure stabilisation of Uganda Museveni’s introduced a zero-
party movement based system (Ibid). Simultaneously, he announced the absence of 
                                                 
27 Museveni also wanted Uganda to cooperate closely with the other East-African countries (Legum 1987) 
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elections for 5 years and decided to “prevent political parties from holding meetings 
unless approved by authorities” (Legum 1987). Originally this was a system put in 
place in a transition period until the Ugandan society was ready for multipartyism 
(Mamdani in Human Rights Watch 1999). The Constitution of 1995 legitimised the 
“no party state” and committed the country to another five years of “no party rule” 
with ban on political activities controlled by the NRM. In 1996 the President and the 
Parliament were formally elected to power under a new constitution. The referendum 
of 2000 resulted into over 50 percent vote against bringing back political parties, 
leading Uganda to keep the no-party system (EIU 2002). In the Presidential election of 
2001 Museveni was re-elected for his third five-year term by 75 percent of the votes 
(Ibid).  International agencies have questioned whether these elections were free and 
fair. Museveni’s continued ban on party politics has also been criticized, and his zero-
party system is said to be a one-party system in practice 
In February 1986 Museveni announced the system of Resistance Councils (RCs) as 
part of the Movement System as a way of introducing popular democracy to Ugandans 
(Obscansky 1996: 59). These Councils were set up at village, parish and sub-county 
level, and were later expanded to county, district and national level (Mugaju 1996: 28). 
All Ugandans are members of this five level movement system whether they want to 
or not, as they are all members of a village (Human Rights Watch 1999). In 1989 the 
first election was held to these Committees (Hermele 1989: 106). At national level the 
National Resistance Council became the law-making body of Movement System 
(Ibid).  In the 1997 Local Government’s Act the Local Councils (LCs) replaced the 
former Resistance Councils. And the Constitution (1995) and the Local Government 
Act (1997) transferred more power from central level to these local governments in 
several areas (Human Right Watch 1999).  
According to Human Rights Watch (1999) an important part of the local council 
structures serve as partisan NRM bodies during election times and target multipartyists 
and their supporters for abuse during these periods. Local councils often mobilise in 
support of NRM candidates and can thus influence the success of a candidate. Many 
critics thus see this system as a one-party state rather than a system without political 
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parties. In addition, civil society in Uganda is fairly restricted as NGOs have to be 
formally registered in order to operate. And the government exercises considerable 
control over nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) by delaying or threatening to 
withdraw their registration, which must be sanctioned by a government-controlled 
board and can be quickly revoked. Although the NGO Registration Statute sets no 
such requirements, NGOs must function as non-political and non-sectarian 
organisations, and practice a significant amount of self-censorship of their 
programmes in order to obtain and maintain registration (Human Rights Watch 1999). 
Museveni has managed to maintain good relations with the west despite his denial of 
multiparty-democracy, corruption within the government and a large record of human 
rights violations (Ofcansky 1996: 59). His early embracement of the economic policies 
of IMF and the World Bank with liberalising trade, privatisation and fiscal and 
monetary discipline has largely contributed to this positive relationship (Leggett 2001: 
02).  Since 1986, there has been an impressive transformation of Uganda’s 
commercial, economic and social infrastructure (Leggett 2001: 03). A relatively stable 
Uganda combined with foreign aid has contributed positively in building up the 
country’s economy, and the country has become a model of success for structural 
adjustment policies (EIU 2002). The results are visible: inflation has decreased 
dramatically from over 200 percent in 1987, to 4 percent in year 2000 (Leggett 2001: 
03). Since 1986 Uganda has experienced an average early economic growth of over 6 
percent through most of the 1990s (EIU 2002).  From having a GDP per capita of 511 
in 1987, the figure today is 1490 (UNDP 19902003). Simultaneously, Uganda’s score 
on the international Human Development Index has improved from 0,386 in 1985 to 
0,489 in 2000 (UNDP 2003).           
Table 2.3 Recent social, economic indicators for Uganda (UNDP 2003) 
Life expectancy at 
Birth (2001) 
Adult Literacy 
Rate (2001) 
HDI GDP per capita HDI minus GDP 
rank 
44,7 68 0,489 1,490 1 
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As under colonial rule, agriculture remains the most important sector of the Ugandan 
economy (Leggett 2001: 54), accounting for about 42 percent of GDP with subsistence 
farming countering for almost half of the incomes and employing over 80 percent of 
the work force (EIU: 02). The Ugandan economy is largely dependent on high 
international coffee prices leading to a vulnerable economy over which they have very 
little influence (Ibid; Ofcansky 1996: 100). A significant part of the Ugandan economy 
is informal and “non-monetary” as families take care of their own needs and don’t take 
part in the trade-market (Ibid). Uganda is largely dependent on foreign aid. According 
to Leggett (2001: 60) Uganda’s macroeconomic stability is due to the increasing level 
of foreign aid, and not real changes in the economic capacities of Uganda. From 1986 
to 1997 donor support increased from US$ 200 million to US$ 850 million (Leggett 
2001: 60). The negative aspect of the inflow of aid was a rapid increase in the size of 
the foreign debt (EIU 2002). In 1999 Uganda had a debt on US$ 4.1 compared to US$ 
1.2 in 1986 representing 64 percent of GNP. The debt represents more than 525 
percent of the value of exports of goods and services (EIU 2002).   
The GoU started the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997 recognising 
“that the benefits of growth didn’t reach the poorest Ugandans“ (Leggett 2001: 64). 
According to the Uganda Poverty Status Report (1999) there has been a decline in 
absolute poverty from 56 percent in 1992 to 46 percent in 1996, and around 35 percent 
of Ugandans live below the poverty line. Economic growth has reduced the overall 
proportion in poverty quite substantially (Uganda Poverty Status Report 1999: xiv). 
Poverty reduction has however been uneven as the poorest 20 percent of the 
population did not benefit much (Ibid). Between year 1990 and 2000, 82 percent of 
Ugandans lived on less than one US$ a day and 96 percent of the population live on 
less than two dollars a day (UNDP 2003). This gives one of the highest poverty rates 
in Southern Africa (Ibid). Corruption among civil servants and politicians is an issue 
aggravating the situation for the poor. Simultaneously there is an emerging elite in 
Uganda that is heavily benefiting from the economic growth of the country as they 
have the money, connections and access to information (Leggett 2001: 62).  
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Most people have, however, started to benefit from the government’s emphasis on 
basic social services (Leggett 2001: 63). Life expectancy has decreased from the late 
80s28, largely due to the many deaths of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but is higher than 
previous years and still higher today than in the late 90s.29 According to WHO/AFRO 
([online]) only around 49 percent of the Ugandan households have access to health 
care facilities, which is due to lack of infrastructure especially in rural areas. In 
addition most Ugandans have to pay for treatment if they get sick and as people delay 
going to get treatment, illnesses such as malaria get more serious (Leggett 2001: 63).  
Table 2.4 Uganda’s Health situation today (UNDP 2003) 
Pop. w/access to 
health services:  
2000 
Matern.mortal rate 
pr. 100 thousand 
(1985-2001) 
Physicians (per 
1000, 000 people 
(2002) 
Infant mortality 
rate 
(2001) 
Health 
Expenditure of 
GDP (2000) 
Affordable drugs: 
50-79 percent 
Improved 
sanitation: 79 
percent 
510 5 79 Public: 1.6 
Private: 2.4,  
Per capita:  38 
 
More than 50 percent of Ugandans do not have access to clean water, which make 
them vulnerable to cholera and diarrhoea (Leggett 2001: 63)30. Promising signs are 
expressed by the infant mortality rate which decreased from 110 per life births in year 
1970 to 81 in 2000 (UNDP 2002). Furthermore, 68 percent of the adult population of 
Uganda was literate in year 2000 compared to 58 percent in 1985 (UNDP 1990; 
UNDP 2003)31. It is in fact within the education sector the biggest improvements in 
Uganda with the introduction of Universal Primary Education (UPE) (Leggett 
2001:03). Previously more and more children were dropping out of schools due to the 
school fees (Leggett 2001: 65). The figure of enrolment in schools increased from 2.7 
million in 1996 to 5.3 million in 1997 and 6.56 million in year 2000 due to the 
introduction of UPE (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2001). The number of primary 
schools and secondary schools has increased partly for the same reason (Statistical 
Abstract 2001; Leggett 2001: 67). However, school fees may still prevent many 
                                                 
28 Life expectancy at birth in Uganda was only 44.7 years in year 2001 compared to 52 years in 1987 (UNDP 2003). 
 In 1997 life expectancy was as low as 39.6 years (UNDP 1999). 29
30 Between 1995 and year 2000 malaria was the highest cause of death among Ugandans, followed by pneumonia, worms and 
diarrhoea (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2001:54). 
31 Youth literacy rate has also increased (15-14 years) from 65.5 percent in 1985 to 78.8 percent in year 2000 (UNDP: 2002).   
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children from access to higher education as only around 40 percent go on to secondary 
school (Leggett 2001: 67-68)32.  
Women are very important in the Ugandan society as they are the caretakers in the 
family and perform 90 percent of the domestic labour, as well as 80 percent of 
agricultural labour (Mygenyi 1998). However, cultural customs and limited ownership 
and control of agricultural production such as land, information, technology and 
training have undermined the woman’s position in society, keeping her subordinate 
and highly dependent on the man (Mygenyi 1998; UNDP 2002). “They are the most 
underprivileged ones living in the undesirable conditions of the vicious cycle of 
underdevelopment” (Lubwama 1990: 49) Women make around 2/3 of the money 
made by their male counterpart, and only 57 percent of women are literate compared 
to the 75 percent of men (UNDP 2002). Girls drop out of school more than boys, and 
due to their dependency on men and extreme poverty women have been more 
vulnerable to diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Nevertheless, with affirmative action 
policies of the Government more women today take higher education and are involved 
in politics at all levels. Through the Local Councils and at National Level 27 percent 
of the ministers are women (Mygenyi 1998). Women’s organisations and associations 
have been established, enabling women to express their point of view (Ibid). 
Nevertheless, the government’s reforms are criticised for not addressing gender issues 
at family level. Many consider issues like sexual and domestic violence, wife-
inheritance, division of labour, property ownership etc. to be private issues and not 
matters for the state (Ibid).  
Even though there has been observed great changes in Uganda, it is important to stress 
that there are great differences within the country. Economic growth and stability/ 
security is highly visible in the South, around Lake Victoria, a shift from the brutal 
violence of the past regimes and progress in the reduction of ethnic tensions 
(Obcansky 1996: 58).  People in the North-East are poorer, have less access to public 
services that are of worse quality. Their freedom and security is also very limited. 
                                                 
32 There are also high dropout rates in secondary schools especially for girls due to a large amount of orphans and widespread 
poverty. 
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They tend to oppose the government and feel excluded and unprotected due to the 
government’s lack of concern and almost non-existent education (Leggett 2001: 05, 
30). There is “chronic insecurity in parts of Northern and Western Uganda leading to 
social dislocation and economic underdevelopment in the most affected areas” 
(Leggett 2001: 03). The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has for the last fifteen years 
under their leader Joseph Kony terrorised the people of Kitgum and Gulu instead of 
fighting the government’s army. They have no political agenda or alternatives, but the 
government of Sudan supports them and their behaviour has extremely violent 
consequences for civilians (Leggett 2001: 29, 30). Over 20.000 children have been 
abducted by this army (Leggett 2001: 31). People have been driven from their homes, 
separated, killed and raped. In such an environment the HIV/AIDS epidemic normally 
spreads fast (Leggett  2001: 05, 30).   
2.4  Conclusion  
The Ugandan people have experienced many years of insecurity and brutality since the 
bright outlook at independence in 1962. Amin and Obote destroyed the country 
through civil war and dictatorships. Today Uganda is more stable and in many areas 
the country has witnessed progress compared to the situation when Museveni’s NRM 
government came into power in 1986. Economic growth has developed and 
simultaneously the Ugandan government has focused on building up infrastructure, 
health and education etc. Despite progress, Uganda is still one of the poorest countries 
in the world ranging number 147 out of 173 countries at the Human Development 
Index. People are struggling for their lives and women are still inferior to men. The 
Northern part of Uganda is lagging behind and experience insecurity in their daily 
lives, which the government has difficulties in controlling. Uganda has also been 
criticised for human rights violations and for being one of the most corrupted in the 
world. Museveni’s recipe on democracy with no parties is also questioned and the UN 
considered the last election not free and fair. However, in the fight against the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic Uganda has been and is still portrayed as a good example, and 
people from other countries come to Uganda to learn how to deal with the epidemic. 
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3 Theoretical Approach  
3.1  Introduction  
In the 1960s and early 1970s many countries in the Western world instituted 
programmes with the intention to improve people’s health, expand educational 
opportunities reduce pollution etc. Implementation theory came up seeking to explain 
the apparent failures of these programmes such as the ambitious Social Programmes; 
“War on Poverty” and “Great Society” (Sabatier 1986a; Kjellberg/ Reitan 1995: 138). 
The initial contribution to implementation theory came from Pressman and Wildavsky 
who conducted a pioneer study in 1973 where they thoroughly examining factors 
important for policy implementation (Ingram 1990). Their study was later to become a 
contribution within the “top-down” approach of implementation research, as a contrast 
to the later “bottom-up approach”. These theoretical contributions have very different 
points of departures, and they emphasise the importance of different actors involved in 
the implementation of public programmes. Whereas the “top-down” approach 
emphasise the importance of formal actors like politicians and bureaucrats, and a 
centralised state and existence of resources, the “bottom-up” up approach points at the 
power of the grassroots: the involvement of civil society and local government’s 
authority to address their own needs (decentralisation ). 
Hence, classic implementation theories address several of the factors which at the time 
of Museveni’s takeover and his announcement of the AIDS Control Programme were 
either absent or very limited in the Ugandan society. The country was in economic 
ruins after the many years of terror-regimes with extremely limited financials 
resources, absence of external donors, and there was even a lack of state power, 
institutions and authority. Health services offered to people were almost non-existent, 
and the organised civil society was very weak. Government officials had also been 
under a “rule of the jungle” mentality of previous tyrants. Thus, as Uganda lacked so 
many of the factors selected for this study, one would not expect them to have played 
an important role in understanding the relative success of fighting HIV/AIDS. It is 
therefore a challenge to examine if some of the factors emphasised by various 
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implementation scholars have actually had a positive effect on these programmes or if 
Western implementation theories are not at all relevant in this setting 
3.2  Theory on implementation of public programmes 
“Top-down” approach 
The “top-down“ approach to implementation of public programmes is often described 
as “forward-mapping” or “decision-oriented”. Adherents assume policy to be 
formulated at the top and transferred and implemented at the bottom (Younis/ 
Davidson 1990). In order to explain success or failure in implementation, they start 
with a policy decision approved by the government, and thereby see if the 
implementing officials and target groups have followed the goals of the procedures 
and policy (Sabatier 1986a). Adherents of the “top-down” approach distinguish clearly 
between different stages in policy formulation/decision-making and implementation. 
They focus on the need for control of actors involved and how (…) “official policy-
makers can use a variety of control mechanisms and institutional arrangements to 
guide social-change” (Kaufman: Ch.10 in Sabatier: 1986a). They emphasise the 
importance of formal structures/ institutions in the implementation process and the 
formal actors involved in this process: the bureaucrats and the policy-makers33. 
The “top-down” theory does not explicitly include political will/commitment as a 
determinant factor for success in implementation of public programmes. However, 
adherents have argued for a general need for interest, responsibility and commitment 
from various actors involved in implementing programmes, including politicians, and 
especially the political elite and executive sovereigns are brought forward34. In 
addition, they point at political support as one of the preconditions of success. It is 
from this standpoint one can argue that political will/ commitment is a necessary 
condition within this approach. Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1983: 30-31) express a need to 
maintain political support throughout the long implementation process, in order to 
                                                 
33 The “top-down” approach also focus on other factors than the factors introduced in this dissertation such as clear objective 
and consistent objectives, adequate causal theory, legal control mechanisms (Sabatier/ Mazmanian 1987,1980 in Sabatier: 
1986b), but these factors will not be included in the thesis.  
34 Downs 1967; Murphy, 1973; Bardach, 1974; Sabatier, 1975 in Sabatier 1986b. 
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overcome delays in seeking cooperation among a large numbers of actors with 
different interests. The authors also claim political support to be essential in order to 
allocate scarce government resources as well as they emphasise how socio-economic 
conditions should not undermine the political support (Ibid). This position is also 
brought forward by Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) as they recognise that political 
support will (…) “make more available resources which will facilitate administration”.  
For adherents of the “top-down” approach the bureaucrats/ government officials are 
the most essential actors involved in formulation and implementation of programmes. 
They believe the support of bureaucrats goes hand in hand with the support from 
politicians (Sabatier 1986b). “Top-downers” claim the commitment of government 
officials to policy objectives, and skills in utilising available resources, is critical35. 
Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1983: 28) argue that especially when programmes seek to 
change the behaviour of target groups, the implementers must be strongly committed. 
This support is expressed through e.g. mobilising support among target groups and 
other government officials and representing the agency’s case in the media 
(Mazmanian/ Sabatier 1983: 35). They claim the degree of commitment will increase 
when a new agency is established after an intense political campaign, leading to high 
visibility and prioritisation of the program (Ibid). Furthermore Mazmanian/ Sabatier 
claim one of the reasons for bureaucratic support and commitment is better informal 
oversight and more efficient channelling of the agencies’ legal and financial resources 
(Ibid, p. 33). Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) assert that the bureaucratic implementers’ 
understanding, acceptance and belief in the objectives of the policy are an essential 
precondition. Negative preferences will lead to open defiance of the programme’s 
objectives and subordinates may refuse to participate. The question of government 
officials’ support is also a question of what bureaucrats are essential-the ones who are 
closer to the decision or the ones who are closer to the target groups.  
Several “top-downers” include resources as a socio-economic condition, which can 
constrain the behaviour of the implementers and limit the possibilities for success. 
Consistent with Gunn adequate time and resources must be available to the programme 
                                                 
 Lipsky, 1971, Lazin, 1973, Levin, 1980 in Sabatier 1986b 35
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(Gunn 1980: 05 in Younis/ Davidson 1990). Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) consider 
both sufficient economic and human resources to be critical for successful 
implementation. These authors claim only a policy decision can provide the type and 
extent of services such as technical assistance (Ibid). Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1981, 
1983) believe financial resources are important in order to improve the ability to guide 
the behaviour of street-level implementers (Sabatier 1986a). In addition Mountjoy and 
O’Toole cite the provision of resources and clear instructions as determining factors 
for effective implementation in order to avoid unanticipated voluntary activity 
(Younis/Davidson 1990).  
Supporters of the “top-down” approach do not emphasise the importance of including 
informal actors such as civil society in the implementation process. On the contrary, 
Pressman/ Wildavsky (1973) claim support of official policy-makers is important to 
affect the outcome of local negotiation more than the informal “street-level 
bureaucrats” (in Sabatier 1986a). They believe organisations have modest influence in 
implementation of public programmes and describe them as part of “basically 
impediments” (Ibid). Nevertheless, the “top-downers” wish a certain control of this 
group (Sabatier 1986a). Mazmanian/ Sabatier reject hierarchical control of interest 
groups in the sense of tightly constrained behaviour. Nevertheless, they argue for a 
certain control of these groups as the behaviour of street level bureaucrats and target 
groups should be kept within acceptable bounds over time (Mazmanian/Sabatier 1979: 
489-92, 503-4 in Sabatier: 1986b). 
Despite a certain negative attitude to the involvement of civil society expressed by the 
“top-down” approach, they still believe the support of these groups might be 
important. For instance Mazmanian/ Sabatier claim support of interest groups is one of 
the necessities, in addition to the support of other actors: politicians, general public 
and bureaucratic sovereigns (Mazmanian/ Sabatier 1983: 30). Van Meter/ Van Horn 
(1975) also bring forward the importance of general mobilisation in support of the 
policy as one of their “economic, social and political conditions”. They claim a certain 
mobilisation of citizens and interest groups to the program might increase the pressure 
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of the government officials to carry out the programmes efficiently, even if the 
program does not coincide with their beliefs and preferences (Ibid). 
According to the “top-down” approach central level control of the planning and 
implementation of public policy/ programme is the ideal, and decentralisation with 
local level control has a negative impact. Adherents consider a strong central state with 
direct implementation of programmes to be a necessity. For instance Mazmanian/ 
Sabatier see the need for central guidance and control of the local implementers to 
make sure they follow the policy decision, and various factors can improve their 
ability to guide the street-level implementers (Sabatier: 1986a). Van Meter/ Van Horn 
(1975) believe that a decentralised system of governance where autonomy is enjoyed 
by the state and local governments, results into programs having a small impact. They 
claim the more hierarchical control and the less actors involved in planning and 
implementation of programs and policies, the better (Ibid). 
“Bottom-up” approach  
The “bottom-up” approach represented by e.g. Elmore, McLaughlin and Whetherley/ 
Lipsky36, starts by looking at the actors involved and networks created in the policy 
problem rather than the policy decision taken by central government (Sabatier 1986a; 
Banik/ Kjellberg 2000: 153). “Bottom-uppers” criticise the “top-downers for drawing 
a clear distinction between policy formulation and implementation as no clear 
distinctions can be made (Sabatier 1986b). They also consider the “top-down” 
approach puts a too narrow focus on the central decision-makers as the key-actors, and 
neglects other actors such as the private actors, street level bureaucrats and local 
implementing officials (Ibid). “Bottom-uppers” also criticise the “top-down” approach 
for being difficult to employ when there is no dominant policy or agencies and a 
variety of actors are involved. This complex situation is often the case in social-service 
delivery (Ibid)37.  
                                                 
36 Elmore (1982), McLaughlin (1978) in Ingram 1990; Wheatherly/Lipsky 1977 in Younis/Davidson 1990 
37  Elmore questions “the assumption that explicit policy directives, clear statements of administrative responsibilities, and well-
defined outcomes will necessarily increase the likelihood that policies will be successfully implemented” (Elmore 1982). 
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The “bottom-up“ approach, unlike the “top-down” approach, does not bring forward 
the support from formal actors such as politicians. Instead this approach focuses on the 
substantial limit of central government to guide the behaviour of local implementers 
and target groups (Sabatier 1986a)38. Elmore (1982) considers the ability of actors at 
one level to influence the behaviour of other actors to be limited, and questions the 
importance of politicians and political control in implementation. He claims (…) “The 
notion that policy-makers exercise some kind of direct and determinant control over 
policy implementation might be called the ‘noble lie’ (…)” (Elmore 1982: 20 in 
Younis/Davidson 1990).  
Most adherents of the “bottom-up” approach do not include the existence of resources 
in their analysis, and take them more for granted. However, efficient channelling of 
resources is important according to Elmore. Resources should be given to those in 
direct contacts with the target group-such as organisations and other street-level 
bureaucrats (Elmore 1982). Policy-makers should instead of seeking control over the 
organisations make the most of their human resources. They should allow for 
implementers to fully utilise the organisations’ professional experience, and support 
them by the “strategic use of funds” (Elmore 1978: 605 in Younis/Davidson: 1990).  
The “bottom-up” approach emphasises the importance of informal actors such as the 
“street level bureaucrats”, meaning those who interact directly with the target group 
(teachers, social workers, priests, traditional healers etc.) in service delivery rather 
than the formal actors39 (Sabatier 1986a). They argue that civil society organisations 
are more essential actors in implementing programs as they have more influence on 
regulation of people’s behaviour than government officials (Sabatier 1986a). Elmore 
believes in the mobilisation of local skills and inclusion of competence from the 
target-groups in formulating and implementing programs40 (Kjellberg/ Reitan 1995: 
155). He claims “(…) the diversity in the performance of the task is an important 
                                                 
This will be further examined in a later section looking at decentralisation vs. centralisation in implementation of policies.   38
39 According to Weatherly/ Lipsky the street level bureaucrats are those who have direct contact with the public and are required 
to make decisions about people’s life on a daily basis (Wheatherly/ Lipsky 1977 in Younis/Davidson 1990)  
40 There is a close connection between local level authority and civil society involvement which a later paragraph will further 
examine. 
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source of knowledge about how to do it better” (Elmore 1982) He also asserts:  
“organizations can be remarkably effective devises for working out difficult public 
problems (…)” (Elmore 1982).  However, in order to employ organisations 
successfully in public policy, government must know of their competence, 
performance and the resources required, and whether or not their influence will have 
substantial effect on the problem the policy is trying to solve (Elmore 1982).  
Adherents of the “bottom-up approach” believe, in contrast to the “top-downers“, that 
control of street-level professional is neither possible nor desirable (Sabatier 1986a). 
They believe that elected policy-makers neither at national nor at local level seldom 
can exercise effective control over “street-level bureaucrats” as the communication 
and control between them is limited (March/Simon 1958, Grunow: Ch.13 in Sabatier 
1986a). For Elmore (1982) the control of organisations work against the principle of 
reciprocity, as diversity in performance is an important source of knowledge and can 
lead to improvement on the outcome. “Bottom-uppers” believe that instead of control 
there should be trust between government and civil society and “(…) one should give 
them the resources required and trust them to do a good job” (Sabatier 1986a).  
Adherents of the “bottom-up” approach are more positive to decentralisation in policy 
implementation and criticise the “top-down” approach for focusing too much on 
central governing and control. They wish for decisions to be taken closer to people, 
and implementation to be conducted by local government. The decision-makers and 
implementers at local levels know more about people’s needs and programs become 
more efficient. Elmore is one of the authors having a clear decentralised position. He 
claims that the less hierarchical control and the closer one is to the source of the 
problem, the higher is the possibility that an intervention will reach the behaviour it 
attempts to change (Elmore 1980: 28-29 in Kjellberg/ Reitan 1995: 153 and Elmore: 
1982). The authors see implementation as a process of learning where policy-makers 
change their politics and adapt them to the problems they seek to improve. Hence, the 
programmes do not to turn out to be standardised and abstract (Elmore 1980: 27 in 
Kjellberg/ Reitan 1995: 155). According to Elmore there is no need for control from 
the centre. Even if the top knows what the bottom is doing any attempt to tightly 
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circumscribe the behaviour of professionals is likely to be counterproductive (Elmore 
1978 in Sabatier 1986a).  
Sabatier (1986b) has brought together the two approaches in a synthesis. According to 
Sabatier the most useful principle of aggregation when analysing is by “belief system”. 
A belief system is “(…) actors from various public and private organizations who 
share a set of beliefs and who seek to realize their common goals over time” (Sabatier 
1986b). Thus, he wants to use the networking methodology to identify the actors, but 
also to look at socio-economic conditions and legal instruments that influence 
perceptions, resources and participation of actors and constrain behaviour. According 
to Sabatier both implementation approaches can be criticised on decentralisation vs. 
centralisation of programmes: “Just as top-downers are in danger of overemphasizing 
the importance of the Centre vis-à-vis the Periphery, bottom-uppers are likely to 
overemphasize the ability of the Periphery to frustrate the Centre” (Sabatier 1986b). 
3.3  Development theories 
Grindle/ Cleaves 
In her edited book Merilee Grindle (1980) discusses policy and implementation in 
third world countries. She criticises studies which range variables that intervene in the 
process of implementation41, and who has a too narrow focus on administrative 
apparatus and characteristics of the bureaucratic officials. The author nevertheless 
agrees with the “top-down” approach as “means are designed and pursued in the 
expectation of arriving at particular ends”42, and where the evaluation of programmes 
is made “ (…) by measuring program outcomes against policy goals” (Grindle 1980). 
Grindle points at implementation in third world countries as different from 
implementation in the developed world43. The author shows us the importance of 
evaluating the context in which different policies are implemented in these countries. 
                                                 
41See Bardach (1977): “The implementation game”; Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975): “Policy implementation Process” 
 
42 Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) “The implementation process” 
43 For instance high concentration of political activity on the implementation process in third world countries leads to more 
complexity and difficulties (Grindle 1980). 
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Hence, she brings to our attention the need for relating implementation problems to the 
characteristics of the political regimes in which policies/programmes are implemented. 
According to Grindle (1980) formal actors such as bureaucrats and politicians have an 
important function also in developing countries, but should be evaluated on the basis 
of the current political regime. A program’s success may be affected by the priorities 
of political officials, and responsiveness is essential in order to e.g. provide for the 
allocation of resources. Furthermore, the author considers support and understanding 
from public institutions and bureaucrats of the environment in which they operate. 
This will ensure responsiveness to the needs of the target groups and flexibility, 
support and feedback to the programmes. 
Grindle (1980) also claims that bureaucrats must make sure there is political support 
and political commitment at national as well as at local level. Her research suggests 
that in a more open, democratic environment, elections impose a greater degree of 
responsiveness than under authoritarian regimes. This responsiveness to people’s 
needs leads to better adapted and more efficient programmes. Grindle (1980) asserts 
the motives for politicians to support a policy are not always noble and depends on 
whether or not the program is in any way a threat to the existing system. The author 
only considers political commitment/ support to be a necessary factor in 
implementation if there is real commitment and it not only lip-service. This point is 
further elaborated by Cleaves’ article who considers “more prudent political or 
bureaucratic leaders might hesitate to implement even modest changes if their power 
was on decline” (Cleaves 1980). He asserts that in times of national resistance to a 
program, there could be a strong effect of the arrival of a reform leader with deeply 
felt commitments in order to ensure success.  
Grindle (1980) claims that the type of regime will also decide whether or not the 
involvement of civil society will be a positive contribution to policies/ programmes in 
third world countries. She believes that in certain regimes civil society and interest 
groups might not represent the interests of its citizens but rather protect the interests of 
the existing systems and the politicians. Thus, their participation in formulating and 
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implementing policies in many cases do not assure responsiveness to people’s needs 
and more efficiency. Cleaves (1980) claims that in an open political system-
characterized by pluralism: (…) “a large number of relatively autonomous interest 
associations, political organizations and governmental agencies” can enhance policy 
implementation (Cleaves 1980).  He sees private organisations as playing a positive 
and important role in these open societies, and when their interests support the public 
programmes, there is a greater possibility of success. Cleaves claims it is often 
misleading to consider policies in these systems as simply “public” or “governmental” 
because the policy of private groups often has an effect on the public domain. The 
success of a programme/ policy increases when public and private resources 
eventually support matching goals44.  
Consistent with the research of Grindle (1980) implementers must be able to control 
the distribution of resources to achieve the goals of their programmes. Grindle (1980) 
and Cleaves (1980) focus on the special situation of the third world countries where 
the scarcity of available resources lead to more problematic implementation of policy 
and problems in setting of a political conflict.  Willingness of regimes to be responsive 
to demands does not always equal their capacity, and the lack of resources will thus 
not lead to successful outcomes (Grindle 1980). In order to generate extraordinary 
resources for problematic policies the choices are either by revolution to change power 
relations or through the bureaucracy (Cleaves 1980). According to Cleaves (1980) the 
possibility of the latter option varies according to type of system in the country. When 
public and private groups are cooperating in a policy (sort of pluralism) this “can 
enhance policy implementation if public and private resources support compatible 
goals, but it can also entail costs if power is widely distributed in a policy area where 
there is no room for change” (Cleaves 1980: own italic). 
Looking into Grindle’s studies (1980) the question of whether or not programmes 
should be decentralised is a question of the ability of central government to control the 
implementation. The author finds decentralisation to be a good strategy when central 
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authorities are able to have some form of control over local authorities to make sure 
their activities are kept within the boundaries of the programs. However, if there is 
little power from the centre to control local agencies, she argues the activities should 
be directed from the centre. Thus, also here it depends on the structure of political 
institutions and the type of political regime in which the program is implemented45. 
However, an implicit argument of decentralisation is brought forward as she claims 
constraints on communication between superiors and subordinates in third world 
bureaucracies, may mean that national level plans are not adapted to realities.  
Turner/ Hulme 
In Turner and Hulme’s analysis of development we recognise an argument of the “top-
down” approach as they claim that a strong political elite will be necessary to mobilise 
different kinds of resources, but also to get clear-sightedness into the programmes 
(Turner/ Hulme 1997 in Ingram 1990). These researchers acknowledge that lack of 
political will and commitment and weak institutional capacity can to a certain degree 
explain failures in policy implementation (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 79). Strong and 
consistent leadership from e.g. prime-ministers and other ministers is a necessity for 
successful reforms and implementation suffers if the commitment wanes: (...) 
“schedules are not met, aims are not achieved and accountability lapses” (p.130).  
Even though issues such as education and health are “public goods” and primarily the 
responsibility of the state, private involvement leads better quality of services and 
more resources (Van der Gaag 1995, p.4 in Turner/ Hulme 1997: 127). Also in very 
poor countries the inclusion of private partners is a way of overcoming poor 
bureaucratic performance and force the public sector to develop the countries through 
participatory goals (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 88). Thus, Turner/ Hulme like the “bottom-
up” approach do not have a strong faith in the bureaucracy in itself. The authors claim 
that for successful development interventions, the state and the bureaucrats should 
have limited influence and power and the private sector should be the most important 
actors (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 18-19). Contrary to either of the classic implementation 
                                                 
45 A study done by Rothenberg “suggests that under conditions of fragmented political power decentralisation is not a useful 
strategy for achieving policy goals” as this could paralyse the whole implementation process (Grindle 1980). 
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theories the governments should through public action pursue development goals and 
cooperate with the NGOs, private sector and other institutions of civil society. 
(Turner/ Hulme 1997: 57). These actors should make agreements, plan, coordinate 
their actions and distribute resources. A consequence of this cooperation, according to 
the authors, might be a narrowing of the gap between policy intention and 
implementation, thus enhancing the chances of success (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 91).  
According to Turner/ Hulme whether or not to decentralise is a question of the content 
of the programme. If there is a need for flexibility, innovation and responsiveness, one 
should decentralise, but if there is a large number of standardized product or services 
then centralisation is more efficient (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 108). They point at third 
world’s bureaucratic cultures having executed a centralised “top-down” approach to 
decision-making and implementation of programs with little influence of civil society 
(p.113). These programmes did not meet the needs of the target groups as 
centralisation led to an absence of flexibility and bureaucrats committed to 
participatory measures (p.114). We recognise here arguments made by the “bottom-up 
approach” that decentralisation leads to more involvement of civil society46.  
Rondinelli/ Montgommery 
Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991) point at one of the necessary characteristics for 
development programmes to be mobilisation of resources and political support. A 
developmentally oriented leadership should be focused on the issue in which to deal. 
Thus, these authors emphasise some of the same factors as the “top-down” approach. 
They point at strong political leadership and long periods of political stability allowing 
the more successful developing countries to create strong public and private 
institutions/ structures to establish and pursue goals for development. Thus, in line 
with Turner/ Hulme they also emphasise a need for consistent and stable support from 
political leaders47. Lack of stability in sustaining a regime has led to less political 
commitment and lack of success in development. According to Rondinelli/ 
                                                 
46 However, the authors also have certain reservations to decentralisation of programmes as one should be careful to prevent 
that not an enormous amount of needs, wants and demands will be expressed which the state couldn’t handle, which would 
cause risk of alienation (Turner/ Hulme 1997: 114). 
47 According to Adamolekun  (in Rondinelli/Montgommery 1991), in most African countries the state remains fragile because the 
central authority has had to cope with conflicts such as civil wars, revolts and massacres. 
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Montgommery, political leaders in successful countries have also been able to 
mobilise resources to change priorities and directions to achieve their goals (Ibid)48.  
Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991) assert that in the most successful countries the state 
has taken a strong role in guiding the development activities, especially in the 
beginning. They also believe the support from a well-trained and developmentally 
oriented government bureaucracy is important in mixed economies. Nevertheless, they 
support Turner/ Hulme (1997) and Cleaves (1980) as they speak for public 
administration to encourage private sector involvement in development as this sector 
can offer important services to the population. The role of public officials is thus to 
guide the initiatives of private organisations engaged in development. Consequently, 
they claim cooperation between public and private sector can lead to successful 
programs if they pursue the same goals of development. Rondinelli/ Montgommery 
(1991) believe that public officials can identify the necessary changes and implement 
them effectively, but they can also “create conditions that allow nongovernmental 
organizations to do so”. Hence, in order to understand development one must not only 
look at public administration as the relationships among a variety of organisations and 
groups in society increases the government’s capacity49.  
As Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991) point at “the ability to adapt, change and re-
channel resources in a pragmatic and responsive manner as social, economic and 
political conditions change”. The authors emphasise the importance of understanding 
the necessary structures for resource-mobilisation and channelling. Their studies 
confirm a need “to create effective structures and processes for mobilizing and using 
domestic and externally supplied resources purposively to attain their development 
goals (…)" (Rondinelli/Montgommery 1991). We notice that development theorists 
also look to external resources in addition to internal, an aspect which is absent in 
classic implementation theory.  
                                                 
48 For instance in the case of Ivory Coast (…) “the single party has been a channel of political recruitment, a means of mobilizing 
political support and a mechanism for participation” (Rondinelli/ Montgommery 1991). 
 
49 For example in the case of Costa Rica: “the creation of a strong development administration capacity was the result, again, of 
close public and private sector cooperation” (Rondinelli/ Montgommey 1991) 
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Other development approaches  
The state-centred approach to development came up in the 1970s and early 80s. They 
viewed the state as “a primary motor force behind social and economic occurrences on 
the continent and state leaders where held responsible (…)” (Chazan et al. 1999: 21). 
Adherents placed political factors at the centre of investigation and analysis of the 
African processes (Ibid). They focused on political leaders and their will/ support to 
different programmes to be essential for this approach (Chazan et al. 1999: 22). 
However, the 1980s “neo-liberalism” brought in an increasing understanding that the 
bureaucratic state is not a very efficient actor for success in development. Instead 
countries should reduce the state’s size and operations, while encouraging private 
sector growth and initiatives (Ibid). Large financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and the IMF through their SAP programmes were important adherents of this 
approach in the 1980s50. However, these actors have been criticised by various actors 
for not laying enough emphasis on the state institutions. For instance Abrahamsen 
point at these programmes leading to a reduction of the state and its institutions in 
public service delivery. Hence, people have to rely on private initiatives which can not 
ensure for people’s needs like the state (Abrahamsen 2000: 53-56, 77).   
According to Jain (1992) government officials have an important role to play and 
“bureaucracy has emerged as the most important institution to plan, perform and 
deliver public goods”. However, this author claims that bureaucrats can also be a 
hindrance for efficient policy implementation if they only take their own interests into 
consideration, and are not responsive and sensitive to people’s needs. The author 
claims collaboration of bureaucrats, organisations and private citizens could give the 
bureaucracy valuable information about the effect of the programmes on the 
beneficiaries.  
A study conducted by Materu et al. (2000) looks into the possibility of decentralised 
joint action in development. These authors claim political commitment, going beyond 
lip-service, has created an enabling environment as national politicians have supported 
cooperation between government and civil society at local level of government (p.48). 
                                                 
50Information on World Bank’s theory of implementation of health programmes will be addressed in section 3.4  
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Like Jain (1992) they also point at the need for local level officials’ support to 
involvement and partnership with private organisations in order to avoid duplication 
and conflict. This support will “(…) assure better priority setting, enhance resource 
mobilisation and lead to more effective implementation” (p.37). Through more 
intensive and systematic interaction between governmental and non-governmental 
actors the authors believe they can hold one another accountable, and build trust and 
better understanding (p.37). Materu et al (2000: 41) point at several cases where joint 
action helps overcome the lack of trust between the state and the private sector as 
actors recognise the comparative advantages and skills of each group 51.  
Materu et al. (2000) observe that the previously discussed building of confidence 
between various actors has helped “in stimulating local resource mobilisation” (p.39). 
Even though they claim local agencies should provide resources, they also consider 
external agencies as a necessity in bringing in needed funds to developing countries 
(p.33). The authors claim decentralisation is positive both for the efficient cooperation 
between the state and civil society, and for an efficient channelling of resources (p.13). 
They emphasise that local governments can provide an institutional framework, which 
facilitates the participation of different local actors (p.18). With decentralisation we 
hence see an increasing involvement by people and communities in decisions that 
affect their lives, and service provisions are likely to reflect local needs more 
accurately (p.15). Joint action at decentralised level has “helped strengthen local 
capacities and engendered confidence within the community in its ability to address its 
own development challenges” (Materu et al. 2000: 15). Nevertheless, the authors are 
pointing to the fact that decentralisation is not necessarily better than centralisation if 
delegation of power is not followed by enough resources. In developing countries 
financial constraints are caused by a weak revenue base and preservation of resources 
at the centre. This situation leads to lack of necessary resources and technical 
capacities for the local governments to carry out their responsibility (p.15).   
                                                 
51 ”The aim is rather to involve different actors (local authorities and non state actors including  various community groups, local 
businesses, trade unions etc.) in formulation and implementation of development programmes while  emphasizing the role and 
responsibilities of each of them and in working towards policy coherence” (Materu et al. 2000: 20)  
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3.4  Theory on implementation of health programmes  
World Bank  
The World Bank considered in the WDR of 1993 political will and political leadership 
as necessary prerequisites for health reforms and programmes to be successfully 
implemented almost everywhere (WB 1993: 15, 165). In the report “Investing in 
Health in Africa” (1994), the World Bank cleared out strong political commitment as 
one of the preconditions for efficient health programmes also in African countries. In 
this report the Bank even pointed at strong governmental will in order for early 
political initiatives to be taken in fighting HIV/AIDS (WB 1994: 100). The report 
points at HIV/AIDS to be a special case, and when dealing with the epidemic, 
circumstances make it tempting for countries and individuals to put off dealing with 
the issue until it is too late to prevent a widespread epidemic52 (WB 1994: 100). This is 
due to the fact that sexuality is involved, political benefits are small and issues are 
controversial (Ibid). In accordance with the “top-down” approach the World Bank 
believes political commitment is important also for the allocation of financial 
resources53 and for efficient co-operation between the government and the non-
governmental sector (WB 1993: 43).  
The World Bank focuses primarily on the need for financial resources. As they 
examine what is needed for HIV/AIDS interventions to have a successful outcome they 
end up with “(…) a combination of strategies, backed up with adequate resources 
(…)” (WB 1993: 100, own italic). The Bank points at poor economic conditions in 
African countries and reduction of their per capita health sector expenditures 
preventing these countries from efficiently implementing health programmes (WB 
1994: 03, 43). According to the WB donor resources should be increased and better 
channelled (WB 1994: 04, 43; 1993: 15)54. However, the Bank claims governments 
should play an important role in coordination of these resources to avoid the systems 
                                                 
52 There is also a seven-to-ten year lag between HIV infection and development of AIDS (WB 1994: 100) 
53 The Bank describes how one can see shortage of political commitment to health programmes through lack of necessary 
institutional and financial changes, and reluctance to appropriate a larger share of government funds to health purposes (WB 
1994: 03). Formulation of strategies will help to persuade donors to be financially committed (WB 1994:  41, 155). 
54 We recognise arguments from the discussion on development as the Bank points at economic growth leading to more internal 
money and a better chance of success. 
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from becoming fragmented, and to make sure national leaders take their responsibility 
(WB 1994: 155)55. In order to acquire more human resources the WB also believes the 
government should use more effective policies to finance training (WB 1993: 12). 
Internal resources to health programmes can also rise by promoting private-public 
cooperation and include e.g. NGOs hospitals in the government health-systems (WB 
1993: 168-170).  
There are similarities between the World Bank and the “bottom-up” approach as they 
both emphasise the need for involvement of informal actors such as civil society56. The 
WB claims that in an African environment private providers, mainly religious NGOs, 
are often more efficient, have a higher quality of services and a more direct influence 
on the target groups than the government (WB 1993: 05). In addition civil society 
often uses more creative methods to promote health education and information such as 
theatre, dancing, films etc (Ibid). However, contrary to the “bottom-uppers” the World 
Bank believes in collaboration between public and nongovernmental sectors as this 
will increase efficiency and concentrate more resources to programmes (WB 1994: 
05). In addition the Bank claims that inclusion of organisations in health service 
provision is most efficient in combination with decentralisation57.  
The World Bank does not wish for civil society to fully substitute government action, 
but wants governments to reduce their direct engagement where NGOs “show the 
potential for an increasing role”58 (WB 1994: 09; 1993: 55). In line with the “bottom-
up” approach the WB does not want government to unnecessary regulate the activities 
of civil society. Nevertheless, government should provide them with an enabling legal 
environment for the establishment and registration of their activities (WB 1993: 58, 
125). The World Bank claims government can lack capacity and competence to 
administer and implement policies as well as they might be corrupt (WB 1993: 59). 
                                                 
55 Governments should “develop national health policies and strategies and provide leadership to donors to help put them into 
effect” instead of planning strategies around the available donor-funding (WB 1994: 155, 170). 
56 For instance in distribution of public goods such as information about malaria and HIV/AIDS which are supposed to be given 
to the people by the government, non-profit NGOs may supply some of the needed goods (WB 1993: 55). 
57 According to the WB (1994: 42) involvement of local community groups is important for success and sustainability in health 
programs as it will lead to more trust between government officials and communities, and the programmes are more accurately 
designed to people’s needs and cultures. 
58 Bureaucracy together with politicians should support and understand the importance of civil society (WB 1994: 43). 
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Thus, in line with the “bottom-up” approach the WB claims government officials are 
not as efficient as civil society, but they still believe government should have a role to 
play in implementation of programmes 59.  
In line with the “bottom-up” approach the World Bank values decentralisation and 
explains how this policy “(…) can improve both efficiency and responsiveness to local 
needs in planning and management of government health services” (WB 1993: 128). 
They claim hierarchical and centralised structures are severe obstacles to successful 
health programmes in Africa (WB 1994: 43)60. On the contrary, decentralisation will 
create better institutional arrangements, thus improve the channelling of resources. The 
World Bank wants to combine decentralisation and involvement of civil society- as 
community participation and public support at district level leads to success (WB 
1994: 110). In addition participatory decision-making will develop a sense of 
ownership in local communities (WB 1994: 121). Central authorities, should formulate 
policies, allocate resources and monitor activities at the lower levels, whereas the local 
governments are responsible for the implementation of activities (WB 1994: 17). With 
local government control the Bank asserts that passing of information and coordination 
between various actors, such as government and NGOs, could improve. Districts 
should play an important role in the coordination and supervision of the activities (WB 
1994: 117-118). The World Bank considers successful decentralisation of health 
services requires sufficient financial and human resources as well as mechanisms of 
communication between the different levels of authority (WB 1994: 17, 168, 171)61.  
World Health Organisation  
The World Health Report, 2000, examines the health system’s performance and 
differences in health system’s efficiency to organise and finance themselves (WHO 
2000: xiii). There are three different ways in which health services can be organised: 
(…) “via hierarchical bureaucracies, through long-term contractual arrangements 
                                                 
59 World Bank also emphasises bureaucratic and political commitment for involvement of local communities and non-
governmental organisations in decision-making and implementation (WB 1994: 43). 
60 Centralised systems cannot provide the necessary “(…) organisational framework, managerial processes and financial and 
human resources (…)” (WB 1994: 43). 
61 Thus, donors should help strengthening the public institutions that finance and deliver health services, but also here 
governments should have the lead (WB 1994: 168, 171).   
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under some degree of non-market control, and as direct, short-term market-based 
interactions between patients and providers” (WHO 2000: 62)62. In line with the WB 
and development theories, WHO speaks for collaboration between public and private 
sector through long-term contracting. The intention is “to achieve combined 
advantages of greater flexibility and innovation while maintaining overall control over 
strategic objectives and financial protection” (WB 2000: 63).  WHO agrees with the 
“bottom-up” approach that private organisations “(…) might be more important than 
public resources directed through the health ministry” (WHO 2000: 120, 128)63. 
However, WHO also consents with the “top-down approach” in the need for 
coordination and regulation of NGOs. Governments should thus cooperate with the 
private sector-share information about the resources and interventions of the 
organisations, in order to get an oversight and regulate their behaviour (Ibid).   
WHO wants the ultimate responsibility for the overall performance of a country’s 
health system to always lie within government, although the organisation does not 
explicitly point at political commitment as a necessary factor (WHO 2000: 63) 
However, bureaucracies should have a strong sense of commitment and responsibility 
in order to establish efficient contractual relationships (WHO 2000: 63). According to 
WHO, health systems in low and middle-income countries are centralised and 
ineffective, and the bureaucrats do not recognise the most important actors in the 
fields: the “nongovernmental providers and health actors in other sectors than health” 
(WHO 2000: 120). 
WHO (2000: 95) points at three different possibilities for health systems to collect 
financial resources: revenue collection from e.g. organisations and donors, pooling of 
resources as insurance and purchasing interventions from the private sector. Thus, also 
WHO claims donors and private sector have a role to play in financing health services/ 
programmes. For countries that need more financial resources WHO considers one 
                                                 
62 WHO claims hierarchical controls are better in situations where there is a need of strong coordination in health services. 
However, as bureaucracies are not efficient, they can become a tool to the self-interests of the bureaucrats and often produce 
care that is unresponsive to people’s needs (p.63). On the other side markets are better where there is a need of flexibility and 
innovation, but totally dependency on markets (…) “is less successful for health as the markets work more poorly for health 
care” (WHO 2000: 63).  
63 When dealing with programs to control infectious diseases (e.g. malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS), WHO claims 
implementation as sometimes more effective when carried out under contractual relationships with local providers, than as 
vertical programmes isolated from other services (WHO 2000: 64). 
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should raise the level of public finance for health. In poor countries, however, 
obstacles appear. These countries (…) manage to raise less, in public revenue as a 
percentage of national income than the middle-and upper income countries” (WHO 
2000: 139). Simultaneously, ministries of finance in developing countries are often 
sceptical of the claims of need for resources by the health sector (Ibid). “These 
inefficiencies in collecting and pooling revenues reduce both the funds available for 
investment and for providing services, and people’s access to those services that can 
be financed” (WHO 2000: 113).  
WHO points at the need also for human resources: “the performance of health care 
systems depends ultimately on the knowledge, skills and motivation of the people 
responsible for delivering services” (WHO 2000: 77). According to the organisation 
governments should be responsible of continuing education and training of health 
service personnel, and to make sure of better geographical distribution throughout a 
country (WHO 2000: 79). However, WHO claims most inputs for health services are 
produced by the private sector with the exception of skilled human resources (Ibid).  
According to WHO (2000: 64) a balance between the need for oversight should be 
combined with sufficient flexibility for local implementers to innovate and adapt 
health policies to local needs. Thus, in many aspects WHO speaks for programmes to 
be decentralised. The organisation claims decentralisation “should be designed to 
increase accountability and should give central government and ministries a new role, 
focusing on overall regulation and monitoring” (WHO 2000: 139). However, 
accountability and responsiveness from government officials are important when 
autonomy increases64 (WHO 2000: 110). In this case, there is a possibility of increased 
resources from donors, which again will contribute further to success (Ibid).  
Nevertheless, with increased autonomy overall central policy and guidance is 
necessary to ensure coordination between public and private resources to avoid 
fragmentation and reduced efficiency (WHO 2000: 68, 91).  
                                                 
64 In many cases “central governments reassert control in a heavy-handed fashion” when dealing with politically sensitive issues 
(WHO 2000: 69). 
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Other health approaches 
Cassels (1995) supports the “top-down” approach as she points at the health sector 
programmes requiring political leadership and support. Without political support the 
author claims government might easily be placed on the sideline of reforms, or they 
might not be initiated. The author sees the context in which policies will be 
implemented to be of importance both for political support and for the availability of 
resources65. To improve the functions of the bureaucracies the countries should track 
the distribution of financial and human resources especially as they collaborate with 
other actors such as NGOs (Ibid). Cassels (1995) agrees with the “bottom-up 
approach” that local government control, at least in theory, offers the advantage of 
making health services more accountable to the public. However, due to limited 
capacity the centre must ensure enough financial and human resources to the districts 
and control the distribution of these resources.  
Lorgen (1998) is, like the “bottom-up” approach, very positive to the involvement of 
civil society and points at the need for participation of NGOs in order to attract 
resources from donors. The author believes NGOs activities can contribute with 
development of human resources through training of “government staff or assist in the 
development or reorientation of government programme” (Lorgen 1998). She agrees 
with the WB and WHO that NGOs have “a comparative advantage to the image of the 
state as a corrupt or inefficient institution (…)” (Ibid). The author sees a possibility of 
the involvement of NGOs to strengthen the capacity of the government through 
collaboration, and believes the quality of the relationships between NGOs and 
governments decides if these organisations accomplish their goals (Edwards/ Hulme 
1994 in Lorgen 1998). Thus, like WHO, Lorgen does not want the state to be put on 
the sideline of health programmes. In her article Clark asserts that NGOs can “oppose 
the state, complement it or reform it, but they cannot ignore it” (Clark 1991: 75 in 
Lorgen: 1998). There should also be some government control in order to avoid more 
donor dependency (Lorgen 1998). The state is important to ensure national coverage 
of health services as NGOs often work in limited geographical areas. 
                                                 
65 During crisis or emergence of civil war lack of financial and human resources does not create an enabling environment for 
health policies to be efficiently implemented (Cassels 1995). 
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In Zwi/Mills’ article (1995) the term political will is criticised by Reich as analytically 
vague, even though the term is often cited as a necessity for success in health gain. 
Like Grindle/Cleaves (1980) Reich considers it to be better to examine the context of 
the policies: the history and socio-culture in which a policy is to be implemented as 
well as to analyse the characteristics of the political regime, the political/ economical 
interests in place (Ibid). Zwi/ Mills (1995) are like the “top-down” approach more 
reluctant to the involvement of the private sector in health programmes and contracting 
of services, as this has not been proved efficient in poor countries. A danger of 
liberalisation of services is fragmentation and duplication of service provisions, 
especially if the state is weak and there is lack of coordination between the actors. 
Ugalde/ Jackson (1995) criticise the World Development Report, 1993 (World Bank) 
as they claim this report to be a contribution to the traditional neo-liberal approach. 
The authors claim this report “(…) minimizes the role of the governments in public 
health interventions and health care delivery, places most of the responsibility of 
health on individuals (…)” (Ugalde/ Jackson 1995). They point at evaluations66 of 
private hospitals in Brazil67, which have questioned the efficiency, quality and ability 
to reduce costs. Ugalde/ Jackson believe that the public sector is not always efficient 
but instead of limiting its role, they want to improve its efficiency.  The authors agree 
with the WB that many third world countries have paid little attention to how scarce 
resources are being used, but believe they put too large emphasis on increased 
financial resources and especially economic growth. The major obstacle to health is 
not the absence of resources, which are often there, but how resources are being used. 
The question of a country’s power-relations, who controls the resources, is more 
important. Resources are often in the hands of the local, national and world leaders 
with the quest to stay in power more than a real interest for their people (Werner; 
1998, p.3 in Ugalde/Jackson 1995). The article also criticise the WB’s 
recommendation of decentralisation as this is a complex process which cannot be 
                                                 
66 By Rodrigues, 1989; McGreevy et al.; 1985 in Ugalde/Jackson 1995. 
 
66 “In developing countries where the public system has a near monopoly on health service delivery, a mixed system that 
exposes public service to competition is likely to reduce costs” (WB 1993: pp.125-6 in Ugalde Jackson 1995). 
 The Brazilian hospitals has to some extent followed the WBs advice with a mixed system (Ugalde/Jackson 1995). 67
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recommended to all countries. Instead, one should take the country’s historical, 
political, social and geographical realities into account (Collins 1989 in 
Ugalde/Jackson 1995). They claim decentralisation can even be a measure to increase 
central control rather than a response to pressure from below (Gonzalez-Block, 1991, 
p.85 in Ugalde/Jackson 1995)68.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The theoretical point of departure in order to examine the relative success of the 
Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes is the two different approaches within 
implementation theory: the “top-down” approach and the “bottom-up” approach. On 
the one hand the “top-down” approach focuses on the importance of 
support/commitment by formal actors such as politicians and government officials and 
the availability of resources. While on the other hand, the “bottom-up” approach 
stresses the involvement and support of “street-level bureaucrats”, such as civil 
society, in order to succeed in implementation of public programmes. And while “top-
downers” wish for decision-making and implementation of programmes to be 
centralised, “bottom-uppers” speaks for a decentralised approach with more local level 
control. Development theorists and health theorists look more into the cooperation 
between formal and informal actors, and the political context in which the programmes 
are implemented. In addition, they do not take resources for granted in countries where 
resources are scarce, and inclusion of external donors is crucial.  
 
 
 
                                                 
68 For instance (…)  “in the case of Mexico, decentralization actually increased the power of the federal government in local 
decisions” (Ugalde/ Jackson: 1995).  
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4 HIV/AIDS programmes in Uganda 
4.1 Introduction and the National Policy on HIV/AIDS 
 The GOU fully recognizes that HIV/AIDS poses a real and serious threat to the socioeconomic life and 
 development of the country. All Ugandans have individual and collective responsibility  to be actively 
 involved in the HIV prevention, AIDS care and mitigation of all its perceived consequences (UAC: 
 1997: 01). These activities should take place: (…) in a coordinated way at the various administrative
 and political levels down to the grassroots level (UAC 1993a: vii.)   
There is not one adopted policy (statute) on the fight against HIV/AIDS in Uganda. 
However, various government directives have been announced, such as these citations 
from the two first National Strategic Plans (NSPs). In 1996 altogether around 44 
policy statements had been agreed upon, which have evolved around several issues 
dealing with the fight against AIDS69 (UAC 1996 in UAC 1997a: 01). Even though 
these policies have not been approved by the Cabinet, they are operational and act as 
guidelines (UAC 1997a: 01-02). Policies have involved testing, condom use, 
treatment, counselling, care and support of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs). 
Furthermore, policies comprise mitigation of the socioeconomic effects of HIV/AIDS 
at all levels: family, community and national (UAC 1997a: 02).  
In addition to the early establishment of the Aids Control Programme (ACP) in 1986, 
the Aids Commission (UAC) and its Secretariat was constituted on March 13th, 1992 
by a Statute of Parliament70. The Ugandan Government has since 1986 also had “a 
policy of openness” and political commitment to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (UAC 2000: 
01). Policies have also been made through persistent and continued collaboration 
between civil society, government and donors. This cooperation has been expressed by 
various actors and documents and even in the Statute of the UAC.  
Various interventions have sought to raise people’s awareness on HIV/AIDS and 
change their sexual behaviours. Numerous actors have participated in programmes as 
they have stretched from local level responses to high level government initiatives. 
                                                 
69 Even though these are figures from 1996, they give us an idea of the amount of policy proposals in fighting HIV/AIDS. 
70 th The Statute Suppliment no. 2 to the Uganda Gazette No.11 Volume LXXXXV dated 13  March 1992.
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According to the “Inventory of Agencies” (2001) a total number of 717 agencies are 
involved in HIV/AIDS control activities today 71 (AMREF 2001: viii). National 
Strategic Frameworks/Plans (NSF/Ps) have been formulated by the Uganda AIDS 
Commission (UAC) since 1992 setting these aims for the national HIV/AIDS 
programmes: 1) to stop the spread of the epidemic, 2) to mitigate the impacts of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic72, and 3) to strengthen the national capacity to respond to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and mobilise resources (UAC 2000: 03).  
One of the most important components of the Ugandan response has been 
“Information, Education and Communication” (IEC), which is centred on the 
promotion of safer sexual practices and on helping PLHAs to live positively with 
HIV/AIDS, thus limiting further spread. Both government institutions and NGOs have 
been involved in IEC development and distribution (UAC 2000: 19).  According to the 
latest “Inventory of Agencies” around 69 percent of all agencies (78 percent in 1997) 
execute preventive interventions today (AMREF 2001: 17). Activities comprise 
community sensitisation and education to bring about positive behavioural change, 
voluntary counselling and testing (VCT), control of sexually transmitted diseases and 
prevention of blood-borne HIV transmission (AMREF 2001: viii). This study will set 
the major focus on the agencies’ preventive activities in order to reduce the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic. 
4.2 Government programmes 
When HIV/AIDS was first diagnosed the country had few resources and modest 
knowledge on how to fight the disease. Hence, the first responses to the epidemic were 
few and sporadic (Kaleeba et al. 2000: 04). The first government organised response to 
the epidemic was launched in 1985 with the introduction of the National Committee 
for Prevention of AIDS (UAC 1997a: 13). However, combating HIV/AIDS was 
already part of the programme of the “National Resistance Movement” (NRM) when 
they seized power in 1986 (Damgaard 2000). According to our informants the NRM 
                                                 
71 This  was a 30% reduction from 1997 due to stricter criterion of identifying agencies in 2001 and due to the termination of the 
STI project (AMREF: 01: viii). 
72 Involving care and support of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs). 
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government has since its takeover up to now continued to have “the fight against 
HIV/AIDS” as one of their priority areas. Politicians at all levels have been engaged in 
order to spread information about the epidemic and raise money to these, with the 
President of Uganda as the most important actor.  
Already in October 1986 the new NRM government established the AIDS Control 
Programme (ACP) in the Ministry of Health (UAC 1997a: 13). Various preventive 
programmes were started in order to reach out to the population, to raise awareness 
and reduce their risk behaviour. The ACP’s overall objectives were to reduce the 
spread of HIV and to mitigate the impact of the epidemic on communities, families 
and individuals (UAC 1993a: 13). The major functions of the programme in its initial 
phase were epidemiological surveillance, ensuring safe blood supply, providing of 
HIV/AIDS information, education and communication (IEC), patient care and 
counselling and control of STDs (Kagimu et al 1996: 03, own italic). General 
awareness- campaigns were set into life without much focus on behavioural change, 
but intended only to distribute information to people at national, district and grass-root 
level. Mass media and sensitisation campaigns spread the message through radio, 
newspapers and TV (Hyde et al. 2001: 19; STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: 37).  
Informants point at the government primarily spreading the messages of HIV/AIDS 
from central level during this initial phase. Central institutions had the responsibility to 
make decisions and implement the programmes from national to local levels. MOH 
coordinated the national response of the epidemic during this time period, whereas the 
participation by other sectors and institutions were limited and very ad hoc in nature 
(UAC 1993a: vi). Nevertheless, some civil society organisations also participated in 
the early response at national levels. For instance, The Aids Support Organisation 
(TASO) was established already in 198773 and the Aids Information Centre (AIC) in 
1990. Moreover, various CBOs responded spontaneously. 
In Masaka District a number of emergency measures were early put in place. These 
aimed at raising awareness and mitigating the social and personal impact of HIV/AIDS 
                                                 
73 There will be further information on the involvement of civil society in section 4.3. 
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(MDLG 2002: 06). “Prior to the STI project, activities for HIV control were mainly 
implemented in a vertical manner from the Ministry of health and by non 
governmental organisations” (MDLG 1999a: 03) District IEC campaigns mainly 
focused on raising awareness and preventing sexual transmission of HIV (Musisi 
2002; MDLG 2002: 06). Simultaneously, care for PLHAs was initiated by NGOs 
(MDLG 2002: 06). Thus, NGOs, religious institutions together with the District 
Medical Office and the MOH were actors involved in the 1980s (Musisi 2002).  
Informants in Masaka also point at the early response being directed from the centre 
using central level resources, whereas few decisions were made at district level.  
The Multisectoral Approach (MSAP)  
Already in 1988 a review of the HIV/AIDS activities recommended more programmes 
to be carried out at lower levels with inclusion of actors like civil society, local level 
politicians and all public sectors (Kagimu et al. 1996: 03). From around 1990 the GOU 
determined that HIV/AIDS was not only a health issue, but an issue influencing all 
sectors. Thus, in 1990/91 the Multisectoral Approach (MSAP) was launched and 
several departments established their own programmes. Currently there are 13 Aids 
Control Programs (ACPs) under 12 different ministers (Ibid). The Statute of the UAC 
announced a change in the response: “Multisectoral Approach means active 
involvement of all sectors including non-governmental and community based 
organizations in HIV/AIDS prevention and control”74.  
Informants at both levels, as well as the NSPs, emphasise that government 
programmes have become more and more decentralised75. Moreover, the programmes 
have to a greater extent involved the private sector, as government officials collaborate 
with civil society in planning and implementation of activities. Since 1993, 
decentralisation has been part of the NSPs’ agenda, and more control has been given to 
district administrations or local governments (UAC 1993a: 03). “The implementation 
of HIV/AIDS interventions have been decentralised throughout the country, with each 
                                                 
74 The Statute Supplement no. 2 to the Uganda Gazette No.11 Volume LXXXXV dated 13th March 1992. 
75 For more information on the coordination see 4.3. 
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district having and annual work plan for HIV/AIDS prevention and control” 
(STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: v). Informants at both levels confirm that in the 
districts public and private partners plan and implement their own HIV/AIDS 
programmes. However, they have to follow the national guidelines and policies set by 
the national level. At national level the AIDS Commission establishes and coordinates 
the Multisectoral Approach (MSAP), develops national policies and implementation 
guidelines, integrate the support and monitor all AIDS control activities throughout 
Uganda76 (UAC 1993a: 11). Coordination of programmes occurs at national, regional 
and district levels and the NSPs intend to facilitate the actors’ response (AMREF 
2001: vii). In 1992 District AIDS Coordination Committees (DACCs) were 
established by UAC to coordinate the approach in all the then existing 39 districts 
(UAC 2002). In some districts AIDS committees were also formed at sub-county, 
parish and village levels (Ibid). DACCs were replaced by DHACs in 2000 to be 
chaired by a District HIV/AIDS Focal Officer. DHACs include all Heads of 
Departments, PLHAs and local and international NGOs (Ibid). The health policy 
reforms have also decentralised AIDS control to districts, sub-districts and 
communities. This reform promotes collaboration with the education sector and 
partnerships with churches, NGOs and PLHAs (Okware et al. 2001).  
Informants emphasise how the response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic has changed from 
primarily seeking to raise awareness, to a stronger emphasis on influencing people’s 
sexual behaviours. Whereas the original messages against AIDS were fear-based with 
messages such as “AIDS kills”, they have changed into media campaigns stressing 
compassion, solidarity and hope (Kaleeba et al. 2000 in Hyde et al. 2001: 22). 
Government’s prevention campaigns have continued with a stronger focus on 
behavioural change, and additional education campaigns are carried out through the 
private sector77. The ACP in the MOH has especially targeted vulnerable groups 
(women and youth) and focused on inter-personal communication and a deeper 
understanding of the issue (STD/AIDS Control programme 2000: 37). They also make 
                                                 
76 Rwomushana (1999) claims the coordination is not entirely centralised as UAC is facilitator, participatory and all inclusive and 
not controlling, directing or supervising. 
77 The HIV/AIDS Programmes of civil society will be elaborated on in the following section. 
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use of additional channels such as 14 FM stations78, the popular press, public 
campaigns and interpersonal communication to spread the message of abstinence, 
faithfulness and condom-use (Hyde et al. 2001: 18).  
The Ministry of Health together with AIC, manages 54 HIV testing centres in 22 
districts of Uganda where they provide Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) 
services (STD/AIDS Control programme 2000: 41). The MOH is also, in cooperation 
with NGOs, responsible for counselling and home-based services. In order to ensure 
mitigation of the impact of the epidemic the ACP has (…) trained thousands of health 
personnel in HIV/AIDS counselling and related skills, and has also trained volunteers 
as community AIDS workers, counselling aides and peer educators” (Hyde et al. 2001: 
18). Informants also point at a recent change of the government’s response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic as it today involves the treatment aspect: provision of VCT to 
pregnant women, and a recent programme providing some people with ARVs.  
As adolescents are the key target groups of many programmes, interventions have 
been implemented in the education sector. With the help from UNICEF the Ministry of 
Education and Sports started their programmes as early as in 1986 (Hyde et al. 2001: 
20). HIV/AIDS education has been introduced in the primary education system, and in 
the last year of primary schools this issue is also included in the curriculum (Hyde et 
al. 2001: vi; STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: 16). However, in secondary and 
tertiary schools HIV/AIDS is not yet included in the curriculum, but peer-groups and 
NGOs have spearheaded the campaign against HIV prevention79 (STD/AIDS Control 
Programme 2000: 60). The NGO “Straight Talk” provides information to students 
about HIV/AIDS through their newspapers “Straight Talk” and “Young Talk”, and 
through their radio-shows and peer-clubs in schools (Hyde et al. 2001: 10).   
Other government departments have carried out AIDS programmes in Uganda, 
especially the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Ministry of 
Information and Ministry of Local Government. These programmes have contributed 
                                                 
 During the 1990s the GoU passed legislation which removed government control of mass media (Kaleeba et al. 2000: 12) 78
79 Even though the latest strategic plan of the ACP, MOH seeks to introduce the subject in the curriculum of secondary/ tertiary 
schools (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: 30, 60) 
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to the prevention of the epidemic, mitigation of its impact and capacity building within 
their areas of jurisdiction (Hyde et al. 2000). Since 1995 the Ministry of Local 
Government has been involved in HIV/AIDS prevention and control activities mostly 
through capacity building at national level as well as training of local level 
governments officials and political leaders (MOLG 2000: 07-08).  
HIV/AIDS programmes also exist as a component of the communicable diseases under 
Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). HIV/AIDS activities are also 
included in the Primary Health Care (PHC) package, which is part of the health sector 
strategic response (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: 27). All health units provide 
(HC3 and above) counselling and psychosocial support to individuals/families affected 
and promote behavioural change through IEC programmes and VCT services (MOH 
2000: 19). In addition the STIP and MAP projects launched by the GOU in 
collaboration with donor agencies have been extremely important projects in order to 
channel information on HIV/AIDS80.  
In Masaka District the focus of the HIV/AIDS activities from the early 1990s was still 
on prevention of the disease. In addition, mitigation of the impact of the epidemic and 
strengthening of district capacity for STD/HIV/AIDS control became other objectives 
(Musisi 2002). In this time-period the District IEC campaigns were supported by the 
ACP and care was provided by NGOs. There was an establishment of AIDS Clinics/ 
Pastoral Care counselling and Mobile Home Care services and of VCT centres in two 
hospitals and one health centre. Government and civil society trained peer educators 
such as Community Counselling Aides, Behavioural change agents, home care 
volunteers and health workers in STD management. In addition, effective T.B. 
management and home visiting was supported by STIP and DISH 1 (Musisi 2002). 
DISH projects financed by the USAID have also been implemented in the district in 
close cooperation with the District Medical Office (MDLG 1997). Currently, 
HIV/AIDS interventions are: Community HIV/AIDS led initiatives (component of the 
MAP project), adolescent friend Reproductive Health Services (supported by DISH 
                                                 
80 These projects will be elaborated on in the section 4.4. 
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281), District Response Initiative (DRI) (supported by UNICEF) and improved clinical 
management of AIDS patients e.g. (ARVS) (Musisi 2002). Informants also point at 
health education in primary and secondary schools including training and peer-
educator programmes82. From 1996-1997/98 there was a program sponsored by DISH 
(USAID) in schools with competitions in secondary school-script writing and drama 
tours. This project also sensitised local leaders at the lower levels, formed health clubs 
in district institutions and sensitised on STDs and held mass media campaigns on 
STDs (MDLG 1999a:03). According to informants Masaka district has also recently 
opened up a clinic in Masaka Hospital providing free ARVs to a few citizens.  
All sectors are involved in Masaka’s response today: Health, Education, Production, 
Security, Planning administration and Gender and Community Development (MDLG 
2002: 07). Informants explain how the district has constructed integrated work-plans 
with all relevant actors involved in HIV/AIDS activities to the STIP, MAP projects 
from 1995 to this day. Civil society and government departments (all sectors) gather in 
their DACC/DHAC to make a district plan according to the guidelines set by central 
level (Musisi 2002 [interview]).  
4.3 Civil society programmes83
Civil society organisations have since the early beginning of the response to the 
epidemic, and especially since the start of the MSAP, been referred to as partners by 
the government (UAC 1993a: 37). The “Inventory of Agencies, 2001” claims that 
CBOs84 constitute 21.9 percent of the agencies involved in HIV/AIDS activities in 
Uganda, while NGOs85 comprise 17.2 percent (AMREF 2001: 09). According to our 
informants and several reports civil society organisations have channelled much 
information on HIV/AIDS, especially when it comes to care of the PLHAs. 
                                                 
81 During my stay in Masaka the District’s Health services office got to know that DISH 2 would not further implement activities. 
82 There are dramas/ essay-competitions and videos are shown in school to promote STD-sensitization and behavioural change 
(Namisangov 2000: [interview]). 
83 Only some of the most important civil society organisations will be looked into in this chapter and the organisation “Straight 
Talk”  was referred to in section 4.2. 
84 CBOs: (…) “agencies that are founded or initiated within the local communities and operated by community members with 
donor support or funds delegated through the Local Government (AMREF: 01: 09).  
85 NGOs: (…) “agencies that have a national portfolio with a central governing body and peripheral operation branches spread 
out in the country”  (AMREF: 01: 09) 
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Communities responded at various levels to the epidemic by organising groups to 
educate their people concerning HIV prevention and support to PLHAs (Kagimu et al. 
1996: 04). Around 28.4 percent of the agencies, mostly NGOs and CBOs, are engaged 
in home-based care and support to the PLHAs and community outreach services 
(AMREF 2001: 19). These organisations distribute their information through peer-
education, receptive post-test clubs and communal forums for mutual spiritual and 
moral support (Ibid). Several of these organisations, such as TASO, were initiated by 
and for PLHAs. 
TASO has since 1988 offered many services in order to fight HIV/AIDS in Uganda. 
Care of PLHAs is the major one as the organisation provides them with medical 
treatment, counselling and nursing care (TASO 1995: xi). Their slogan is: “Living 
Positively with AIDS”, and openness about the disease is highly encouraged (Hyde et 
al. 2001: 18). Through counselling of the PLHAs and their families the organisation 
contributes with information to people on how to protect themselves and others from 
the HIV virus. In addition, TASO sensitises community leaders through community 
gatherings and meetings in the Resistance Councils86 etc (TASO/WHO 1995: x). Since 
1995 music, dance and drama groups in TASO counselling centres have become very 
instrumental in educating communities (TASO 1997: 11). TASO has since 1990 
trained counsellors and community-AIDS educators also for other organisations, 
wishing to integrate HIV/AIDS care and prevention in their services (TASO 1997: 18).   
National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS in Uganda (NACWOLA) is 
an organisation with a mission to “improve the quality of life of women with 
HIV/AIDS and their families in Uganda” (NACWOLA 2000). Important objectives 
are to fight stigma attached to the disease and empower women and orphans. 
NACWOLA focuses on their economic rights in order to reduce dependency and 
vulnerability, and offer psychosocial support through counselling and home visits. 
Spreading the message of HIV/AIDS in the community is also one of their objectives 
(Ibid). The AIDS Information Centre (AIC) provides first and foremost an opportunity 
for people to get tested. In addition they offer post- and pre-test counselling where 
                                                 
86 With the Local Government Act of 1997 Resistance Councils became Local Councils 
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they sensitise people on how to protect themselves and their partners. The post-test 
club offers education, awareness creation through entertainment and education, 
production and distribution of condoms and provision of IEC materials (AIC 2001: 08) 
There are also family planning services where clients receive information on family 
planning and are sensitised about ways to avoid contracting HIV (AIC 2001: 06).  
Various religious groups, including Catholics, Protestants and the Islamic Medical 
Association Uganda (IMAU) have carried out programmes to educate their 
communities in prevention of HIV/AIDS. They also focus on how one can provide 
sympathetic care for the PLHAS as well as support affected families, especially 
widows and orphans (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04). Aids Widows Orphans Family Support 
(AWOFS) was founded in March 1991 to “alleviate the social and economic impact of 
AIDS on affected families” (AWOFS: leaflet). These programmes aim at behavioural 
change by providing health education and encourage positive living among HIV 
positive clients and encourage children of these clients to lead safe lives (Lubega 2002 
[interview]). In addition the Federation of Uganda Employers early started the project 
“AIDS in the workplace” in various enterprises (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04). 
In Masaka district civil society organisations have been involved in the response to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic since the very beginning (MDLG 2002: 01). Civil society 
delivers information to people through counselling, home-care and training of 
volunteers (MDLG 1997; 2002). There is extensive collaboration between government 
agencies and NGOs in delivering AIDS services (MDLG 2002: 06). Kitovu Hospital 
early started a mobile AIDS home care programme in Masaka, which became a model 
for other hospitals (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04). Kitovu Mobile Home Care Services have 
been basically involved in home care for HIV/AIDS clients and counselling of PLHAs 
and support of orphans and families. Health education is also one of their components 
as they contribute to community capacity building and HIV/AIDS behavioural change 
(MDLG 1997: 03-05; 2002: 07-09). Informants also point at TASO as an agency with 
many activities in Masaka, which both inform the general public and offer care and 
support to PLHAs. World Vision has been important in rehabilitation and equipping of 
health care facilities. Furthermore, this INGO is central in training in AIDS prevention 
 69
of community health care workers (CHW) and village health committees and 
education and counselling of AIDS patients (Ibid). In addition, religious organisations 
have carried out HIV/AIDS activities. The Grassland Foundation has targeted Muslim 
communities, schools and religious leaders in their programmes (MDLG 1997: 04). 
And the Catholic organisation MADDO has provided AIDS-emergency facilities 
aimed at looking after AIDS patients and orphans including payment of school-fees for 
orphans and protection of their rights (Buwembo 2000 [interview]). 
4.4 Resources 
Extensive financial resources have been allocated for HIV/AIDS activities 
implemented in governmental and non-governmental organisations, research, 
institutions and religious groups (UAC 1997a: 15). The first NSP (1994-1998) was 
estimated at US$ 78.9 million for the government sector, and around US$ 500 
including all non-governmental agencies, whereas the latest NSP (2000/1- 2005/6) was 
estimated at around US$ 181.5 millions87  (UAC 1993b: 20; UAC 2000: 36)88. In year 
2002 a Resource Tracking Study89 was carried out by UAC to track financial resources 
for HIV/AIDS activities allocated by donors in year 2001. According to this study a 
total amount of US$ 43.71 million were allocated by donors in year 200190. These 
funds were spent on; care and support (28 percent), prevention (19 percent), capacity 
building (16 percent), VCT services (12 percent), research (12 percent), adolescents (7 
percent) and OVC91 activities (4 percent). According to the WB the total amount  of 
funds provided by other agencies than the WB is estimated to about US$16-17 
millions per year (WB 2000: 18). 
Since 1987, a number of multilateral, bilateral and private external support agencies 
have responded by supporting AIDS-related activities through financial and technical 
assistance92 (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04).  To get an overview of the external actors 
                                                 
87 This does not include the cost of activities of NGOs (UAC 2000). 
88 Figures from the second NSP (1998-2002) are not available 
89 Appendix II for more information on the “Resource tracking study”. 
90 Figures are a result of their own estimates of their allocations to HIV/AIDS interventions. 
 OVC: orphans and vulnerable children (UAC 2002) 91
92 Already in 1986 international donors attended an international donor conference and pledged immediate support of HIV/AIDS 
programmes in Uganda (Kaleeba et al. 2000: 10). 
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channelling money for these activities is somewhat difficult as there is no single 
central channel for external resources (UAC 1993b: 19). The GOU estimated in 1996 
that external support agencies has provided over 70 percent of the funding for AIDS 
related activities (Kagimu et al. 1996: 33). This money has largely been channelled 
through the Ministry of Health, the Aids Commission and directly to the NGOs (Ibid). 
Historically, resources have been centrally concentrated in Uganda (UAC 1993a: 47). 
However, since 1993 all projects have to be registered with the MOF and the UAC, 
and funding for district activities with the MOLG. The DACCs/ DHACs register funds 
for the districts’ NGOs (UAC 1993b: 19).  
Informants talk of extensive financial support from external donors and only limited 
financial assistance provided by the government. However, local donors have also 
contributed with financial resources. The Inventory of Agencies of 1997 reported that 
external donors have provided assistance to 64 percent of agencies who received 
support, while local donors supported the rest (UAC 1997b: 06). However, 
government has also provided financial resources to HIV/AIDS programmes primarily 
through their health budgets (included in the Primary Health care package), the UAC 
and the ACP. According to our informants government’s financial resources are 
limited, and funds are largely provided by external donors. They claim civil society 
receives most financial resources from external donors directly or indirectly (through 
STIP; MAP). Only a few (e.g. TASO) receive direct government funding in addition to 
donor money. Looking at the allocations from 2001 we also observe that many of the 
donors work with civil society organisations as their implementing partners93.    
Multilateral and bilateral agencies have channelled a lot of resources to HIV/AIDS 
programmes. The 2001 “Resource Tracking Study” serves as an example of the 
allocations of financial resources. With reference to Appendix II we observe that 
besides Makerere University, the largest contributors to these programmes in year 
2001 were large multilateral and bilateral donors such as USAID. WHO has financed 
the Aids Control Programme (in MOH) since its very beginning as they helped to set 
up a national plan to combat HIV/AIDS and offered technical and financial assistance 
                                                 
 Appendix 2  for further information on the “Resource Tracking Study, 2001” 93
 71
(Kagimu et al. 1996: 04). In addition, the UAC Secretariat was initially funded by the 
donor agencies such as UNICEF, UNDP, USAID, WHO and IDA (WB 1994: 08). 
UNICEF has also provided funding to government AIDS control programmes (in the 
MOH and MOES) by offering support to AIDS education in schools and among out-of 
school youth (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04). Since 1992 UNDP has supported the 
establishment of 11 ACPs (Ibid). This organisation also funds community-based 
projects on AIDS education and counselling, care and education of orphans and care of 
PLHAs (WB 1994: 11). EU has provided funds and technical assistance to the 
National Blood Bank, while the smaller bilateral agencies such as DANIDA, SIDA 
have provided funds for different civil society activities (Kagimu et al. 1996: 04).  
The World Bank has primarily channelled money through large loans to the GOU in 
the projects STIP and MAP94. These projects have provided for Uganda’s fight against 
AIDS by channelling a large amount of financial resources to the National Strategic 
Frameworks, both to government agencies and civil society at all levels. The Sexually 
Transmitted Infections Project (STIP) was a project of US$ 73.4 launched by GOU in 
year 1994 and ended in 2000. 50 million US$ was a loan from the WB and the rest 
was funded by SIDA, KfW Germany, DFID and the GOU. STIP aimed at controlling 
and preventing HIV and other STDs, and through this project US$ 33.1 million were 
allocated to prevention, 22.4 million to mitigation and 10.7 million to capacity 
building (WB 1994: ii-iii). According to MOH this project has provided the main 
financial support to HIV/AIDS prevention and control in Uganda (STD/AIDS 
Programme 2000: 18). The main implementing agencies for this project were the 
MOH, NGOs and CBOs. STIP supported 400 NGOs and CBOs carrying out 30 
percent of the activities (WB 1994: ii). Other government agencies such as MOES, 
MOGLSD also had activities supported by the project (AMREF 2001: 04).  
The Multi-country AIDS program (MAP) was announced by the government in year 
2000 to follow up STIP and finance US$ 50 millions of the Ugandan National 
Strategic Framework for HIV/AIDS activities 2000/1-2005/6 (WB 2000: 08). The 
project intended to support the Ugandan HIV/AIDS program, to scale it up and cover 
                                                 
94 However, we will argue in chapter five that MAP and STIP projects are government money as they are loans which the GOU 
has to pay back. 
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some of the activities not funded from other sources (WB 2000: 08). MAP involves 
the following three components: 1. The Nationally coordinated programmes, 
coordinated by UAC and run by the line ministries, government agencies or contracted 
out to CSOs or private sector (US$ 25 million); 2. District Initiatives (DI): Activities 
directly carried out by district authorities, contracted out to civil society or private 
sectors to raise awareness, train human capacity, for activities in hospitals, IEC to 
workforce etc (US$ 10 million); 3. Community-led HIV/AIDS initiatives (CHAI)  
carried out by CSOs or contracted out by them to give home-based care, support to 
orphans and community-based IECs (US$ 10 million)95 (WB 2000: 08-10). 
In Masaka district informants claim that most financial resources for the district’s 
HIV/AIDS programmes are donor funds channelled from central government. In 
general few funds come directly from donors to the local governments. Local 
governments also raise very little money themselves96. Informants claim the situation 
to be rather similar for the HIV/AIDS programme as large donor projects (STIP, MAP, 
DISH) have from the early 1990 to 2003 been channelled through central government. 
When STIP/MAP money is channelled to the districts, the partners distribute the 
money according to the district’s work-plan (Musisi 2000 [interview]). To get an 
indication of the amount of money allocated for HIV/AIDS activities in Masaka 
district we can look at the allocations of the STIP project granted97.  
Government has contributed with financial resources through the ACP (in MOH), 
which especially in the early 1990s supported the strengthening of the District IEC 
campaigns and still provides the district with particularly technical support (Musisi 
2002). As the district budgets for Primary Health Care (PHC), HIV/AIDS has to be 
one of the components98. This money is channelled from central government as 
                                                 
95 The final US$ 5 million will be allocated to District Initiatives or Community Initiatives based on progress review and project 
needs (WB 2000: 10).  
96 According to the D.D.H.S in year 2001 central transfers contributed 79 percent of all revenues of the district while donor and 
NGO funds made up 18 percent. Only 3 percent were local revenues (Nnyanzi 2002 [interview] ). 
97 From 1997-2000 allocation of funds from the Ministry of Health through the STIP project made up around 186,800,000 million 
Uganda Shillings= US$ 9,386.46 US dollars, some was delayed (Musisi 2002: [ interview]). 
98 Money spent on PHC in the District 1996-1998: Year 1996/97: Ugandan Shillings: 232,523,000 equals US $ 11.683. 98.  Year 
1997/98: Uganda Shillings 232,523,00 was budgeted for but only 136,373,000= US$ 6.852.57 (58.6 percent) were received 
(Masaka District Council: 99: 31). 
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conditional grants to the districts. One of the goals for the PHC in Masaka District is to 
reduce HIV/AIDS/STDs/STI prevalence from 10 percent to 5 percent (MDLG 1999b: 
65). However, informants claim the amount of PHC-money allocated on HIV/AIDS is 
very limited at all levels. Politicians prioritise other areas that are not as greatly funded 
by other sources and where needs are more urgent. According to informants the newly 
opened up ARV clinic is provided for with funds by American donors, who are 
personal friends of the District Chairman. 
Civil society organisations claim they receive most financial resources directly from 
external donors in addition to those they receive through the STIP and MAP projects. 
International organisations such as the INGOs (e.g. World Vision) and USAID also 
bring in funds to assist NGOs in their work (Nnyanzi 2002: [interview]). Kitovu 
Mobile claims to receive most direct funds from external donors. These have changed 
over years, but presently they include CAFED, NOTIV, GOAL and CONCERN 
(Ssentonga 2002 [interview]). TASO, Masaka receives funds from their mother 
organisation at national level which is funded by e.g. USAID, DANIDA, EU, SIDA 
and CAFED. In addition, through CHAI projects (under MAP) external funds from 
central government are trickled down to communities under their supervision 
(Namusoke 2002 [interview]).  
Human resources 
A wide range of workers like peer educators, community health workers and 
community AIDS workers have been trained to extend knowledge on AIDS and 
prevention of the HIV infection (Kagimu et al. 1996: 06). In the Inventory of Agencies, 
2001, 25.7 percent of the 717 agencies where involved with training, 8.7 percent train 
their own staff whereas 12.8 percent does training in the communities at large 
(AMREF 2001: 20-21). Informants point at government contributing to increased 
human resources. Hospitals, most NGOs, and some CBOs train both institution-based 
and community-based counsellors (AMREF 2001: 19) Together with civil society, the 
government has trained a wide range of health care service providers including peer 
educators in AIDS management (UAC 1997a: 18). In addition international 
organisations such as “Mildmay hospital of the UK and Medecins du Monde have also 
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been engaged in training counsellors (Kagimu et al. 1996: 21). Moreover, MOH and 
NGOs have produced training material for nursing care and guides for training 
counsellors. Donors also participate with some human capacity but they have provided 
most technical assistance to various NGOs (Kagimu et al. 1996: 31). In Masaka 
informants point at government and civil society  who are training teachers in 
HIV/AIDS as well as medical staff and community counsellors. Various behavioural 
change agents and peer-educators have been trained in schools/ out-of schools and as 
community counsellors. Government contributes through their medical workers which 
sensitize people in clinics and schools. In addition, local leaders and religious leaders 
as well as community workers sensitise people about the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  
4.5 Conclusion 
The Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes started out as fairly centralised government 
campaigns where the ACP channelled a lot of information from their offices. The aim 
was to make people aware of the disease. However, more and more grassroots 
interventions have been carried out with a stronger involvement of local governments 
and civil society, and more emphasis on changing Ugandan’s sexual behaviours. Local 
communities and organisations, as well as district authorities have been given more 
authority to plan and implement their own programmes based on their needs. Civil 
society has held a very important position in the channelling of information about the 
epidemic and especially in the care for PLHAs. The cooperation between government 
and civil society has been extensive and was institutionalised through the creation of 
the Aids Commission (UAC) and the adoption of the Multisectoral Approach (MSAP). 
Financial resources have primarily been allocated by external donors. However, some 
financial and human resources have also been channelled from the Government’s 
health sector: through the ACP, PHC and the large projects of STIP and MAP 
(primarily lent from the World Bank). In addition, resources to civil society have 
passed either directly or indirectly through government. Now we will seek to examine 
how we can analyse the effect of the different factors in order to explain the relative 
success of fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda.  
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5  Explaining the Ugandan success!  
While several theoretical contributions have highlighted the importance of strong and 
centralised institutions and political support for AIDS programmes to succeed, others 
underline the need for decentralisation and civil society to play an active role. In this 
chapter we will disentangle the routes to effective public sector health programmes in 
the south. Thereby, we look into how our informants consider the importance of 
various factors in explaining the relative success of fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda.  
Official statistics about the reduction in AIDS prevalence rates and changes in sexual 
behaviours, receive broad legitimacy and support amongst government officials. With 
some uncertainty concerning district figures such as for Masaka99, national figures 
seem to have broad legitimacy. According to Dr. Baingana in the Ugandan AIDS 
Commission (2002 [interview]), the whole population is now aware of how the HIV 
virus is transmitted. While most respondents point at some gap between awareness and 
changes in sexual behaviour, they do confirm progress in both areas. And while civil 
society representatives are more sceptical about progress at the local level, they also 
agree to the Uganda “success story”100.  
Views may still differ when it comes to the explanations for the success. Informants 
underline the decrease in prevalence rates due to increased awareness, reduction of 
stigmatisation and discrimination as well as changed sexual behaviour. However, the 
question remains as to why the AIDS programmes have succeeded in Uganda. Is it the 
political focus and commitment at top national level, support from government 
officials or involvement of civil society that may be ruled out as the most crucial 
component in explaining the success? What seems to be most effective, centralisation 
or decentralisation of decision-making and delivery structures? Do structures have the 
most important impact or is impact rather seen as an effect of resource allocation? On 
this background I will look into which factors may explain the relative success of 
                                                 
99 In Masaka there is no antenatal clinic and hence more problematic to collect information. Progress seem to have taken place, 
however, when we take into consideration that the number of deaths and burials has been reduced. According to the district 
medical officer, the population has also improved their clinical status. 
100 Informants in civil society organisations focus on the many challenges still present in fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 
Uganda. Both TASO and Kitovu Mobile stress that the number of AIDS-patients is not getting down, rather up in Masaka district.
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Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes and how this corresponds to the theoretical 
approaches.  
5.1 Political will and commitment  
The political support of president Museveni is the factor most often emphasised 
internationally as explaining Uganda’s success in the fight against AIDS. All the 
respondents agree that high level of political will and commitment has been amongst 
the most important reasons for the changes in people’s awareness and behaviour. Most 
of our respondents argue that the even though not one policy on AIDS has been 
adopted, the first AIDS initiatives came from “the top” and with President Museveni 
playing a key role in driving the initiatives. Vis-à-vis other countries in the region, the 
President has held a leading role in the formulation and priority setting of campaigns 
and programmes.  
Respondents describe how initial priorities and commitment in Uganda were played 
out in the establishments of institutions to initiate, control and coordinate the fight 
against HIV/AIDS. They also assert that this early and quick reaction has been carried 
through in the 90’s and manifested itself through further escalation of interventions as 
well as in the consolidation and strengthening of institutions101. Thus, political will and 
establishment of institutions have led to information-sharing and coordination between 
major actors amongst civil society, donors and government. Many of the respondents 
at national level point at the importance of the AIDS Commission (UAC) under the 
President’s Office as being the forum through which they cooperate and share 
information in a Multisectoral Approach (MSAP) involving all government sectors. 
While some informants underline the broader commitment and support also of 
parliamentarians, as they have addressed the issue of HIV/AIDS in various forums, it 
is first and foremost the will and commitment by the President that is emphasised by 
the respondents. 
                                                 
101 Introduction of the multi-sectoral approach to expand the programmes and the establishment of the UAC under the 
President’s Office in 1992 illustrate HIV/AIDS as having a high priority/ visibility, and confirms the political commitment of the 
GoU to fight HIV/AIDS. The National Strategic Frameworks which have been formulated and implemented since 1993, shows a 
planned response to the epidemic in Uganda involving many different stakeholders including the ones infected with the disease-
the PLHAs (WB 2000: 21). 
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Museveni began talking to people around the country, sensitising them about the 
epidemic in the 1980s as he discovered a large amount of the Ugandan soldiers being 
HIV positive. Hence, he realised this was a serious issue which had to be tackled. 
According to our informants, the President contributed to the creation of an 
“environment of openness” in the country. By early addressing the issue he helped 
reducing the stigmatisation and discrimination attached to the disease. The 
government’s “policy of openness” also mobilised other actors to become involved in 
the fight against the epidemic. Civil society organisations have been invited to join the 
struggle, and accepted as partners both formally through the MSAP and in the UAC 
and through more informal interaction. Respondents claim national political 
commitment has helped NGOs and CBOs to operate, participate from different angles 
and distribute HIV/AIDS information to the grassroots. In addition, informants point at 
Museveni’s early personal commitment as essential in mobilising external donors as 
he was frank and early asked the international community for help (Hyde et al 2001). 
Two loans from the World Bank were for example granted through the recognition of 
the President’s personal commitment to fight the epidemic (WB 1994; 2000) and were 
in turn channelled to local levels for information spreading.  
Informants in Masaka emphasise the role of the President in bringing more openness 
around issues of AIDS. They claim Museveni’s commitment has set the fight against 
the disease to be “a national priority issue”, and a certain will from local level 
politicians to address HIV/AIDS out of “respect for the big man”. Civil society 
describes how Museveni’s commitment has given them new space to participate in 
political activities. The fight against HIV/AIDS has opened up for new forms and 
degree of collaboration with government officials. In addition, local level informants 
confirm the importance of the President and emphasise the general impact politicians 
in Uganda have on people’s attitudes and beliefs. An important consequence of 
political commitment at local level is, according to our respondents, politicians’ 
support to the district plans. In addition, they have channelled information to people 
about AIDS and mobilised target groups102. Furthermore, informants claim political 
                                                 
102 For more on the involvement of local level politicians see section 5.5.  
 78
support has contributed to widespread collaboration between civil society and 
government. Various civil society organisations emphasise the importance of moral 
support by politicians and the support to operate also at local levels. 
Yet, several respondents, and particularly national leaders themselves, argue that local 
level commitment is lower than that found amongst national politicians and leaders103. 
In Masaka, civil society organisations underline how local politicians “talk more than 
they act”. While understanding the budget constraints of local governments, 
organisations still claim local politicians spend very limited district financial resources 
to AIDS programmes run by government or by civil society.  
There seems to be indications that “political will and commitment” has played an 
important role in explaining the relative success of the Ugandan HIV/AIDS 
programmes. While there is little doubt that the AIDS catastrophe has also helped the 
President unite the people and avoid criticism for his zero-party regime, informants do 
believe his commitment is real and sincere, out of concern for the people. Suspicious 
voices may question the motives behind the President’s AIDS focus and policies. 
However, the relative freedom given to civil society to operate in this area seems to 
indicate that he does not consider the issue to be a threat to his political leadership. In 
spite of limited political democracy, it seems as if the zero-party political system has 
managed to become a rather plural and open society in the area of HIV/AIDS. 
5.2 Support of government officials 
While all informants underline the role of Museveni in the area of AIDS policies, they 
are more mixed when it comes to the attitudes and commitment of government 
officials. A civil society informant explains how some government officials in the 
Health Department were rather negative to the early initiatives by the President. They 
were afraid information about the HIV/AIDS epidemic would have a negative effect 
on Uganda’s foreign investments and tourism industry (Luwaga 2002 [interview]). 
Some government officials outside the Health Department also claim certain 
                                                 
103  In general informants at national level seem to not have enough information on the involvement of politicians at grassroot 
level in Uganda and are somewhat indecisive in their answers on local level commitment.  However, they believe they are not 
sufficiently committed, a problem which the UAC has addressed through a “political mobilization strategy”. 
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bureaucrats today do not consider fighting HIV/AIDS as their responsibility (Ssonko 
2002 [interview]; Nsubuga 2002 [interview]).  
Nevertheless, all the national and local government officials that were interviewed 
express the importance of fighting HIV/AIDS, and believe they are both supportive 
and involved. In addition, officials in the MOH have spearheaded the policy of 
openness about the epidemic (UAC 1993a:12). All groups of respondents focus on 
how the government primarily through the AIDS Control Programme (ACP) in the 
MOH have carried out a multitude of interventions together with civil society from the 
very beginning of the response. These programmes have helped to raise awareness and 
change sexual behaviours. In Masaka most informants believe government officials do 
support the fight against the epidemic, even though some civil society informants 
explain how the officials are not as committed as they are. Informants emphasise how 
government’s IEC activities have spread information through print media and radio 
contributing to awareness and behavioural changes104.  
At national level some civil society informants claim government officials are corrupt 
as they stick money into their own pockets. However, it is the delay in release of funds 
which is most often emphasised as a limitation to the successful implementation of 
HIV/AIDS programmes105. Also according to MOH “(…) there is generally a delay 
between commencement of project implementation and the initial disbursement of 
funds” (STD/AIDS Control Programme 2000: 19). Respondents in Masaka confirm 
the delay of funds at central level, which according to the DMO106 hinders the 
decentralised HIV/AIDS programmes from becoming even more efficient (Musisi 
2002 [interview]). Some civil society informants claim this delay is a result of lack of 
support among national bureaucrats more than a capacity problem. In Masaka 
informants believe government officials support the programmes, but acknowledge 
                                                 
104 At both levels informants focus on the establishment of various FM stations around the countries, which has helped the 
government to spread information to all areas. This is due to the fact that while television reaches the urban population and 
newspapers only the literate urban areas, the radio reaches a much larger audience even the illiterate in remote areas (WB 
1994: 16). 
105 In the “Inventory of Agencies of 2001”, agencies involved with HIV/AIDS activities cited problems of the bureaucracy-delay of 
funds as causing an obstacle to implementing programs and hampering the progress (AMREF 2001: iii, 27). 
106 District Medical Officer: The person responsible for the District’s HIV/AIDS activities and distribution of money for WB 
projects according to the District Plan. 
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“the government not being as efficient in channelling of money”107. Regardless of its 
causes, delays in transfers have had a certain negative effect on the degree of success 
of the HIV/AIDS programmes in Uganda.  
Government and its administrative organs have created an enabling environment in 
which donor agencies, NGOs and CBOs can work unhindered (AMREF 2001: 21)108. 
Respondents express the importance of collaboration and trust between government 
and civil society as it increases resources for both parties and enhances the efficiency 
of fighting HIV/AIDS109. All groups of informants at both levels claim government is 
supportive to the work of civil society in combating AIDS. Government considers 
them as partners with more capacity and experience in areas such as counselling and 
caring. Hence, they bring in e.g. TASO and AIC to reach the grassroots of Uganda.  
In Masaka informants describe how government officials support the involvement of 
civil society in their daily work. Respondents explain how this support gives civil 
society the opportunity to work within their fields of expertise and to access resources. 
For instance the district government provides civil society organisations like TASO 
with human resources such as medical personnel to follow up the medical needs of 
their clients- the People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs) (Namusoke 2000 
[interview]). The “partnership” with government also gives civil society the 
opportunity to access money through e.g. the STIP and MAP projects. However, civil 
society informants claim government officials at local level support civil society 
morally more than financially. They welcome the involvement of organisations and 
make it easy for them to establish themselves by e.g. offering them a building from 
which they can carry out their activities.  
The possibility of a certain lack of support in the health department in the initiation of 
the programmes may strengthen previous interpretations that the President’s will was 
“forced through”. However, it seems as if most government officials do support the 
                                                 
107 Still we must keep in mind that a certain delay in release of funds might also be a result of delays in the banking system, and 
general inefficiencies in bureaucracies at central level and not only lack of support. 
108 Also by looking into the NSPs we notice that government officials recognise the importance of the NGOs/CBOs in fighting the 
epidemic. In the last NSP more support to local NGOs/CBOs providing AIDS care and treatment is recognised (UAC 2000: 03). 
 This cooperation will be further examined in section 5.4. 109
 81
fight against the pandemic today. Informants claim this support is due to the fact that 
“all people have been affected”, leading also most government officials to recognise 
the threat of the pandemic.  
5.3  Resource allocation  
Uganda’s (…) “extensive level of funding has enabled a wide range of HIV prevention 
and mitigation activities to be developed and implemented” (Kagimu et al. 1996: 31). 
Informants at both levels explain how especially external donors’ financial support has 
been essential in order to carry out HIV/AIDS interventions. They express how 
increased financial resources have helped both government and civil society to scale 
up their programmes and expand them to many areas of Uganda110. Civil society has 
also been able to start activities to reduce the vulnerability to become infected and to 
mitigate its impact. Informants in Masaka explain how increased financial resources 
have given actors more opportunities to reach out to people for instance by financing 
air-time at the local FM stations and distributing brochures and leaflets.  
There is a strong tendency among informants at both levels to consider donors’ 
financial contributions to the HIV/AIDS programmes as much more important than the 
government’s. They point particularly at the financial contributions of the UN system, 
and the loans from the World Bank for government and civil society’s implementation 
of various programmes111. Nevertheless, civil society informants at both levels assert 
that both multi-lateral and bilateral external donors collaborating directly with their 
organisations have contributed with most of their financial resources. Civil society 
informants, both in Masaka and at national level, point at government’s allocation of 
resources to their HIV/AIDS programmes to be from limited to non-existing112. Our 
documentation indicates that donor resources are higher than the ones allocated by the 
GOU. However, the large loans of STIP and MAP, lent by the World Bank, have been 
taken up by the Government of Uganda. Hence, in line with assertions by the 
                                                 
110 For instance organisations like TASO and AIC have been given the opportunity to go further into rural areas. 
111 The STI project has enabled many agencies, governmental, NGOs and CBOs to engage in the provision of IEC activities to 
promote awareness and avoidance of STIs and for training of health workers and counsellors (AMREF 2001: 18) 
112 We have to take into consideration that civil society might be very sceptical to the government, but also other documents 
confirm civil society primarily sponsored by external donors.
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government officials these loans should be regarded as an expression of government’s 
will rather than international priorities. This money is not charity and has to be paid 
back by the GOU with high interests. 
Several informants claim government funding has played a major role since 1986 
primarily for their own agencies to reach out to people with HIV/AIDS 
interventions113. Also in Masaka District some respondents as documents point at 
government activities primarily sponsored by central government, prior to the large 
projects of MAP, STIP and DISH (MDLG 1999: 03). Moreover, some government 
officials also claim more of the Primary Health Care (PHC) money was spent on 
HIV/AIDS at the time. Informants explain the importance of government’s human 
capacity, through training of their own personnel such as doctors and nurses as well as 
teachers. In addition, civil society has trained government officials and vice versa, 
making use of each other’s resources. Moreover, these actors have trained community 
members as counsellors, which is an enormous resource in passing of information to 
their villages.  
All the respondents underline that they could have come even further with more 
resources made available for the HIV/AIDS programmes. Also all NSPs claim lack of 
resources is a main obstacle for further combating of the epidemic, and agencies both 
in 1997 and in 2001 pointed at lack of financial resources as the major constraint 
(UAC 1997b: 10; AMREF 2001: 29)114. Civil society informants focus on the need for 
financial resources in order to expand programmes to all areas of Uganda (including in 
the North and remote areas), and to limit the vulnerability of people to become 
infected. Informants at both levels also claim there is lack of human resources like 
counsellors and nurses to test people and follow up of the seropositives115. The review 
of AIDS activities in 1996 confirms a need for more counsellors (Kagimu et al. 1996: 
12).  
                                                 
113 This money has primarily gone through their own government agencies such as the ACP, MOH and the UAC as well as 
some money has been spent on HIV/AIDS in other departments (Education, agriculture, Local Government etc) (Hyde et al. 
2001). 
114 The review of HIV/AIDS activities in 1996 confirmed shrinking donor funding and a need for more resources (Kagimu et al. 
1996: iii). 
115 Insufficient trained personnel were stated by 25 percent of the respondents as a limit to their work, and inadequate capacity 
of CBOs was stated by 6.9 percent (AMREF 2001: 28). 
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In Masaka respondents assert how lack of human resources prevent LC structures from 
efficiently channelling information and services to the grass-roots, as there is need for 
house-to-house information due to high degree of illiteracy. Informants stress how 
organisations today lack financial resources and are hence run with voluntary 
unsustainable human resources. They also point at international donors, being the main 
contributors to the HIV/AIDS programmes, creating a problem of donor-dependency. 
Civil society organisations express concern of donor dependency, leaving them 
vulnerable to the international community’s willingness to support their activities116. 
Organisations like TASO have developed a strong reputation and are heavily funded 
by many donors while others are more vulnerable (Kagimu et al. 1996: 34). According 
to some informants the support of the international community also seems to depend 
on the level of trust in the President of Uganda. Donor dependency implies that donors 
instead of agencies set the priorities for spending money, which can represent an 
obstacle to the efficiency of the programmes117.  
5.4 Involvement and support of civil society  
All informants believe that involvement of civil society organisations in fighting AIDS 
has been one of the most important causes of raised awareness and behavioural 
changes among Ugandans, distinguishing their response from the ones in other African 
countries. Some informants point at early spontaneous initiatives to deal with the 
epidemic at grass root level, cooperating with the MOH. However, they also claim the 
involvement of civil society at national level and in Masaka in more “structured” 
forms to be a result of the President’s invitation. 
According to all informants civil society organisations in Uganda have been key actors 
to spread information about AIDS, offering counselling and care to the people in 
villages and communities. Through various often innovative means such as plays, 
                                                 
116Acknowledgments of the “Ugandan success story” can also affect their willingness to help positively as they see their 
contributions having an effect, but can also lead to “complacency” as they might get the impression of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
already being combated (Nakabinge 2002 [ interview]) 
117 “The reliance on donors causes problems of sustainability of projects- if our donors pull out we don’t have the resources to 
give services to people. Newly European Union introduced money that they wanted to be used on the Northern Districts, but 
now due to the war we can not go into these areas. At the same time we can not go into other areas because the donors have 
decided how the money should be spent. For example if a donor gives money to VCT we can not give a person a simple shot 
she/ he might need because this is not what the money is for” (Batte  2002 [interview]). 
 84
dance/ drama groups, peer-group support and seminars in communities, civil society 
has trained people in how to protect themselves and take care of their relatives. Several 
informants describe how people receive and accept the message of AIDS. They tend to 
trust more in the messages coming from civil society and trained community workers, 
which are closer to them. Civil society also has more capacity than the government to 
go out to the villages through outreach activities. 
Overall, informants point especially at the importance of the involvement of the people 
infected with the disease (PLHAs) and their established organisations being decisive to 
fight AIDS in Uganda118. Together with the President’s “openness policy” they have 
played a leading role to “open up” the Ugandan society, creating an environment in 
which channelling of information about the disease became possible. Informants 
explain how testimonies from PLHAs have helped to see them as victims, which has 
reduced the stigmatisation and discrimination of this group. Furthermore, people have 
tended to believe in the messages from the infected themselves, which has affected the 
behaviour of many Ugandans.  
In Masaka PLHAs have played and continue to play a major role to get the message 
across through groups like TASO, NACWOLA and Kitovu Mobile. Informants at both 
levels consider the PLHAs involvement distinguishing their response from other 
African countries’ where the government has not allowed this group to participate. 
Hence, in these countries there is a lot of stigmatisation attached to HIV/AIDS turning 
it into a “silent disease”, spreading without too much attention by the government. 
According to several informants also involvement of Faith Based Organisations 
(FBOs) has influenced the population significantly. As religion and religious leaders 
are important for Ugandans, they have trusted the messages on HIV/AIDS coming 
from a variety of these organisations. In addition FBOs often have favourable 
structures already in place facilitating the spread of information throughout Uganda119.  
                                                 
118 A number of NGOs such as TASO and organisations of PLWA, have been formed and contributed to prevention, control and 
mitigation of the personal impact of HIV/AIDS, as well as promotion of positive living (STD/AIDS Programme 2000: 16). 
119 For instance in Namirembe Diocese, the Church of Uganda had already established youth groups, women’s groups etc. 
through which they could spread information on HIV/AIDS (Moses 2002 [interview]) 
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Informants believe civil society is important as their HIV/AIDS activities support the 
ones of the government. All groups of informants claim that the widespread support, 
trust and understanding between civil society and government officials have 
strengthened the response. Government officials at national and local levels bring in 
organisations where CSOs have “comparative advantages”, and where government 
lacks capacity and resources. Informants claim these organisations are better at 
providing information to the grassroots; as they make use of means such as 
drama/songs. They also have more competence in offering care and counselling, and in 
addressing young people. For instance in Masaka government officials bring in the 
competence of various NGOs like TASO and Kitovu Mobile in e.g. schools to inform 
young people. In addition, CSOs often assist government in counselling and training, 
which gives the programmes more human capacity. Hence, involvement of civil 
society improves implementation capacity at district and community level (STD/AIDS 
Control Programme 2000: 19). Inclusion of civil society also brings more financial 
resources into the country through earmarked funds from external donors. In Masaka 
we witness how government increasing their financial resources by cooperating with 
NGO as they include civil society’s activities in the government’s budgets (Nnyanzi 
2000: [interview]).  
Moreover, informants explain that civil society has freedom to carry out their 
HIV/AIDS activities, as they have respect from the government and its officials. 
Nevertheless, some civil society informants claim it to be difficult to register as an 
organisation at the NGO board. Through institutions such as UAC and District Aids 
Committees there is also a certain control mechanism of civil society120. Many 
government officials consider this to be an advantage as it leads to less duplication of 
activities and more accountability and transparency121. However, civil society also 
receives money directly from donors at national and at local levels over which the 
government does not have as much control.  
                                                 
120 As civil society participates in the formulation and implementation of NSPs and district plans, their activities are somewhat 
controlled as they have to account for the money being spent. 
121 Informants in Masaka district point at the D.D.H.S knowing at all times what they are doing as they have to account for their 
activities 
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Apparently the effect of the “involvement and support of civil society” has been 
extremely important both in initiating and implementing HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda, and especially the organisations of PLHAs. However, why does civil society 
have the trust of government and a relative freedom in a country without political 
parties? Informants point at this freedom to be especially large regarding HIV/AIDS as 
this issue does not pose a threat to the President of Uganda, and as he has set this issue 
as a top priority to which he is sincerely committed. 
5.5  Decentralisation 
Informants at both levels point at differences in the degree of decentralisation of 
HIV/AIDS programmes throughout the response122. According to government 
informants, an early rather centralised response primarily initiated by the MOH had, a 
certain effect on raising the awareness of Ugandans. Nevertheless, respondents claim 
the needs of everybody were not taken into account and “normal people” did not 
decide as much as they do today. Some informants suggest the decentralisation process 
emerged when people’s awareness should be transferred to further changes in sexual 
behaviours.  
The main impression from the informants at both levels is that more local level control 
over the programmes has to a certain extent improved the channelling of information. 
In Masaka informants describe how the district has the responsibility for planning and 
implementation of these interventions. At both levels informants explain how 
increased local level decision-making has led to more local level “ownership” of the 
issue of HIV/AIDS, giving the districts an opportunity to identify and address their 
special needs123. Politicians in Masaka District claim local governments know better 
the needs in their districts than the national level authorities. And they now have the 
power to address these needs. Informants point at national level still establishing 
guidelines, policies as well as mobilising resources. Some government officials in 
                                                 
122 In the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s the government’s response was more centralised as messages were mostly 
sent from central level’s ACP, MOH which decided what the districts should do. 
123 Through an example set forward by the DMO in Masaka (Musisi 2000 [interview]) we realise how decentralisation reacts 
positively to local dynamics: The district has a problem with landing sites and fishermen’s sexual activities, as they are fishing 
during the night and making love during the day which causes HIV to spread fast. This issue is today addressed by the district 
through specific programmes targeting this group. 
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Masaka claim the present guidelines from national levels hinder the districts’ freedom 
to create efficient plans and implement their programmes.  
Several informants explain how decentralisation of governance has led to increased 
commitment among local politicians. They seek to prove themselves as “good 
politicians” in order to be re-elected, and hence become more responsible to fight 
HIV/AIDS as it is a “national priority issue”. In addition, informants primarily in 
Masaka, explain how local politicians through the decentralised system has mobilised 
and sensitised people at all levels, down to village level. Informants also look at the 
decentralised health institutions having brought HIV/AIDS information and treatment 
closer to people.  
According to several informants at both levels more local level control of HIV/AIDS 
programmes has led to increased involvement of groups like civil society, and 
improved cooperation with the government. Local Government’s Act provides for 
local councils to monitor and coordinate the NGOs within their jurisdiction area 
(Tumusiime et al. 2000: 11). According to several respondents a decentralised system 
of governance has led to more local level control over civil society’s activities as 
districts supervise and collaborate with them. This leads to more transparency and 
better and more extensive coordination and integration of activities in the district124. 
Civil society organisations claim that the districts have a better overview of HIV/AIDS 
activities. This helps the districts and civil society to know where the capacity of 
NGOs is needed. Informants in Masaka claim there is more frequent information-
sharing at lower levels than at central level, as they are directly communicating with 
each other weekly.  
Some of our informants also point at decentralisation as a structure which makes 
mobilisation of human and financial resources easier. They describe how actors talk to 
the district council to get more resources without waiting for central government. In 
addition, local government structures are involved in planning and implementation of 
                                                 
124 All activities including those from the NGOs and the private sector, have to be included in the District work plan (STD/AIDS 
control programme 2000: ix). 
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the budget through a “bottom-up” planning for e.g. PHC activities125, making the 
health budget more adapted to local needs. However, informants claim HIV/AIDS 
programmes in the districts are primarily provided for with an extensive amount of 
donor-money passing through central government. Some informants claim that 
resource channelling from national level limits the efficient channelling of money 
since lack of support by central level government officials lead to delay of funds.  
Informants explain how a decentralised approach with mobilisation of human 
resources at local level is efficient as districts train their own personnel and central 
authorities give assistance if needed. This training increases the chances of a 
sustainable response as it ensures competence at lower levels. Some national level 
government officials claim it to be easier for central level to direct funds and activities 
today as they use the already existing human resources at lower levels. Today central 
level (such as the UAC) contacts the district’s HIV/AIDS focal person who works with 
the health team to implement programmes instead of using their own personnel.  
There seems to be some positive results of “decentralisation”, even though a 
centralised system might have played a role in the early years. When informants were 
asked to point at reasons for Uganda’s progress, none spoke of decentralisation as the 
most important factor. However, when probed further most of them claimed that local 
level control has been important in the latter years. 
5.6   Analysis and discussion of findings 
On the basis of the interviews with the informants, there is little doubt that political 
will and commitment has been the most important factor in order to explain the 
relative success of Uganda in the fight against AIDS. Even though some informants 
point at sporadic initiatives being initiated by civil society, they point at the large 
strategic response in the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes coming only after 
the President had taken the early initiatives. He invited civil society to join, and made 
the resources available. Although it is difficult to determine whether the political 
initiatives and programmes have come from the “top” or from the “bottom”, political 
                                                 
125 In Primary Health Care, HIV/AIDS activities has to be one of the components 
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will and commitment seems to be more important than the “involvement and support 
of civil society”, even though they very soon became involved in the response. When 
informants were asked about the general reasons for the “Ugandan success-story”, all 
of them expressed the importance of the President of Uganda, all the way down to the 
CBOs at the very grassroots in Masaka126. Hence, the importance of political will and 
commitment seems to be primarily due to the commitment of President Museveni and 
his “policy of openness”. 
Together with the People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHAs), national politicians have 
contributed to the creation of “an environment of openness” about the disease in which 
stigmatisation was greatly reduced and programmes could be initiated by different 
actors. As Museveni announced the fight against HIV/AIDS as a “national priority 
issue”, several other factors were triggered, such as the allocation of resources from 
external donors, mobilisation of civil society, and even some support of government 
officials. Political commitment has also had a certain effect on “decentralisation” as 
decisions of more local level control of HIV/AIDS activities have been made by the 
government and UAC. Even in Masaka informants pointed at the effect the President’s 
openness to fight AIDS had on all actors to join the response from civil society to local 
politicians and government officials. In this “environment of openness” the Ugandans 
also became more open to receive and accept the messages on how to protect 
themselves and take care of the PLHAs. Nevertheless, the effect of the President’s 
openness would probably have been less without the involvement of the People Living 
with HIV/AIDS themselves.  
It is important to keep in mind that there have also been other factors besides political 
commitment leading to resource allocation to the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes 
especially to civil society, such as the trust of donors in these organisations127. Thus, 
political will and commitment can not take the entire credit for the extensive resource 
allocations to the fight against AIDS. In addition, we can not argue political 
                                                 
126 They told about the importance of the President before I asked particularly of the role of “political commitment”, which also   
increases the reliability of the information. 
127 For instance TASO is highly recognised internationally and with this reputation they raise donor resources primarily without 
the involvement of Ugandan government.  
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commitment to be the only reason for the involvement of civil society. Civil society 
announces their involvement to be a cause of real concern for the people of Uganda, 
However, it has mainly been through the political initiatives that they have been 
allowed to, and been given the resources to operate. In addition, political decisions 
initiated cooperation between government and civil society in order for the services to 
be better coordinated. In Masaka all groups of informants128 explain how local 
politicians also support at least morally civil society and their activities, which makes 
it easier for them to operate. Thus, support to civil society seems to be one of the most 
important consequences of the support to fight AIDS among local level politicians. 
From informants and documents we see how the openness and political commitment at 
national level also has continued, through establishment of institutions like UAC and 
by sustaining extensive cooperation between government and civil society. With 
increased financial resources from donors due to e.g. the President’s commitment, 
HIV/AIDS programmes from all actors have been scaled up and efficiently 
implemented. From informants we have seen how politicians have also been important 
actors in spreading information to people at national level and to some degree also at 
local levels. In general we can not draw conclusions on a widespread involvement of 
politicians at all local levels or all districts, as we only have examined Masaka District. 
Nevertheless, informants in Masaka talk of at least some form of involvement of local 
level politicians from the early days, either through talking with their own village-
members, or mobilising them to show up for events organised by other actors. When it 
comes to the personal involvement of Museveni, it is difficult to get the whole picture. 
However, information presented indicates that large presidential activity in fighting 
AIDS; from being personally responsible for spreading information to mobilisation of 
other actors. Thus, not only has political will and commitment, especially from the 
President and his government, initiated the fight against the epidemic, but has also 
contributed greatly to the relative success in implementation of the HIV/AIDS 
programmes up to now. Consequently, national level political will and commitment 
has had an important effect on all of the other factors.   
                                                 
128 This includes informants of civil society which makes the information even more reliable and not only a result of “bragging” of 
the government” 
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Resource allocation  
Contrary to the President’s will to fight AIDS, the allocation of financial resources is 
not a necessity for initiatives to be taken. However, from the information reported we 
can draw the conclusion that extensive financial resource allocation has been essential 
in order for a variety of actors to implement and scale up their programmes within 
different areas of HIV/AIDS prevention129. From informants and documents we also 
realise the importance of human resources as one need human capacity in all agencies 
and at all levels in order to pass information on HIV/AIDS to people. Moreover, as 
informants regard a scarcity of both human and financial resources to prevent them 
from further progress in fighting AIDS. On this background, we recognise how 
resource allocation is also a necessary factor which should not to be taken for granted.  
Despite the importance of resource allocation, this factor could be regarded as a 
consequence of political commitment and the involvement of civil society 
organisations. The President’s early will to fight AIDS started the allocation of 
government and donor resources, and seems to also play a role for today. The money 
primarily lent from the World Bank by the GOU (STIP/MAP) is primarily a result of 
political commitment from the highest level of government. As pointed out above, 
external donors’ trust in civil society has also contributed to their continued allocation 
of resources. In addition, human resources to these programmes are apparently a 
consequence of the extensive cooperation between government and civil society130. 
Therefore, it is questionable that resource allocation should be regarded as a separate 
factor. When asked about the general reasons for the Ugandan progress a grand 
majority of informants pointed at the “involvement of international donors” rather than 
resource allocation. We saw in chapter 4.4 that 70% of funds for HIV/AIDS activities 
came from donors before 1995. There might be other causes of the international 
donors’ financial contributions (national interests in the donor countries etc). 
Nevertheless, political commitment and trust in civil society seems to explain most of 
                                                 
129 We do not have the total overview of all financial resources allocated to the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes, but they seem 
to be extensive as they have covered different areas within prevention, care and mitigation of the epidemic as well as financial 
resources have been channelled to many different actors in order to carry out the programmes.
130 The importance of this collaboration to increase human resources will be further examined in the following section. 
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the effect of financial resource allocations of international donors as well as the 
government’s contributions. 
Not only the actual existence of funds is important, but through which actors the 
resources have been channelled. Informants have described how resources have helped 
all actors contribute within their area of expertise and many different interventions 
targeting different groups. Resources in Uganda seem to have supported actors from 
the President’s high level initiatives with involvement of national media, to the small 
grass-root organisations to educate families in how to take care of their sick relatives. 
And without the extensive interaction between government and civil society the 
channelling of resources, both human and financial would not have been as efficient. 
Hence, resources seem to have “backed up” the many initiatives allowing many 
different actors to participate within their area of competence. This leaves resource 
allocation as another force which has “pulled in the right direction”.  
The importance of civil society versus civil service? 
From the information presented, we may conclude that the second most important 
factor in order to explain the relative success in fighting HIV/AIDS in Uganda has 
been the “involvement and support of civil society”. Although their extensive 
involvement to a certain degree depends on the political commitment, all informants 
point at the involvement of civil society as an important factor for the progress in 
fighting AIDS. As documented previously (chapter 4.3), the early and extensive 
involvement of civil society played a vital role in passing information, fighting the 
stigma attached to the disease and caring for the ones infected. In order to create the 
previously discussed “environment of openness”, the political initiatives had probably 
not been as influential if the People infected with the disease (PLHAs) were not 
included. From informants we have heard how the PLHAs “gave the epidemic a face”, 
and without this involvement people might still not have believed in the messages sent 
out by various actors. Thus, many people might still be living “in denial” in Uganda, 
hiding its victims and not protecting themselves. This is still the situation in many 
other African countries. 
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Although initially, there were certain negative attitudes to give priority to AIDS in the 
health bureaucracy and government departments, such attitudes were not given much 
of a chance to influence the programmes. While this may to some extent be explained 
by the President being so decisive in initiating and driving these interventions, the role 
of civil society as a driving force also played its part in mobilising resources and 
placing the issue on the agenda. While it would be inaccurate to argue that civil 
servants played a destructive role in the longer term implementation of programmes, 
they are also not seen as an equally constructive driving force behind the mobilisation 
enrolling in the 90s.  
Donors, civil society and government officials at national and local levels believe in 
the support of government officials in carrying out interventions especially in the 
MOH and MOES131 since the beginning of the response. The role of government 
institutions, such as UAC, as coordinating mechanisms and information channels is 
seen as particularly important for the cooperation between these actors. In addition, 
these mechanisms also seem to be important as the response is multi-sectoral and also 
government sectors have to coordinate their response132. While the support of 
government officials may be more critical in the delivery of services at local level (as 
we saw in Masaka), it also seems to be stronger here.  
All in all, a substantial amount of donor money (including STIP/MAP projects) is 
channelled through government. Thus, their support to the programmes is critical for 
their implementation. Delays in transfers of funds are highlighted by several sources. 
Some even suspect corruption. While no documentation has been found to this effect, 
the level of corruption is generally considered to be relatively high in Uganda. Delays 
may however be explained by delays in the banking system and weak infrastructure in 
Uganda. At the same time, all our respondents indicate that the support for, and 
commitment to the AIDS campaign seems to be much higher amongst local civil 
service, than amongst the national civil service. At local level, there are indications of 
less bureaucratic obstacles and more transparency than at the national level.  
                                                 
131 See chapter four for more information on the HIV/AIDS activities of the MOH and the MOES. 
132 The importance of the MSAP is also mentioned by several informants: both for all government sectors and for private sector 
to be involved and cooperate.  
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It is difficult to put private and government initiatives up against each other as from 
interviews and documents we have seen how they have both played a role. The ACP, 
MOH is emphasised by all respondents to have played a leading role to e.g. raise 
awareness by the use of different media. However, the support of government officials 
looses some of its influence as we have witnessed that civil society has taken on many 
responsibilities. In a situation where government carried out all interventions this 
factor would of course be more important. Many programmes have also been carried 
out in cooperation between civil society and donors without real involvement of 
government. Nonetheless, what informants primarily focus on is the importance of 
their daily support to civil society’s HIV/AIDS programmes. This appears to be the 
most important consequence of government officials’ support. Both parties explain 
how this support is crucial in order for them to cooperate and use each others strengths 
in implementing efficient programmes. For civil society organisations in Masaka the 
support of government officials might even be more important in their daily work than 
that of local politicians. Thus, informants express the importance of this close 
cooperation whereas local level politicians’ support seems to depend more on national 
level decisions and priorities. 
In order to bring information to reach all the way to the grassroots, civil society 
organisations such as NGOs and CBOs as well as Faith based and Aids Support 
organisations were critical partners for the Ugandan government. Organisations took 
on several responsibilities in the fight against AIDS. They are often more trusted by 
the target groups, have more capacity and allocate both human and financial resources. 
Their initiatives also extended the areas of work in fighting the epidemic. Hence, 
support from and involvement of civil society seem to have been somewhat more 
important even than the role of government officials. It is important here to underline 
that it is also the extensive cooperation, without real conflicts, between government 
and civil society which is essential in explaining the HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda. Nevertheless, we may still conclude from our informants that civil society’s 
initiatives have had an even stronger impact than those of the civil service. Civil 
society has been critical in order for programmes to reach the grassroots with 
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information especially in care and counselling, as well as they have contributed to 
“open up” the Ugandan society. 
Centralisation versus decentralisation? 
From the information reported decentralisation seems to be relatively important in 
explaining Uganda’s fight against AIDS. Resource allocation has been primarily a 
central responsibility from the start of the programmes up to now. However, as 
developing countries do not have much of an opportunity to raise their own financial 
resources at local level (through taxes etc.), funding to HIV/AIDS, like in other areas 
of public policy, becomes more of a national concern133. Hence, resource allocation, 
being a national responsibility can not be avoided, and thus should not be regarded as a 
sign of limited decentralisation. However, civil society has received funds outside of 
government structures since the very beginning, which limits the central control over 
resources. Today, district institutions seem to have more of a control over 
organisations’ funds mechanisms, although not fully.  
This relatively centralised resource allocation seems to be partly an advantage for 
these districts who struggle to raise their own resources. However, the delay of funds 
from central level is a disadvantage with this system, preventing resources from being 
more efficiently channelled. As documents and certain government officials and civil 
society informants at both levels talk of such delays, this information should be trusted 
at least for the district of Masaka and maybe also for other districts134. Further 
channelling of resources once received has become more of a local matter. This seems 
to have made more of a positive contribution as the structures and thus human capacity 
is already in place, and there is a better overview at local levels.  
 
Informants and documents suggest that programmes have gone from more detailed 
control of national level, to local government having the responsibility for planning 
and implementation of their own activities within certain national policies and 
                                                 
133 We have witnessed that in Masaka except for the DISH project most financial resources for government activities have 
apparently been allocated by central level through the STIP and MAP projects in addition to, especially in early years, the Aids 
Control Programme in MOH. 
134 We also saw in chapter 4.4 that the delay in funds also appears in other areas within health, which makes this information 
even more trustworthy.
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guidelines. In the start of the response central level decided the nature of the 
HIV/AIDS programmes as well as national level was responsible for their 
implementation. Informants and documents, however, suggest positive results also 
from this early more centralised approach. This limits some of the effect of 
decentralisation. But maybe a certain awareness level had to be raised, before more 
local programmes could further try to influence people’s sexual behaviour? However, 
there are still certain restraints to total local government control, which informants in 
Masaka claim limit the progress. On the basis of information reported we can draw 
certain conclusions of positive effects of more local level control and responsibilities. 
Many informants point at more autonomy to the districts and less control from central 
level having contributed to a possibility of “tailoring” the programmes according to the 
real needs of people in the districts135.  
More local government control seems to have a positive effect as it has supported the 
factors already stated to have played an important role. In Masaka we have witnessed 
that civil society has been involved from the very beginning to the response against the 
epidemic, which limited central government’s control over local HIV/AIDS activities. 
And information reported suggests that more local government control and institutions 
have offered civil society even more of an opportunity to become involved, and 
collaborate with local government. Hence, more local level responsibilities seem to 
have supported the factor previously considered to be one of the most important: 
“involvement and support of civil society”, and their cooperation with government 
officials. A decentralised decision-making combined with further collaboration 
between civil society and government has apparently made a great impact. In Masaka 
informants describe how more authority to local governments has contributed to 
further collaboration between actors and a better overview. This has resulted in more 
transparency and less duplication of activities both between civil society and 
government and between different government sectors 136. More local government 
control therefore may have increased the availability of human resources to the 
                                                 
135 At the time of more standard centralised programmes, the opportunity to address the different needs present in each district 
and adapt programmes were limited. 
136 As the Multisectoral approach is mentioned by several actors to have played an important role. 
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programmes. Also financial resources have increased as the organisations’ finances to 
certain activities are included in district level budgets. We can not draw any clear 
conclusions of decentralisation in itself leads to more political commitment at local 
levels. However, there are indications for Masaka that a decentralised system has at 
least facilitated the involvement of local level politicians. We should, however, be 
careful in making these assumptions for all districts of Uganda as many informants 
question the amount of political commitment at local levels. 
Efficient collaboration and common interests 
In general one important reason for the relative success HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda has been the peaceful and extensive cooperation between the various actors 
involved in fighting the epidemic: politicians, civil society, bureaucrats and donors. It 
seems that they all share a common goal: to fight the epidemic. Hence they support all 
contributing actors. The factors examined here more or less support this positive 
collaboration in “an environment of openness” were actors have all been asked and 
allowed to participate. This has made the cooperation successful. Many of the 
informants claim all Ugandans support the fight as all households in Uganda have 
been affected. As many have died people started to know about the cause, they wanted 
to participate in the fight. Another reason might be the power of the President turning 
the issue of AIDS into “a national priority issue”. In a political system where the 
President is so powerful, everyone seems to accept the fight against the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic as a national priority.  
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Figure 3 Collaboration between the internal actors in HIV/AIDS programme 137
      Politicians 
        
Resources (mostly external donors) → →Channelling information on 
protection, care and mitigation 
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
Lack of conflicts, openness and common interests  
in the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
Civil society       Government Officials 
 
5.7   Analysis and theoretical implications 
The “top-down” approach claims that bureaucrats/ government officials are the most 
essential actors involved in formulation and implementation of programmes, while 
involvement of the informal “street-level bureaucrats” such as “civil society” is 
supported by the “bottom-up” approach (Sabatier 1986b). We have witnessed that in 
the initiation of the response to the epidemic political will and commitment has 
apparently played a more important role, than both the support and involvement of 
government officials and civil society. The pre-eminent role of politicians and their 
commitment in explaining the relative success in fighting HIV/AIDS support the “top-
down” approach, which emphasises the need for politicians’ support to the 
programmes with some focus on the political elite (Ibid).  
The “top-down” approach is strengthened since the most organised initiatives to fight 
HIV/AIDS came “from above” even though no formal policies were adopted138. This 
speaks against the “bottom-up” which claim the “top-down” approach is not efficient 
when there is not one adopted policy (Sabatier 1986b). Hence, the “bottom-up” 
approach apparently underestimates the role of politicians both in initiation and 
implementation of programmes as they pay little or no attention to these formal actors. 
For instance, Elmore does not believe in actors who can influence each other’s 
                                                 
137 This figure is a follow up of figure 1 (in chapter 1) as to what can explain the efficient collaboration between the internal 
actors in the fight against the epidemic and how they channel information to the target groups.  
138 However, policies even not formally adopted by the Cabinet do function in practice and also informal policies do exist. 
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behaviours and policy-makers who can control policy implementation (Elmore 1982: 
20 in Younis/Davidson 1990). In Uganda, contrarily, we have witnessed politicians 
who have had a large influence over the implementation of HIV/AIDS programmes.  
Findings in Uganda support the “top-downers” Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) and 
Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1983: 30-31) as they claim political commitment play an 
important role for resource allocation139. However, this approach fails to take into 
consideration that political commitment to a programme does not only lead to 
allocation of internal/ government resources, but also to external donor resources. The 
established connection between political will/commitment and external resource 
allocation, supports theories explaining successful programmes in developing 
countries and health programmes. For instance, the World Bank as well as 
development theorists such as Turner/ Hulme (1997 in Ingram 1990) and Rondinelli/ 
Montgommery (1991), focus on the necessity of political commitment for mobilisation 
of donor resources in addition to government resources.  
Furthermore, findings from the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes fit perfectly with the 
theories of the World Bank on the need for strategies140, in order to acquire donor 
money (WB 1994: 155). However, as the WB has been one of the most important 
agencies in channelling money to the programmes, this might be an example of “self-
predetermination” rather than a confirmation of their theoretical approach. On the 
other hand, several other external donors have also channelled money to Uganda, 
many based on the NSPs, also prior to the STIP/ MAP projects, due to political will 
from the Government141. These findings strengthen the WB’s theory. According to 
Grindle (1980) the political commitment should be noble in order to make a positive 
contribution. In the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes we have seen there is a 
possibility for a hidden agenda of the President’s commitment: a need for donor 
money and acceptance by international community. However, here this appears to 
                                                 
139 More information on resource allocation in the following section 
 This is one of the measures through which political will and commitment is measured. 140
141 With reference to section 4.4 and Appendix II 
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have had a positive contribution as the result has been extensive allocation of donor 
money to fight HIV/AIDS. 
The apparent connection between political commitment and involvement of civil 
society and their cooperation with government is more or less missing from the “top-
down” approach. Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1983: 30-31) claim that political commitment 
is an essential factor for early and efficient cooperation among various actors involved 
in programme implementation. Yet, this approach does not explicitly point at the 
importance of politicians to mobilise and involve civil society, which they claim are 
not important actors. And contrary to what “top-downers” expect, the political support 
has been more important for the involvement of civil society than for the involvement 
of government officials. Furthermore, the “bottom-up approach”, which believes civil 
society organisations to be essential actors, seems to underestimate the importance of 
political will to mobilise these actors as they are rather seen to “mobilise” 
themselves142. In addition, they consider the ability of actors at one level to influence 
the behaviour of other actors to be limited (Elmore 1982).  
Nevertheless, other theories might explain the connection between political 
commitment and mobilisation of civil society better than implementation theory. 
Development theorists like Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991) point at the necessity of 
a stable political leadership at least to establish these coordinating mechanisms 
between private and public actors. Also Materu et al. (2000) claim real political 
commitment at national level support cooperation between government and civil 
society at local level, which is consistent with findings in Masaka district.  
Despite the essential role of politicians and a somewhat strengthened “top-down” vis-
à-vis the “bottom-up” approach, the “top-downers” also underestimate the role of the 
politicians and their commitment. This approach puts a stronger emphasis on the 
support of government officials than the politicians. In Uganda’s fight against AIDS 
this political commitment has been proven far more important in initiation and 
implementation of public programmes than the government officials’. In addition, the 
                                                 
142 Elmore (1982: 12 in Younis 1990) claims there is no possibility for policy makers to control the implementation or influence 
the other actors’ behaviours.  
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“top-down” approach has overseen the importance of involving politicians as real 
actors in the response, to spread the messages, and not only to support the 
programmes. Even more importantly, the “top-down” approach does not place 
sufficient emphasis on the commitment by a country’s leader, in this case the 
President’s. Hence, implementation theory falls short in explaining the extensive 
importance of political commitment, which we witness in Uganda.  
Development and health theorists speak more of the necessity of the political 
leadership. Some of the “development theorists” focus on the need for a “strong 
political elite” and consistent support from political leaders, in order for programmes 
to be successfully implemented (Rondinelli/ Montgommery 1991; Turner/ Hulme 
1997 in Ingram 1990). In addition, health theorists like the World Bank (1993; 1994) 
and Cassels (1995) focus on the need for political commitment in order for health 
programmes, even HIV/AIDS programmes, to be initiated, presumptions which have 
certainly been confirmed here. The World Bank assumes that a country’s leadership 
puts off dealing with the epidemic because sexuality is involved, political benefits are 
small and issues are controversial (WB 1994: 100). In Uganda, however, we have 
witnessed a President who did not put off dealing with the issue. Nevertheless, the 
issue of HIV/AIDS, even though not spoken much for at the time in Africa, had not 
been made controversial within Uganda. In countries like South Africa we see this 
situation very clearly: the issue has become politicised and controversial. In Uganda, 
the fight against AIDS has become an accepted issue for all groups in society, for all 
Ugandans, one in which they have to deal. 
According to Grindle (1980) there has to be real commitment in order for political 
commitment to be a positive contributing factor. There might have been some political 
benefits to this decision, such as acceptance and resources from the international 
community. However, most people believe this to be a cause of real concern for 
Ugandans. Other information reported also suggests there is also real commitment. 
The President did not have to take up loans or speak about the issue if he was not 
sincerely concerned.  
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Even so, as we look at Uganda’s fight against AIDS these theoretical approaches also 
seem to underestimate the widespread importance of a country’s political leader, both 
in initiation and implementation of programmes. It is probably only the 1970s “statist” 
approach to development which plays sufficient emphasis on the importance of a 
country’s political leader in order to affect the outcome of the programmes. 
Nevertheless, none of the theories employed can explain Museveni’s widespread 
importance as a contributor to an “environment of openness” where implementation of 
HIV/AIDS programmes became possible. We also lack theories to understand how 
political commitment can contribute to “open up” a society and reduce stigmatisation 
attached to the disease for efficient channelling of information to people. When 
looking at the ability to transfer findings of the particular role of the President to other 
types of programmes, one must take into consideration that the fight against this 
pandemic is a very particular fight. Hence, a president’s personal involvement in these 
programmes may not be as important for programmes in other areas where the issue in 
which to deal is being addressed openly. Nonetheless, the President’s support to the 
programme and his creation of an “enabling environment” for all actors to become 
involved might very well have an influence also in other areas.  
The political system 
Various scholars emphasise the importance of a socio-economic stable context in order 
for programmes to be successfully implemented. For instance, development theories 
focus on the need for a stable and consistent leadership with abilities to develop 
structures to follow up their programmes (Rondinelli/Montgommery 1991; 
Turner/Hulme 1997 in Ingram 1990). In addition, Cassels (1995) considers political 
support to health programmes as fragile and the context as essential in order to obtain 
this support. In Uganda we have witnessed a stable political leadership, which has 
continuously addressed the fight against AIDS throughout the President’s period, and 
which has manifested itself through the establishment of institutions. Institutions like 
the AIDS Commission (UAC), coordinates the country’s Multisectoral Approach and 
all its actors. These are signs of “strong public institutions”, which development 
theories like Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991) consider to be a necessity for efficient 
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policy implementation. In Uganda a relatively stable socio-political environment has 
also contributed to the allocation of resources by donors. The President, which has 
proved himself committed to fight AIDS, has stayed in office up until today, and still 
donor and internal resources are granted based on Museveni’s personal commitment.  
Nevertheless, this rather stable political system is not an example of a democratic 
multi-party system, which Grindle (1980) stress to be a precondition for political 
commitment to play a positive role in the implementation of programmes. According 
to Grindle (1980) and Cleaves (1980), programmes implemented in an open 
democratic environment are better adapted as politicians and bureaucrats are more 
responsive, than if they are implemented in an authoritarian environment. It is 
therefore of particular interest that in a political regime which prohibit political parties, 
this factor has played a very important role. We can, however, not assert that the 
Ugandan political system is a total authoritarian system, as its leaders are very open to 
the involvement of private organisations in fighting HIV/AIDS, and thus might be 
more pluralistic at least in this area143. There is also a possibility that a political regime 
where the President has more power than under multi-party democracies can be 
efficient in order for his ideas to be carried through. In the fight against AIDS 
Museveni’s ideas have benefited the whole population and gone in line with most 
other actors’ interests. It could, however, be questioned what happens in a situation 
where the political leader’s ideas are not in line with the people’s needs and wishes.  
Resource allocation 
Findings on “resource allocation” support only to a certain degree implementation 
theory as they emphasise the need for bringing in the “existence of resources” as a 
separate factor. By looking at interviews and figures144 we see that an enormous 
amount of money has been spent on HIV/AIDS activities in Uganda. There is no doubt 
that “resource allocation” has been important in explaining the Ugandan success. 
Without these financial resources plans by various actors on HIV/AIDS can not be 
carried out and programmes not scaled up. Hence, findings supports the “top-down” 
                                                 
143 We will examine whether and why there is such freedom for organisations also in the next section. 
144 Go to section 4.4 and appendix II 
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approach such as Gunn (1980: 05 in Younis/ Davidson 1990) and Van Meter/ Van 
Horn (1975) who consider sufficient resources to be a necessity for programmes to be 
successfully implemented. Simultaneously, even though Elmore points at a certain 
need for resources to be granted primarily to organisations (1982), the “bottom-up” 
approach seems to underestimate the importance of resource mobilisation in order for 
all actors (also government officials) to carry out and scale up their programmes. 
However, as “resource allocation” in this case is more a consequence of other factors 
such as political will/ commitment and involvement of civil society, this factor should 
not be paid as much attention to as asserted by the “top-down” approach.  
“Top-down” adherents such as Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) describe how resources 
should be made available through government decisions and passed through 
government channels. Assertions of the availability of government resources are partly 
confirmed in these programmes as government has been active in providing human 
resources by educating personnel. In addition, government has made government 
resources available through channelling of financial resources through the Ministry of 
Health and the MAP/ STIP projects (by loaning money from the WB). However, these 
financial and human resources to fight AIDS where not granted through adopted 
policies, but are rather a result of collaboration between external donors and 
government145. 
Furthermore, the “top-down” approach does not emphasise the importance of external 
donor resources, which have been extremely important to fight AIDS, not only for the 
loans from the WB but also for other financial contributions. Hence, classic Western 
implementation theory is not as adaptive in environments where the state is poor, and 
external donors allocate much of the funds for public and private programmes. Again 
we have to go to development and health theory as they have adapted their theories 
more specifically to these circumstances. The WB’s examination of health 
programmes and development theorists such as Materu et al. (2000: 33) and 
Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991), all consider external agencies to be a necessity for 
programme implementation in developing countries, in combination with government 
                                                 
145  Except for the UAC and the ACP, MOH where policies were adopted to establish these institutions and its human resources. 
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resources. These findings do not, however, support the early “neo-liberal” approach 
represented by World Bank in the 1980s, which believed the economic growth will 
“trickle down" to the health of the population, as most money was not spent from the 
government’s own revenues (Zwi/Mills 1995).  
According to Grindle/ Cleaves (1980) a scarcity of resources in developing countries 
leads to more problematic implementation of policies. We see this situation very 
clearly in Uganda as the country has depended and continues to depend on donor’s 
will to support these programmes in order for HIV/AIDS information to reach out to 
people. This leaves the country very vulnerable. The solution to this “donor-
dependency” might therefore be for external donors to make commitments to fight 
AIDS by supporting actors long-term. Moreover, in a poor country like Uganda the 
fight for resources is also more intense as resources are scarce. Hence, it is even more 
surprisingly that many actors have agreed on the prioritisation on the fight against 
AIDS. Of course this might be the consequence of a political system where the 
President has such a large power in setting country’s “priority-issues”. However, since 
all actors (including civil society) agree on the importance of fighting AIDS, this could 
also be the cause of “all Ugandans” having been affected by the epidemic.  
In Uganda’s fight against AIDS we have seen that the extensive collaboration between 
civil society and government has been important at all levels to allocate, but most of 
all to channel resources146. Therefore, in line with Ugalde/ Jackson (1995), we must 
also take into consideration the importance of how resources are channelled, who 
controls them and how they are spent. The “bottom-up approach” considers resources 
should be channelled to organisations as they are closer to the target groups (Elmore 
1982: 28), while “top-down” scholars focus primarily on the availability of resources 
for government (Van Meter/Van Horn 1975). Hence, both of these approaches seem to 
underestimate the need for cooperation between government and private actors for 
successful channelling of human and financial resources.  
                                                 
146 For more on the support of government officials see section 5.4. 
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As a consequence, findings from these programmes rather support development 
theorists and actors examining health programmes, like the WB and WHO. These 
actors consider public-private partnerships as important in order to raise and channel 
internal financial and human resources for HIV/AIDS programmes (WB 1994: 168-
170; WHO 2000: 139). The “top-downers” Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975) as well as 
WHO, and to a certain degree the World Bank, emphasise the need for human 
resources. Findings of the importance of cooperation between government sectors and 
civil society for human resources primarily confirm the theories of the WHO. This 
organisation emphasises the need for such human resources, for skilled health 
personnel, which should be offered by the government, but otherwise mostly by the 
private sector (WHO 2000: 77).  Findings of the importance of the UAC, DACCs/ 
DHACs and creation of common plans to fight AIDS also support Rondinelli/ 
Montgommery (1991). They point at the need for government to create effective 
structures and processes to mobilise and channel resources. In addition, as many civil 
society resources pass outside of government structures these findings support Ugalde/ 
Jackson (1995) who claim that people should have more control of the resources 
compared to the government.  
The importance of civil society versus civil servants? 
Findings from the Ugandan case strengthen the “top-down” approach as adherents see 
the need for support from both government officials and civil society. Nevertheless, 
this approach, contrary to the “bottom-up” approach, seems to underestimate the role 
of civil society. They have been key actors and one of the most important factors in 
order to explain the relative success. In addition, the “bottom-up approach” 
underestimates the role of government officials especially for the involvement of civil 
society, like they also did with the politicians. Hence, neither of the two approaches 
within classic implementation theory points at the importance of cooperation between 
government officials and civil society. Again we have to turn to development and 
health theories in order to understand the importance of this cooperation for successful 
programmes to be carried out in developing countries. 
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First of all we have seen the importance of civil society in passing of information to 
the grassroots, which are in line with the preconditions for successful implementation 
set by the “bottom-up” approach. Target groups have received information from what 
this approach called the “street-level bureaucrats” – the NGOs, community-workers, 
FBOs and CBOs. They are closer to the target-groups and can easier implement 
programmes to influence people’s behaviours (Sabatier 1986a). Their influence 
follows the “bottom-up” adherents who claim organisations have greater possibilities 
of influencing people’s behaviours as well as they have more skills from the grassroots 
(Sabatier 1986a; Wheatherly/Lipsky in Younis 1990). Simultaneously the “top-down” 
approach underestimates the local resources present in the informal groups such as 
civil society, as they have skills and competence of the problem which the government 
lacks (Elmore in Kjellberg/Reitan 1995: 155). By involving these groups in the 
response the programmes become more successful. The World Bank asserts that civil 
society, together with a decentralised approach, increases the involvement of 
community groups at all levels147. We also recognise presumptions by the Bank that 
these actors are more flexible than the government and use more creative methods to 
promote health education and information, through theatre, dance, films etc (WB 
1994: 05). Development theorists also support the involvement of the private sector 
and civil society as they offer important services to the population 
(Rondinelli/Montgommery 1991) and can improve the quality of services (Van der 
Haag 1995 in Turner/Hulme 1997: 127).  
Grindle (1980) and Cleaves (1980) believe civil society influences the programmes 
positively in an open, political system within a plural society. In these societies there 
are higher possibilities of organisations to be autonomous and responsive to people’s 
needs, and for private organisations interests to support the ones of the government. 
Once again we see a certain contrast between these presumptions made by these 
authors and the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes. In this country which we can not 
call an open democratic society, there are between 700-1000 agencies involved with 
AIDS activities, and private organisations do support the public programmes. Hence, 
                                                 
147 The connection between involvement and civil society and decentralisation will be further discussed in a later section. 
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there seems to be a certain level of pluralism benefiting these programmes despite 
Uganda being a zero-party system.  
We have seen the “bottom-up” approach arguing that informal groups are more 
influential to pass on information to people (Sabatier 1986a; Wheatherly/Lipsky in 
Younis 1990. Nevertheless, in order to fully grasp the importance of People Living 
with Aids and their organisations to reduce the stigma and discrimination attached to 
the disease, we are in shortage of theoretical guidelines. Neither the “bottom-up” nor 
any of the other theoretical approaches talk of the importance of involvement of 
certain groups in order to “open-up” a society to become more susceptible to receive 
and accept the messages. This corresponds to the absence of theories we witnessed in 
order to understand the importance of the President’s “openness-policy”. Since there is 
often heavy stigmatisation attached to the AIDS epidemic, the programmes in question 
and the need for actors “to open up” might be particular in this case. One might, 
however, expect health theories to include this aspect, as also other diseases have some 
stigma attached to them, although not to a similar extent.  
The “top-down” approach considers government officials’ support to be one of the 
most important factors to carry out successful programmes (Ingram 1990)148. In 
Uganda we have seen that government officials have been involved, which according 
to Van Meter/Van Horn (1975) is evidence of support. Also government officials’ 
support can be witnessed through government institutions to fight the epidemic149. 
These findings support “top-downers” like Mazmanian/ Sabatier (1985: 35) who assert 
that the creation of such agencies will increase the possibility of government 
commitment leading to prioritisation and visibility of the programmes150. However, 
apparently their support has not been as important as the “top-down” approach 
believes, as civil society has taken on responsibilities and not all information reported 
claim widespread support, at least at national level. But cooperation between 
                                                 
148 For instance implementation scholars such as McLaughlin and Bardach focus on bureaucrats to be relevant actors with a 
major influence on the outcomes of the programmes (Bardach 1977: 43, McLaughlin 1978: 167-80 in Ingram 1990). 
149 From the establishment of the ACP, MOH to the establishment of the Multisectoral response and coordinating institutions like 
UAC and DACCs/ DHACs. 
150 The visibility of the fight against AIDS in Uganda can be witnessed through the creation of the UAC under the President’s 
office. 
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government and civil society suggest that the public arena still has an important role to 
play unlike the arguments put forward by “neo-liberalism”.  
In addition, findings of lack of support among government officials through corrupt 
and delayed tendencies criticise the “top-down” approach and their emphasis on the 
need for support from government officials. Nevertheless, this does not support the 
“bottom-up approach” who claims the degree of the support of government officials to 
be without importance. On the contrary, findings support the sceptics to the 
involvement of government officials such as neo-liberalists and the WB as well as 
WHO (2000: 63) and Jain (1992) who claim bureaucracies are not efficient in health 
programmes as they often become tools for self-interest of the bureaucrats and are not 
responsive to people’s needs. However, if all channelling of resources would have 
gone outside of the government system we would also face problems with overview of 
activities and placing the state on the sideline of activities, which various health 
theorists have warned against151.  
Cooperation between government officials and civil society  
In the Ugandan HIV/AIDS interventions civil society supports the government 
programmes. This correspond to the “top-down” approach who points at the need for 
support of interest groups as for all other groups, but they ignore the involvement of 
civil society (Mazmanian/ Sabatier 1983: 30). However, in these programmes we have 
seen the importance of the cooperation between government and civil society. While, 
the “top-down approach” apparently omits that government support has to include 
support to the involvement of civil society, the “bottom-up” approach underestimates 
the need for support from government to the “street-level bureaucrats”. However, in 
the fight against AIDS the actors depend on and compliment each other in order to 
increase capacity and carry out successful programmes.  
We have to turn to development and health theories in order to fully understand the 
importance of both of these actors supporting each other. As government has included 
civil society in their HIV/AIDS programmes, these findings support development 
theorists such as Rondinelli/ Montgommery (1991). They emphasise the importance of 
                                                 
 WHO 2000; WB 1993.  151
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the support from the bureaucracy in order to create conditions that allow NGOs to 
implement efficient programmes. Also Grindle (1980) considers the importance of 
public institutions to be responsive to people’s needs and to understand the 
environment in which they operate and ensure responsiveness. Findings also support 
health theorists as the World Bank as they consider bureaucratic commitment to be 
essential for the involvement of local communities and non-governmental 
organisations in decision-making and implementation (WB 1994: 43). Edward/ 
Hulme’s analyses of health programmes also point at the need for support from NGOs 
as they strengthen the capacity of the government through collaboration (in Lorgen: 
1998).  
We have observed that civil society has certain capacities in different areas with 
fighting HIV/AIDS of which the government seems to know how to make use of to 
improve the programmes’ capacities152. These findings support Turner/Hulme (1997: 
88) who consider increased resources and improved government’s capacities to be a 
result of this cooperation. At local level the importance of cooperation and overview of 
the actors on a daily basis support Materu et al. They focus on local level and how 
cooperation between the two actors is important to avoid duplication of activities and 
conflicts and build trust between the two (Materu et al. 2000: 37). In Uganda we have 
also witnessed that these actors have the same interests of fighting HIV/AIDS leading 
to few conflicts between the two. These findings support Rondinelli/ Montgommery 
(1991) who claim cooperation between government and the civil society organisations 
can lead to successful programmes if they pursue the same goals.  
In Uganda we have seen that despite the fact that many HIV/AIDS activities are in the 
hands of civil society, the government institutions have at least to some extent the 
overall control through various mechanisms. WHO (2000: 63) and Lorgen (1998) 
stress that the ultimate responsibility of health should lay within the government 
administration. Jain (1992) also considers bureaucracy to have emerged as the most 
important institution to plan, perform and deliver public goods. Findings of somewhat 
institutionalised HIV/AIDS programmes to a certain extent also support the statist 
                                                 
152 Especially when it comes to care of PLHAs and VCT services, but also in areas they have innovative measures. 
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approaches and Ugalde/ Jackson (1995) and Zwi/ Mills (1995). They see a need for a 
strong state in order to administer and coordinate the programmes, and a certain 
control of the private sector to concentrate their resources on the right points and avoid 
duplication and fragmentation. On the other side, the “neo-liberalist” approach seems 
to undermine the need for an overview of the actors involved in the response through 
government institutions. WHO’s assertions seem to be appropriate in order to describe 
the collaboration between government and civil society. The intention is “to achieve 
combined advantages of greater flexibility and innovation while maintaining overall 
control over strategic objectives and financial protection” (WHO 2000: 63).   
Contrary to the wishes of the “bottom-up” approach, civil society is under a certain 
control from the government at national and local level as part of the cooperation 
between the two. However, in this case neither the “top-down” approach, wishing 
much control, nor the “bottom-up” approach believing in no control seems to be 
appropriate. It is rather the World Bank’s and WHO’s philosophy which is supported 
here: the government seems to provide the NGOs with an enabling legal environment 
for establishment and registration of their activities without unnecessary regulation of 
their activities (WB 1994: 125). We have seen indications that civil society 
organisations are controlled but are still given freedom to implement innovative 
HIV/AIDS programmes (WB 1994: 05). The extensive cooperation in various 
institutions support WHO which points at a need for information- sharing and dialogue 
between public and private sector to get an overview of the activities of NGOs, and to 
coordinate and regulate them (WHO 2000: 128).  
Centralisation versus Decentralisation? 
Whether or not the public programmes should be under local or central level control 
(decentralised or centralised) is one of questions most clearly distinguishing the two 
approaches within implementation theories. Indications from this research primarily 
support the “bottom-up” theory, although some central level control probably played a 
role early in the response. Assertions in the HIV/AIDS programmes of a positive effect 
of more autonomy to local authorities to “tailor the programmes to local needs” 
correspond to claims by adherents of the “bottom-up” approach. Elmore claims 
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decentralisation leads to adaptation of programmes to people’s own needs and 
increases the possibility for programmes to influence changes in behaviour (in 
Kjellberg/Reitan 1995: 155). Simultaneously, this is a critique of the ”top-down” 
approach who claims strong central control of the  programmes is necessary in order to 
secure successful outcomes. Findings also support development theorists such as 
Turner/Hulme (1997: 114) which argue that decentralisation can better meet the needs 
of the target groups, as opposed to times in Uganda when central level set the priorities 
regardless of local needs. This seems especially to be the case in Uganda as 
decentralisation is combined with involvement of civil society, spoken for by various 
theoretical approaches. 
According to the “top-downers” Van Meter/ Van Horn (1975), a variety of actors 
involved in a programme decrease the chances of successful outcomes. On the 
contrary, in Uganda more local level control over the programmes and district 
coordination committees has contributed to the increased involvement of government 
sectors, but especially to the close collaboration with civil society. This has a clear 
positive effect on the programmes which support the “bottom-up” approach. Elmore 
explains how decentralisation contributes to more knowledge and competence at local 
level through strengthening of the involvement of non-governmental actors (Elmore 
1980 in Kjellberg/Reitan 1995: 53). In Masaka this is exactly what we have witnessed: 
local level control has contributed to more involvement of civil society, and more 
capacity in order to reach out to people with information about HIV/AIDS. Findings 
from the district also support development theorists like Materu et al. and health 
theorists like the World Bank, which both claim decentralisation leads to more 
efficient cooperation and coordination between the government and civil society (WB 
1994: 117-118; Materu et al. 2000: 18). The HIV/AIDS programmes also appear as 
good examples of Turner/Hulme’s precondition for when to decentralise a program: 
when there is need for flexibility, innovation and responsiveness, for more 
participatory measures including civil society153 (1997: 108). Thus, there are 
indications that a decentralised system of governance is efficient when it supports the 
                                                 
153 As we witnessed in a previous section the inclusion of civil society has contributed to innovative and flexible programmes to 
reach down to people with HIV/AIDS initiatives. 
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factors which tend to strengthen the programmes, such as the collaboration between 
the state and civil society. In addition. decentralisation may also have contributed to 
more responsible and committed local politicians154. None of the theories examined 
can, however, explain this connection.  
Nevertheless, in the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes there is not a total absence of 
control from central level which the “bottom-up” approach prefers. Hence, these 
findings rather support Grindle (1980) who point at a certain control of district and its 
actors to be important if one should have successful decentralised programmes155. 
However, as this lack of autonomy for government officials seem to somewhat limit 
freedom and thereby effectiveness of the programmes, this might strengthen the need 
for further decentralisation and further control of “local government”. However, due to 
early positive results we can conclude that also a more central control, spoken for by 
the “top-downers”, has had a certain positive effect. But we should keep in mind that 
also in the early years of the response the situation was not like the “top-downers” 
preferred with overall central control as civil society was involved. 
Materu et al. (2000: 13) state that decentralisation can increase also the possibility of 
efficient allocation and channelling of financial resources. This is only to some extent 
supported in this case. Contrary to what the “bottom-up” approach expect, and 
consistent with the “top-down” approach there has been central level control in 
allocation of resources, which can be an advantage for the programmes within poor 
countries. Hence, the “bottom-up” approach claiming a need for local government to 
allocate resources does not seem to be adapted to developing countries. As we saw in 
Masaka, chances of raising their own resources through local taxes appear rather 
limited, and few donors today wish to give direct support to only a single district 
within a country156.  These findings are supported by Materu et al. who claim that in a 
developing country with a weak revenue base there is limited possibility for local 
                                                 
154 However, these findings should not be generalised to all of Uganda as several informants questions local politicians’ 
commitment to fight AIDS. 
155 Districts HIV/AIDS plans should also be approved by central authorities before the money is granted. 
156 In Masaka we have, however, seen one example of a Chairman’s own political initiatives raising money to an ARV clinic, 
which has had drastic consequences for provision of ARVs. This appears however to be an exception and based on personal 
friendship in the US, and not organisational cooperation through which most money is passed to the HIV/AIDS programmes in 
Uganda. 
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governments to raise their own revenues through e.g. taxes (Materu et al. 2000: 15). In 
developing countries national level political commitment can contribute to resource 
allocation from external donors to local levels. Hence, some central control over 
resource allocations seems to go hand in hand with the “top-down” approach. 
However, financial delays of central government show how national level control over 
allocation of resources can also be an obstacle to an efficient implementation of 
programmes in line with the “bottom-up” approach. To avoid such delays from central 
government the best solution might be more decentralised financial resource allocation 
by which donors could deliver money directly to the District Government. In Masaka 
informants claimed that lack of local resources and national level control limit their 
freedom to address local needs. However, unless they are able to raise their own 
district resources a certain level of control from national level might be needed.  
We have, however, seen how a decentralised system facilitates channelling of funds as 
the structures are already in place and improves the availability of human resources. 
These findings support “bottom-up” and health theorists like the World Bank, which 
claim decentralisation can create better institutional arrangements and improve the 
channelling of financial and human resources (WB 1994: 04). Once the money is 
allocated to the districts, it is their responsibilities to spend them according to their 
own plans and to the actors responsible for carrying out the interventions. In a 
previous section we also witnessed that a more decentralised system of governance 
contributes to raise human resources, as many people at all levels could be mobilised 
in fighting the epidemic such as politicians, government officials and civil society.  
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6 Summary and Conclusion  
This master thesis has put its focus on a major security threat: the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and has sought to understand why Uganda as the only country in Southern 
Africa, has managed to turn the trend and greatly reduce the number of infected. We 
have examined the HIV/AIDS programmes and witnessed that they have involved a 
wide variety of actors both from public and private sector. External donors have 
greatly financed these activities, but government has also contributed, for instance by 
lending money from the World Bank. From starting out as fairly centralised 
programmes, the programmes increasingly became more decentralised involving more 
of civil society. 
The factors which can explain Uganda’s relative success in fighting AIDS have 
contributed in a concerted action of “an environment of openness” about the disease. 
The most important factor is “political will and commitment” primarily from the 
President of Uganda. Museveni early addressed this issue and “opened up” the 
Ugandan society, creating an environment for actors like civil society to become 
involved. The President thus spearheaded the cooperation between government and 
civil society through various forums at all levels. The President’s commitment also 
triggered mobilisation of resources from external and internal donors. Even in Masaka 
we have witnessed the consequences of the President’s commitment through openness 
and facilitation of activities from different actors like local level politicians, 
government officials and civil society.  
“Resource allocation” has been important for all actors to carry out programmes in 
different areas. However, this factor seems to be largely the cause of other factors such 
as political commitment and involvement of civil society. In addition, also channelling 
of resources seems to play a role. Channelling of resources has supported the 
cooperation between the government and civil society, which have contributed to most 
human resources. However, this factor should not be taken for granted in a country 
depending on external donors.   
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“Involvement and support of civil society” appears to be the second most important 
factor. The creation of the “environment of openness” would not have been possible 
without the inclusion of People Living with HIV/AIDS themselves and their 
organisations. They have held testimonies and given the “epidemic a face”, which has 
increased the target groups reliance in information on the issue. Civil society in 
general through NGOs, FBOs and CBOs has also been the government’s most 
important partner in fighting HIV/AIDS. Their involvement has been extremely 
important to distribute information to the grassroots. People trust them. Moreover, they 
have more capacity and knowledge and use more innovative measures to reach people 
at all levels. However, involvement of civil society has been even more important as 
they have supported government interventions. Thus, “support of government 
officials” at national and district level can be observed through the support to, and 
collaboration with, civil society. This collaboration has been extremely important, 
increasing both human and financial resources, to reach more people with information 
and services in relation to HIV/AIDS. However, “support from government officials” 
looses some effect as there are indications of some lack of support at national level 
creating certain obstacles through especially delay of funds.  
“Decentralisation” appears to have had a certain effect as more local level 
responsibility has supported other important factors. In this connection we will 
emphasise the collaboration between government and civil society and to some extent 
also local political support. In addition, districts now have more of an opportunity to 
“tailor” the programmes according to local needs. However, programmes still have to 
follow certain national guidelines, and programmes also had an effect when they 
where more under national level control.  
Findings from the Ugandan HIV/AIDS programmes in general support the “top-down” 
more than the “bottom-up” approach since many actors have supported the 
programmes and formal actors, especially the politicians, have played such an 
important role. As initiatives came primarily “from above” this supports the “top-
down” approach. However, this approach seems to pay too much attention to formal 
actors such as government officials and their “control”, and too little attention to the 
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freedom of e.g. civil society organisations to contribute with their capacities. As 
“bottom-up” initiatives were early taken and civil society has been a decisive partner 
for the Ugandan government, contributions of the “bottom-up” approach are also very 
important. The involvement of these “street-level bureaucrats” has provided the 
programmes with innovative and flexible measures spoken for by the “bottom-up” 
approach. In combination with more local level control over the programmes, this 
seems to have been decisive. 
Classic implementation theory does not, however, seem to grasp the importance of the 
cooperation between government and civil society. Hence, we need to supplement this 
theory by development and health theoretical approaches in order to further understand 
the Ugandan case. And thereby also to grasp the challenges of health service and 
delivery structures in developing countries. Development and health theories place 
more of an emphasis on the role of politicians and point at the importance of the 
collaboration between public and private sector to increase financial and human 
resources. Contrary to the implementation theory which only focuses on internal 
money, these theories also point at the need for external resources. This collaboration 
supports the WB (1993; 1994) and WHO (2000) more than either of the 
implementation theories. Civil society is somewhat controlled, but still given freedom 
and flexibility to fight AIDS. However, none of the theoretical approaches examined 
can help us understand the widespread importance of the President’s commitment, the 
importance of the “environment of openness” and the involvement of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS.  
For other countries struggling to fight the epidemic the country’s political leadership 
must take a primary role in combating AIDS to involve the PLHAs and reduce 
stigmatisation of the disease. The worst enemy for fighting HIV/AIDS in African 
countries is silence and stigmatisation. Unless people start talking about the disease, 
thus making the disease “acceptable”, the issue of AIDS can not be dealt with. The 
political leadership must also encourage and “open up” for involvement from all actors 
who can participate in the response, especially civil society and international donors 
should be accepted as partners.  
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If these initiatives will lead to the decrease in the HIV/AIDS epidemic also in other 
countries might depend on the country’s political system and the amount of power of 
the President to set “national priorities”. In addition, we must keep in mind that at the 
time of the annunciation of Uganda’s HIV/AIDS programmes the donors had their 
eyes set on Uganda as the country had a very violent history. There might have been 
good-will among the international society for a new path in Ugandan history. Maybe it 
was easier for the President to receive extensive resources as he showed early signs of 
cooperation with the West, by adopting WB policies and announcing the fight against 
HIV/AIDS? This was a clear contrast to the previous leaders of Uganda and donors 
quickly responded to the requests.  
Whether similar initiatives will lead to similar outcomes can also be a matter of 
timing. Today more political leaders have already taken a stand to this issue, and do 
not have the same opportunities as Museveni to announce this fight at the takeover of a 
regime. In the mid-80s few African leaders had started to address the issue of AIDS, 
and the President’s initiative was highly appreciated at the international level. Today, 
however, more countries have started to address the issue of AIDS also in African 
countries. Consequently countries which today initiate their responses do not appear 
“as unique” as Uganda, and maybe the international community is not as “generous” in 
allocating money to the HIV/AIDS programmes as they once were.  
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Appendix I Abbreviations 
AWOFS Aids Widows Orphans Family Support 
AIDS  Acquired Infection Deficiency Syndrome 
ASO  Aids Support Organisation 
CBO    Community Based Organisation 
CHW  Community Health Worker 
CSO  Civil society organisation 
GOU  Government of Uganda 
HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IMAU  Islamic Medical Association Uganda 
IEC  Information, education and communication 
LRA  Lords Resistance Army 
INGO  International Nongovernmental Organisation 
MAP  Multi-country Aids Project 
MDLG Masaka District Local Government 
MOES Ministry of Education and Sports 
MOFPED Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development 
MOGLSD Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development 
MOH   Ministry of Health  
MSAP Multisectoral Approach 
NACWOLA  National Community of Women Living with AIDS 
NRM/A National Resistance Movement/Army 
NSP/F National Strategic Plan/ Framework 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
OWAU Orphans and Women of Aids Uganda 
PEAP  Poverty Eradication Action Program 
PAF  Poverty Alleviation Funds 
PHC  Primary Health Care 
PLHAs  People Living with HIV/AIDS 
STIP  Sexually Transmitted Infections Project 
TASO  The Aids Support Organisation 
UAC   Uganda AIDS Commission 
UNAIDS  United Nations Joint Program on AIDS 
UNDP  United Nation Development Program 
VCT  Voluntary Counselling and Testing 
WHO  World Health Organisation 
WDR  World Development Report 
WHR  World Health Report 
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Appendix II Resource allocations from donors, year 2001157 (US$ 
millions).
Agency Implement. 
Partner 
Prevent- 
Ion 
Care 
Support 
VCT Capacity 
Building 
Adol. IGAs Research Advo- 
cacy 
OVC TOTAL 
USAID TASO, JSI, 
CCP, FBC, 
NGOs  
2,799  5,590  2,437 3,447  0,150   0,475 0, 130  15,028 
MAKERERE 
UNIVERSITY 
Rubaga 
Hosp,MUK 
0,500   0,100   2,650   3,250 
 
EU AAU, TASO, 
Straight Talk, 
AIC, PEARL 
1,041 0,748 0,247 0,245 0,943     3,223 
World Bank Publ./private, 
NGOs,comm.... 
0,333 0,333 0,333, 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 0,333 3,000 
WHO MOH 0,092 0,340 0,037 0,053 0,522     1,044 
DFID TASO,MOH 
Straight Talk 
Mildmay 
0,232 1,508 0,232       1,972 
AVS MOH, COWA, 
Kitgum distr.. 
0,050 0,134  0,877 0,290    0,698 2,049 
CDC AIC, TASO, 
AIM,UVRI.. 
 0,483 1,680       2,163 
MRC/UVRI TASO, EU, 
WELCOME 
      1,499   1,499 
FRENCH 
EMBASSY 
UNICEF, 
MU, Med. de 
Monde, UNFPA 
 0,476        0,476 
JAPANESE 
EMBASSY 
UAC,  
CPAR, AMREF 
0,577         0,577 
MILDMAY 
CENTRE 
MoH, NGOs 
hospitals etc. 
 0,837       0,102 0,940 
DANIDA TASO, RAIN 
Kitovu, OCBO 
0,107 0,282       0,023 0,412 
SIDA Naguru TC 0,150 0,500   0,050     0,700 
NORAD FUE, UWESO 0,016        0,090 0,106 
WFP World Vision 
Feed the Child. 
0,248 0,248  0,248     0,248 0,992 
UNICEF MOH, NGOs 0,237   0,187   0,019   0,411 
UNFPA MOH, Norad 
WHO, UNICEF, 
districts,  
0,200  0,100  0,263   0,038  0,600 
UNAIDS Unaso, IMAU 
Unicef, 
ATGWU 
0,333   0,590   0,315 0,053  1,290 
AMREF KCC, MOH, 
MOES 
 0,030  0,145 0,135     0,310 
Save the 
Children, DK 
FOCA, GUSCO 
HAR, CPA 
 0,040   0,044    0,070 0,154 
AYA MOH, MOES 
POPSEC 
   0,500      0,500 
EMBASSY 
OF IRELAND 
Districts, NGOs, 
CBOs 
0,221 0,089  0,089      0,398 
GOAL 
UGANDA 
UYDEL, Meting 
Point, MMM, 
AWOFS 
 0,032  0,151 0,053 0,010 0,034  0,035 0,315 
FEED THE 
CHILDREN 
AMREF, KCC, 
DISH, MOES, 
MOH, MLGSD,  
0,080    0,135    0,095 0,310 
UNHCR Dictricts OPM, 
AHA, IRC,etc. 
0,117  0,010       0,127 
ACORD NCOs, UNHCR 
Comic Relief 
0,638 0,411  0,114      0,116 
HOSPICE 
UGANDA 
MOH  0,111  0,076      0,187 
TOTAL158  8,289 12,160 5,076 7,159 2,932 0,367 5,325 0.596 1,805 43,709 
                                                 
157 The table is a summary of the 35 agencies responding to the study: where agencies allocating over 100.00 dollars are 
present.  
158 These figures are a result of the whole table, all agencies included, not only the ones represented in this table. 
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Appendix III Interview Material 
Each interview lasted between 30-90 minutes depending on how much time the respondents had 
available. Extensive notes were taken during the interviews and the notes were completed soon after 
the interviews were finished in order to maximise accuracy. Altogether 36 interviews were conducted, 
of which two thirds were with national representatives of government and civil society organisations, 
donors and academics and the rest amongst local level representatives in Masaka. Respondents were 
asked questions about the organisation, focus and priorities of the HIV/AIDS programmes in Uganda 
with a focus on the following: 
 
1. Has there been success, progress in the fight against AIDS in Uganda? 
2. Are people aware, have they changed their sexual behaviours, decrease in prevalence rates? 
3. What are the reasons for this progress? 
4. Actors: Who where the most important to pass on information to people? 
5. Politicians: what role have they played? Have politicians been committed? 
6. Resources: where do they come from-to the government? What impact have they had on the 
programmes? 
7. Decentralisation: what is decided by local and national level. Has decentralisation contributed? 
8. Civil society: has contributed? 
9. The informants contributions: how have they spread information or channelled resources? 
10. The informants’ cooperation with others (especially the cooperation between government and 
civil society): through what channels and has it been efficient? 
11. Through what channels do you receive your financial resources? 
12. What are the obstacles for further improvement of the HIV/AIDS situation in Uganda? What 
are the obstacles the informants face in their daily work?  
 
Informants:  
Dan Wamanya Ahimbisibwe. Programme Manager Specialist. USAID 
Beatrice Ajambo. Account assistant. NACWOLA 
Susan Ajok: Project coordinator, Straight Talk 
Vincent Bagire. HIV/AIDS Focal Point, Uganda Catholic Secretariat, project administrator 
Kasheeka Emmanuel Baingana. Director, Planning and Monitoring, Uganda AIDS Commission  
Jane Batte. Public Relations Officer, Aids Information Center 
Vincent Bagire. Catholic Secretariat 
Sam Igaga Ibanda. Assistant Resident Representative. UNDP 
Jantine Jacobi. Country Programme Advisor. UNAIDS, Kampala.  
Swizen Kyomuhendo. Lecturer and Consultant in Research and Training, Dept.of Social Work and 
Social Administration 
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Beatrice Lumbega. Director, AWOFS  
Henry Luwaga. TB specialist, AIM 
Dr. Elizabeth Madraa. ACP Coordinator, MOH 
Motavu Moses. Namirembe Diocese. 
Edward Mukiibi. Information scientist, TASO 
Stella Neema. Research fellow/ Medical Anthropologist-Makerere Institute of Social Research 
Kayongo Nsereko. President/ Chief Executive Director of OWAU 
Ysuf  Nsubuga. Commissioner for Secondary Education/ HIV AIDS co-ordinator, MOES 
Deo Nyanzi. Information and Documentation Officer, UNASO: Uganda Network of AIDS service 
organizations 
Dr. Hafswa Kyambadde. IMAU 
Rosemary N. Ssenabulya. Leader Federation of Uganda Employers 
J.J. Sonko.S.  Head of Human Resources Mangagment, Deputy ACP Manager, MOLG 
Benon Webare. Programme Support Services Manager. Save the children Norway 
Rosemary Mwesifwa, Documentalist/ Librarian, UAC  
 
Dina Kakande. Health educator, Department of Health. Masaka District 
John Kazabwe. Community Health Worker, TASO Masaka 
Matia M. Lukumbwa. Health Educator, Masaka District 
Jamil Miwanda Deputy Chairman, Masaka Distric 
Dr. Stuart Musisi. District Medical Officer, HIV/AIDS Focal Person, Masaka District 
Joseph Kazotzi Muyomba. Secretary health and environment, Masaka district 
Stephen Nakabinge. Customer-relations service coordinator, World Vision 
Teresa Namisangov. District Health Visitor. 
Deodata Namusoke.  Manager, TASO. Masaka 
Dr.Joseph Nnyanzi. District Director of Health Services, Masaka District 
John Kyosimba Onanya, District Promotion Officer. UNDP, Masaka 
Robina Ssentongo. Programme Director, Kitovu Mobile 
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